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Three Essays on Finance and Product Market Competition 
 
Chang Suk Bae, PhD 
 





This dissertation consists of three essays on finance and product market competition. In the 
first essay, I investigate corporate agility, the importance of which is emphasized in both field and 
academic research but understudied empirically. Using the business descriptions provided in firms’ 
10-K filings with the SEC as the main input, I construct a novel measure of corporate agility and 
confirm its validity. Next, I identify various firm flexibility measures as the determinants of 
corporate agility. I next find that product market performance improves with agility in the short-
run and firm survival likelihood increases with agility in the long-run. I also document that the 
benefits of corporate agility are particularly realized when firms face industry-wide common 
shocks such as R&D or M&A waves, or trade barrier reductions and that firms increase agility at 
the expense of short-term profitability. Lastly, I find that agility is a negative predictor of future 
returns even after controlling for other firm risks and characteristics.  
In the second essay, I investigate negative externalities of innovations along supply chains 
by analyzing the effects of customers’ innovations on suppliers’ trade credit provision. I find that 
suppliers extend more trade credit after customers innovate, and the effect is robust to controlling 
for various firm characteristics and industry-specific market conditions and to addressing potential 
endogeneity issues. The effect is mainly driven by the holdup channel as opposed to the demand 
channel or the financing channel. Next, I document that greater technological overlap between 
customers’ innovation and suppliers’ innovations attenuates the effect. Lastly, I find that suppliers 
 v 
adopt more conservative financial policies and innovate more by learning from customer’s 
innovation.  
In the third essay, I investigate industry spillover effects of corporate fraud. Using a sample 
of securities class action lawsuits, I document that fraud mitigates financial constraints of product 
market rivals. This positive intra-industry spillover effect is stronger for firms in more 
concentrated industries or firms with less analyst coverage. In contrast, fraud worsens financial 
constraints for firms in the top-supplier and top-customer industries of the fraud firms. The 
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1.0 First Essay: Corporate Agility, Product Market Performance, and Survival 
1.1 Introduction 
Alchian (1950), a seminal paper, introduces the notion of natural selection into economics 
and concludes that profit maximization is meaningless for firm survival in a world of uncertainty. 
The paper articulates that the natural selection process is the “survival of the fittest.” Building on 
Alchian (1950) and anecdotal evidence from the business world, Lehn (2018) hypothesizes that 
greater corporate agility, defined as a firm’s ability to adapt to environmental changes, is likely to 
increase firms’ survival rates. Further, Lehn (2018) proposes that governance structures that 
expedite the decision-making process (e.g., decentralized governance structures) increase firms’ 
agility. However, the notion of corporate agility and its effect on firm survival or performance 
have been empirically understudied in the literature, presumably due to the lack of a useful measure 
of corporate agility. This paper creates a novel measure of corporate agility using the dynamics of 
business descriptions provided by firms in their annual 10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). More specifically, this paper characterizes and quantifies corporate 
agility in the product market space using the 10-K business descriptions and defines it as a firm’s 
responsiveness to the product encroachment of its rivals. Thereby, this paper investigates how 
variation in agility measured in the product market space affects firms’ product market 
performance and survival rates.  
 The importance of corporate agility is apparent in the results of surveys of field experts. 
According to a survey from the Economist Intelligence Unit, an overwhelming majority of 
executives (88%) cite agility as a key to global success. However, more than one-quarter (27%) of 
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respondents say that their organizations are at a competitive disadvantage because they are not 
agile enough to anticipate fundamental marketplace shifts. In addition, a report from the MIT 
Center for Information Systems Research claims that agile firms grow revenue 37% faster and 
generate 30% higher profits than non-agile companies.  
 An empirical challenge in studying corporate agility is that it is hard to accurately quantify 
agility, and thus, only a few papers empirically investigate its importance. These studies try to 
quantify corporate agility (e.g., Dove, 1995; Dove, 2002; Metes, Gundry, and Bradish, 1998; 
Goranson and Goranson, 1999); however, their metrics are score-based agility indices evaluated 
with subjective attributes regarding the notion of agility. As Lin, Chiu, and Chu (2006) points out, 
the scoring approach is subject to ambiguity and multi-possibility when mapping evaluators’ 
judgements to a number. In contrast, this paper’s measure has the advantage of being completely 
and objectively replicable by researchers using SEC 10-K business descriptions and the procedure 
outlined below. Also, the integrity of the measure is ensured in that firms’ business descriptions 
are required to be representative and accurate by Item 101 in Regulation S-K. It is also dynamic 
in the sense that the inputs to the measure are updated annually and applicable to every firm that 
posts 10-K filings.  
 Previous literature (Sharifi and Zhang, 1999; Yusuf, Sarhardi, and Gunasekaran, 1999; 
Christopher and Towill, 2000; Lin, Chiu, and Chu, 2006) describes several dimensions of business 
environmental changes: consumer demand change, competition change, technological change, and 
change in social factors. More specifically, legal environment changes (i.e., regulation changes), 
cross-border environment changes (e.g., trade barriers), technological environment changes (i.e., 
innovation shocks), market demand changes, or social factor changes (e.g., changes in social 
norms) may be cited as factors promoting firm agility. However, it is challenging to implement 
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tests using these types of environmental changes due to the lack of observability and definability. 
For example, when there is a change in social norms (e.g., campaign for minorities), an agile firm 
may alter or newly provide its own norm or policy (e.g., hire more minorities), which is hard to 
observe or define for researchers. This paper exploits the product market as the laboratory for 
corporate agility research, where agility and performance can be measured in a straightforward, 
observable, and intuitive way. 
 Using business descriptions in 10-Ks that are mandated to be representative and significant 
by item 101 of Regulation S-K of SEC, I first define a firm-year level measure of corporate agility 
in the product market through further developing the framework of Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 
(2014). 1 Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) introduces a measure for competitive threats 
(“product market fluidity”) by gauging the convergence of rival firms’ products to a firm’s current 
products and studies how product market fluidity influences financial policies such as payout and 
cash holdings. To quantify a firm’s ability to adapt to business environment changes following the 
definition of corporate agility (Lehn, 2018), this paper computes a firm’s (bidirectional) 
responsiveness to rival firms’ competitive threats in the product market space using 10-K 
information as in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014).2 In particular, I estimate a firm’s product 
 
1 In addition to item 101 of Regulation S-K, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the company’s CEO (and CFO) 
to certify that the 10-K is both accurate and complete. Thus, I presume business information given in 10-K is a reliable 
and accurate source for a firm’s business. However, I acknowledge the possibility of bias in the corporate agility 
measure to the extent that firms can omit information at their discretion even though they are required to submit a 
complete business description.  
2 Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) investigates how competitive threats (in the product market space) leads to 
firm responses (in the financial space). Whereas, this paper observes firm responses (in the product market space) to 
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convergence to or divergence from rival firms’ products (i.e., product responsiveness) when the 
rivals’ products approach its current product space (i.e., competitive threats increases).3 In other 
words, a firm’s corporate agility is estimated as the sensitivity of its product similarity or 
dissimilarity (to its rivals’ products) to the rivals’ product similarity (to the firm’s products). For 
example, an agile firm will develop newer products (relative to the rivals’ products) when its rivals 
assimilate its current products so as to “escape” the increased competitive threats. Or alternatively, 
an agile firm can also strengthen its current products in order to “resist” rivals’ competitive threats. 
On the contrary, a rigid firm will be irresponsive (i.e., neither converge nor diverge) to its rivals’ 
threats and maintain the status quo.4 If the rigid firm’s agility value is estimated to be zero (as the 
opposite extreme of positive), then high agility scores reflect agile counterparts.  
 
competitive threats (in the product market space) and exploits the responses themselves to construct the agility 
measure.  
3 Business description in 10-Ks narrates not only current products but also various dimensions of business such as 
business strategy (e.g., joint ventures and strategic alliances), investment status (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), 
environment, and risk factors. That is, a product description is a part of the entire business description. However, 
throughout this paper, I proceed with the product description as being identical to the business description to simplify 
the explanation of constructing a new measure of agility.  
4 This paper does not claim that responsiveness (i.e., “escape” or “resist” strategy) is optimal or irresponsiveness (i.e., 
maintaining the status quo) is suboptimal when threats arise. Following the definition of agility (i.e., responsiveness 
to rivals’ threats), a high level of agility is not necessarily ex-ante optimal. Moreover, irresponsiveness (or being rigid) 
may be a firm’s strategy to resist the external threats, but this paper defines “resist” strategy as consolidation of current 
production, differentiating it from irresponsiveness. Section 4.12.5 contrasts outcomes from “escape” and “resist” 
strategies. 
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 I find that the choice between the “escape” and “resist” strategies depends on firms’ 
current status (i.e., cash holdings, profitability, R&D investment, industry concentration) in 
intuitive ways. The results show that firms on average choose the “escape” strategy (rather than 
“resist” strategy or the status quo) under competitive threats in line with the past studies which 
show a positive relationship between product market competition and innovation (Nickell, 1996; 
Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999; Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright, 2004; Schmitz, 2005; 
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenan, 2011) to the extent that innovation enables firms to “escape” the 
competition. In particular, firms with higher cash holdings, lower profitability, higher R&D 
expenditures, in more concentrated industries, or that are younger appear to develop new products 
(i.e., choose “escape” strategy) rather than strengthen current production (i.e., choose “resist” 
strategy) or maintain the status quo when facing rivals’ threats. This suggests that a firm’s agility, 
measured as the sensitivity of its responsive strategies (i.e., either “escape” or “resist” strategy) to 
rivals’ threats, represents actual firm behaviors.  
 A critical part of this study is to confirm the validity of the newly introduced measure of 
corporate agility. First, if my 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure truly represents a dimension of abilities, one might 
expect stability and persistence of the measure. I find that a firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 value is immune to 
different permutation of parameters used in its construction and shows some persistence within 
the same firm over time. Second, industry-level 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is examined to see whether firms in 
industries that are expected to be agile have higher values of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 than those in rigid industries. 
I specifically focus on pharmaceutical firms to exploit two industrywide variations that are likely 
to influence the agility of those firms: the FDA’s new drug approval time and rates. To wit, the 
pharmaceutical firms, which observe a faster drug approval speed and higher approval rates on 
average in their industry, will anticipate the expected time of drug approvals to decrease and the 
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expected approval likelihood to increase, respectively. Hence, a faster drug approval process and 
higher approval rates should increase the introduction of new drug products for a given level of 
the rivals’ threats, and, consequently, increasing firms’ agility measures. Using subsample 
regressions of pharmaceutical firms, I find that drug approval rates (drug approval times) are 
positively (inversely) associated with the agility of pharmaceutical firms.  
 Next, I also examine whether and how firm flexibility variables are related to firm agility. 
To the extent that agility measures the ability to respond to business environment changes, 
“flexible” firms are likely to be endowed with agility. In addition to the conjecture in Lehn (2018) 
that governance or organizational flexibility or characteristics can be relevant for agility, I examine 
whether financial flexibility promotes agility. Using local linear regression (with Gaussian kernel 
functions), I observe that firm flexibility (i.e., financial flexibility, governance flexibility, 
organizational flexibility, operating flexibility) promotes firm agility. However, the results show 
that agility does not necessarily lead to an improvement in financial, governance, organizational, 
or operating flexibility, suggesting that agility is a unique firm characteristic distinct from other 
firm flexibility variables.  
 I find evidence that corporate agility influences product market performance and survival 
likelihood. Even though it is a stylized fact that greater firm agility improves performance, it is an 
empirical question as to the magnitudes and whether or not performance improvements are 
transitory or eventually lead to increased survival rates. For example, even if agility can enhance 
firm performance in the short term, the enhancements may fade away over time. Also, agility can 
increase firm survival likelihood with the improved performance in the short run, but it might also 
take time for the performance improvement leads to higher survival likelihood ultimately. Also, it 
is plausible that agile firms are targeted more frequently by acquirers that seek agility or the strong 
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product market performance of agile firms. I find that agility significantly increases market share 
growth after 1 and 3 years, but the positive effect is not significant after 5 years. Meanwhile, agility 
is not significantly related to survival likelihood (i.e., probability of delisting) for the next year, 
but survival likelihood significantly increases with agility after 3 years. These effects are both 
statistically and economically significant. However, the results could also be driven by possible 
endogeneity of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 due to reverse causality or omitted variables problems. To address these 
concerns, I instrument for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in a two-stage regression framework within the pharmaceutical 
industry, using the FDA’s new drug approval time and rates as instruments. While the instruments 
correlate with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, there is little reason to believe that they have a direct influence on the 
product market performance or survival likelihood other than through their association with a 
firm’s introduction of new drug products, and hence, its agility. On the other hand, lobbying 
activities of the pharmaceutical firms might influence the FDA’s drug approval process, and at the 
same time, correlate with their performance. To further mitigate the confounding effect, the firm-
level lobbying expenditures are controlled for the IV regressions. The IV tests provide evidence 
that the observed results are robust to addressing potential endogeneity concerns. 
Next, I investigate possible channels through which firms attain competitive benefits from 
agility. Agile firms may be able to respond more proactively when facing industry-wide common 
shocks than their rigid counterparts. The results show that agile firms ramp up R&D investments 
(acquisition investments) following industry-wide R&D (M&A) waves more intensively than rigid 
firms. The results also suggest that agile firms have better product market performance than rigid 
firms when facing industry-level tariff reductions. In addition, acquirers’ agility and targets’ agility 
are negatively correlated implying that firms potentially seek agility through acquisitions. Next, I 
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explore costs of attaining agility and find that firms increase agility at the expense of concurrent 
profitability.  
Lastly, I examine stock return predictability of agility. If failure to build up agility leads to 
loss in market share, and eventually, likelihood of firm discontinuation, then agility should be 
negatively associated with priced distress risk. Specifically, agile firms are expected to earn lower 
stock returns than rigid firms. Besides, firms that cannot maintain agility will find it difficult to 
deal with uncertainty which arrives randomly, such as competition or technology shocks, and 
hence, investors raise the required rate of return. Meanwhile, to the extent that agility carries firm 
innovativeness, agile firms bear innovation risk which is priced and earn higher returns. Fama-
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression results suggest that agility is a negative predictor of 
future returns even after controlling for firm risk and characteristics. 
 This paper introduces a novel measure of corporate agility, which has been understudied 
in the previous literature. I believe this new measure can be a meaningful proxy for a hard to 
measure firm characteristic. In addition, this paper contributes to the literature on the determinants 
of product market performance and firm survival. My empirical results are consistent with the 
previous literature, which show a positive relationship between product market competition and 
innovation (Nickell, 1996; Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999; Carlin, Schaffer, and 
Seabright, 2004; Schmitz, 2005; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenan, 2011) to the extent that product 
differentiation is achieved from innovation. However, there are also studies in the literature that 
finds a negative relationship between those (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Hashmi, 2013). The mixed 
results in this literature potentially stem from the differences among the past studies in terms of 
data source, period, and definition of competition and innovation (Hashmi, 2013). However, my 
findings suggest that the relation between competitive threats and firm strategies depends on their 
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current status (e.g., cash holdings, age, market share growth, R&D expenditures, industry 
concentration) which might be a reason why the sensitivity of innovation to product market 
competition varies in the literature.  
My results are also consistent with the literature of cash holdings (e.g., Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1990; MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007) by showing 
that firms with higher cash holdings appear to develop new products when facing rivals’ threats. 
Specifically, the long-purse theory explains that predatory threats from rivals induce firms to 
increase financial flexibility. This paper’s results add to the literature by suggesting that the 
enhanced financial flexibility is indeed useful in escaping the rivals’ threats by enabling firms to 
develop new products.  
This paper is also related to the literature on product life cycles, which concludes that firms 
need to adjust their product strategies (i.e., introduce new products or withdraw old ones) as firm 
growth critically relies upon either introducing fresh product lines or developing current ones 
(Levitt, 1965; Argente, Lee, and Moreira, 2020). This paper also contributes to this literature by 
documenting that the benefits, in terms of firm value or sales growth attendant to current product 
development or new product introduction, are larger when threats from rivals are present. 
1.2  What is Agility? 
1.2.1  Definition of Agility 
Alchian (1950) develops the notion of natural selection in the economics context and 
explains that the selection process is the survival of the fittest rather than profit-maximized ones. 
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Along with Alchian (1950)’s view and anecdotal evidence in the business world, Lehn (2018) 
defines corporate agility as a firm’s ability to adapt to environment changes.  
 This paper especially exploits the product market as the laboratory, and, computes a firm’s 
(bidirectional) responsiveness to rival firms’ competitive threats in the product market space using 
10-K information as in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). In particular, I estimate a firm’s 
product convergence to or divergence from rival firm’s products (i.e., product responsiveness) 
when the rivals’ products approach its current product space (i.e., competitive threats increases). 
Put differently, a firm’s corporate agility is estimated as the sensitivity of its product similarity or 
dissimilarity (to its rivals’ products) to the rivals’ product similarity (to the firm’s products). 
An agile firm will develop newer products (relative to rivals’ products) when its rivals 
assimilate its current products so as to “escape” the increased competitive threats. Or alternatively, 
an agile firm can also strengthen its current production and focus more on the current set of 
products in order to “resist” rivals’ competitive threat. On the contrary, a rigid firm will be 
insensitive (i.e., neither converge nor divergence) to its rivals’ threats and maintain the status quo. 
If then, the rigid firm’s agility is estimated to be zero as the opposite extreme of positive, high 
agility values of agile counterparts. Thereby, this paper suggests a dynamic and objective measure 
of agility in the sense that it is updated annually and is applicable to every firm which posts 10-K 
filings relative to score-based measures suggested in the previous literature (e.g., Dove, 1995; 
Dove, 2001; Metes, Gundry, and Bradish, 1998; Goranson and Goranson, 1999).  
The notion of agility as a dimension of firm abilities should be closely related to existing 
firm abilities or characteristics but is an irreplaceable one to the best of my knowledge. More 
specifically, agility is likely to be in close connection with firm flexibility in that agility measures 
ability to respond to business environment changes. For instance, financial flexibility or slack can 
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be related to agility because it is an ability to use internal cash or access the capital market 
immediately when an unexpected financial shortfall occurs (e.g., when unexpected investment 
opportunities arise). Financially flexible firms may be able to cope with other environment changes 
as well as the change in their financial position in a more agile way. For example, a financially 
flexible firm, with its financial strength, can modify its product market strategy quickly when there 
are competitive threats from rivals. Financial flexibility can promote agility in such a way. While 
this may be true, agility is a broader concept than financial flexibility in the sense that it is an 
ability to respond to various environment changes, including a firm’s own cash shortfall or 
investment opportunities set change. Besides, the responses to the environmental changes are not 
limited to the use of internally hoarded cash or additional capital raising.  
Likewise, flexibility in governance (e.g., rapid adjustment of executive compensation or 
turnover of executive members as a response to the firm performance declines or wrongdoings) or 
organizational flexibility (e.g., ability to reshape the structure of organization) may be related to 
agility following Lehn (2018)’s proposition that decentralized firms can promote agility with their 
low knowledge transfer costs, but is a narrower concept compared to agility. Also, operating 
flexibility (e.g., ability to shift from the current production or operation structure to new ones) may 
be related to agility.  
Alternatively, financial flexibility, governance flexibility, organizational flexibility, or 
operating flexibility may be a substitute rather than a complement of agility. For example, 
financially flexible firms might be able to move agilely under competitive threats with their 
financial strength, or, they might not pursue agility since they can recover the future losses from 
the rivals’ threats with their ease of financing. In any case, agility is a distinct (and probably more 
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extensive) firm ability measure even if it should be closely related to existing ones. Section 4.3. 
explores these possibilities in more detail with empirical results.  
1.2.2 Measuring Agility 
I first start with decomposing the change in the similarity of business description between 
the firm and all the other firms. Following the framework of Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) 
(but with different notation), 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 is the number of all unique words used in the business descriptions 
of all firms (i.e., firms in Compustat-CRSP universe) in year t. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the firm-level word vector 
in 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡-dimension where j-th component equals the number of times that j-th word (when ordered) 
is used in firm i’s description. 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  is the 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 -dimension dictionary vector whose j-th component 
equals the number of times that j-th word is used in the business descriptions of all firms. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 for any firm i and year t are normalized by their sum so that each vector forms the sum of 1 in 
order to keep each word’s importance (or weight) relative to the other words. Then, 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
= 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) + (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1)  ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1                                                             (1)
= 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)�������������
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹
+ (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)�������������������
𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹




 The first line of the equation, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1, represents the total change in the 
similarity between firm i’s description and overall firm’s description from t-1 to t (when assuming 
that both terms are scaled through normalizing each vector before the inner products). After 
decomposition, the total change in similarity can be represented as (1) where the first term, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙
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(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1), corresponds to the Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014)  product market fluidity 
measure and the second term, (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1, represents the similarity between the word 
change of firm i and current word set of overall firms. 5 With additional decomposition, the product 
market fluidity term can be further split into two inner product terms as (2) shows. In sum, the last 
line of the equation shows that the first line can be decomposed into three inner products of vectors. 
The following explains the three terms.   
𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏 ∙ (𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨 − 𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏): This first term is defined as “External Fluidity”, which measures 
firm i’s exposure to rivals’ word set change. In firm i’s perspective, this exposure comes from the 
rivals’ movements, not its own movement. This differs from the original product market fluidity 
measure in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). In this paper’s notation, the original Hoberg, 
Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) fluidity can be represented as  𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ |𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1| (before vector 
normalization). In this paper, I use the external fluidity as a revised version of the original fluidity 
measure to serve the purpose of measuring agility of this paper. There are four reasons for revising 
the original fluidity measure. First, the absolute value function on 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 doesn’t allow the 
measure to distinguish between the decrease and increase in word usage of rivals.6 Second, aside 
 
5 Technically speaking, the first term, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1), is slightly different from the Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 
(2014)’s measure in that there is no absolute function on the second vector, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 , and the vectors are not 
normalized before the inner product. However, both commonly compute an inner product with the same ingredient 
vectors, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  and 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1  in the purpose of gauging a firm’s word exposure to that of surrounding firms. The 
difference is explained in the next paragraph. 
6 It is arguable that word decrease of a firm’s rivals (i.e., a negative component of 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)  may imply an increase 
in threats on that word if the rivals move to newer or different products than the firm’s products. However, both 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  
and 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 are normalized in a way that a negative component of 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 is necessarily compromised by some other 
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from the absolute value function, not only does the measure gauge the product market threat from 
rivals, but it might also contain contemporaneous change in the economic environment; more 
specifically, it could be the case that firm i have changed its word set from 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 to 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 where the 
change 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 comes from the economy-wide change (e.g., technology or innovation shock 
to industries) which also shapes the rivals’ change, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 , contemporaneously. However, 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)  only represents the similarity between firm i’s word choice at t (which is 
potentially an outcome of the economy-wide change as explained) and the change in rivals’ words 
from t-1 to t. To the extent that the similarity between 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 is created by 
the economy-wide change that is unrelated to the product market threat motive of firm i and its 
rivals, the original fluidity measure plausibly over- or underestimates the actual product market 
threat. This paper, thus, filters out this coincidental similarity (i.e., (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) in 
(2)) from the original fluidity measure (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) in (1)) to isolate the actual product 
market threat (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) in (2)). Third, when competing rivals choose their word 
set at t, the firm i’s word information that is available and observable to rivals is 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1, not 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. 
Therefore, it can be deemed that 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) is a more realistic measure of product market 
threat measure than 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) . Finally, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)  measures the similarity 
coming from rivals’ move with holding the word set of firm i chosen at t-1 fixed, and thus, this 
new fluidity is, relative to the original fluidity measure, more free from endogeneity issue when 
 
positive component of 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1, and which represents the increased threat on that new product. If then, the absolute 
value function can magnify the actual size of threats (without changing the direction of threats). Given that the actual 
size is important in measuring agility which is constructed in a way that how much magnitude of 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) is 
comparable to the magnitude of (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1, I use raw difference between 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  and 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1. 
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being used in corporate finance research. The endogeneity issue arises from the fact that an 
individual firm endogenously chooses its word description, and at the same time, corporate 
policies.7 
(𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 −𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏) ∙ (𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨 − 𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏): This second term represents the covariance between firm 
i’s word change and that of rivals (before normalizing vectors). Hence, this term can proxy for the 
degree that firm i synchronizes its word set from 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 to 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as rival firms change their word 
from 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 to 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡. As explained above, this covariance can measure contemporaneous similarity in 
word set of firm i and rivals resulting from the economy-wide change, which is commonly faced 
by firm i and rivals but not related to threat motive of either side. At t, rivals can only observe firm 
i’s words disclosed at t-1 (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) but not its words disclosed at t (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), and vice versa. Hence, it is 
likely that rivals and firm i “coincidentally” synchronize their words following the trend which 
reflects the current economic environment, rather than that firm i or rivals threat or imitate each 
other. Therefore, I define this term as “Trend Sensitivity” (of firm i).  
(𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 −𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏) ∙ 𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨−𝟏𝟏 : The last term represents the similarity between firm i’s word 
change and the current word set of rivals. Unlike the external fluidity, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) , 
measures the threat on firm i created from rivals, this last term measures the pressure on rivals 
created from firm i. At the same time, this can be interpreted as firm i’s attempt at t to imitate or 
assimilate the rivals’ products disclosed at t-1. Hence, I call this term “Internal Fluidity” (of firm 
 
7 In order to ensure that the ingredient vectors and revised fluidity measure are correctly computed in this paper, I 
check correlations with the original fluidity measure provided in the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library 
(http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/). To wit, both 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ |𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1|  and |𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1)|  are 
significantly correlated with the original fluidity measure with positive correlations of 13.4% and 13.5%, respectively. 
I am grateful to Professors Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for making this data available.  
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i) since it comes from firm i’s movement, not rivals’ movements. Note that this measures the 
voluntary action of firm i to imitate the current product of rivals, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1, not to react to the economy-
wide change or trend which is captured by 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1.  
In this framework, I construct agility measure by calculating the absolute value of 
sensitivity of internal fluidity (at year t+1) to external fluidity (at year t). More specifically, I run 
firm-by-firm regression  
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡              (3) 
 
with 5-year consecutive observations of each firm i where8 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 ≡ (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1) 
Hence, |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1| estimates how an increase in rivals’ threat (i.e., increase in external fluidity) 
translates into firm i’s product assimilation (i.e., increase in internal fluidity) or product deviation 
(i.e., decrease in internal fluidity) relative to rivals’ products. Thus, the larger the |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1| is, the 
 
8 The 5-year requirement only applies to the observations used in the regressions of (3). For instance, the 𝛽𝛽 of a firm 
that has observations only for the period of 2006-2010 can be estimated only for the year 2010, not the rest of the 
period. Next, those with available 𝛽𝛽 values are only included in the sample used throughout this paper.  
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more agilely firm i reacts to the competitive threats. Finally, I define 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 as the logarithm 
of |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1| since the distribution of raw |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1| ’s is highly right-skewed with skewness of 5.66.9  
1.3 Data Description 
The paper’s data collection process and sample screening are based on that of Hoberg and 
Phillips (2016) and Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). The two papers use a web-crawling 
algorithm to extract business descriptions in 10-Ks of Compustat-CRSP firms. Most 10-Ks provide 
a business description in their Item 1 or Item 1A.  
 Firms are excluded from the initial Compustat-CRSP sample if (i) they are financials (SIC 
code 6000-6999) or utilities (SIC code 4900-4949), (ii) they have a book value of equity less than 
$250,000, or (iii) they have asset value less than $500,000. After the screening procedure, firm-
year observations with the fiscal year in 1997-2018 are included because the electronic filing on 
Edgar has been required since 1997. The final sample period is from 2003-2018 since the agility 
measure construction (i.e., the estimation model in (3)) requires 5 years of consecutive 
 
9 The main results remain qualitatively similar (or become more statistically significant in some specifications) when 
raw |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1|’s are used as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡+1 values. Alternatively, the results are robust when extreme values (i.e., top 1% 
and bottom 1%) of |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1| are censored from the sample, or, |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1|’s are winsorized at the 1% level before the 
logarithm transformation. On the other hand, the empirical distribution of t-statistics for 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 has a kurtosis of 4.031 
and skewness of 0.018 even when extreme values (i.e., top 1% and bottom 1%) are censored from the distribution, 
indicating that the t-statistics have fat-tailed distribution on both sides and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1’s are significant sufficiently often.  
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observations of both 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 and 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡. As a result, the final sample contains Compustat-CRSP firms that 
satisfy the above screening condition and whose agility can be estimated.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for sample firms and Compustat-CRSP 
firms in the same period as the sample. The Compustat-CRSP firm-year observations meet the 
same screening condition as the sample firms but whose agility cannot be measured through the 
model (3) estimation due to the insufficiency of 10-K information. The sample characteristics 
suggest that firms whose 10-K information is available and hence agility can be estimated are 
larger, more profitable, and more established than other Compust-CRSP firms. Panel B of Table 1 
compares the summary statistics between different quintile groups of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. The last column 
shows the differences in firm variables between Q1 (i.e., lowest 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) firms and Q5 (i.e., 
highest 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) firms. The difference between Q1 and Q5 is statistically significant but is smaller 
in magnitude than the difference between the sample and Compustat-CRSP reported in the last 
column of Panel A.  This implies that firms in the sample are quite homogeneous in those firm 
characteristics even if they have distinct 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values. In addition, there is a weak monotonic 
relation with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile rank of 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴), 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
All those variables are controlled in this paper’s tests to isolate the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
 To define an entire dictionary (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) each year, I follow Hoberg and Phillips (2010) where 
two versions of dictionaries (i.e., main dictionary vs. local dictionary) are defined. A main 
dictionary discards words that appear in more than a certain threshold of all business descriptions 
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in the same year. 10 A local dictionary is constructed based on the size of a local clustering 
coefficient of each word in main dictionary. More specifically, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) requires 
a word in the main dictionary to have a sufficiently high local clustering coefficient in order to be 
included in the local dictionary. The higher a word’s local clustering coefficient is, the more likely 
that the word is used in the “language” among firms that report similar business descriptions (i.e., 
firms which are likely to be rivals to each other).  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 Panel A shows that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 varies quite much between observations with a mean 
and standard deviation of -1.191198 and 1.281941, respectively, even if 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are comparable to each other in terms of mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum. The measures in Table 2 Panel A are computed using a 5% threshold and local 
dictionary, which will be used throughout this paper. In Table 2 Panel B, permutations on the 
threshold level and dictionary version are allowed (e.g., 25% local clustering threshold with the 
main dictionary), and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  measure does not vary much across permutations (even if the 
relative magnitude of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  varies). Thereby, the results 
strengthen the reliability of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 as a firm characteristic. 
 Even though it is intuitive that agile firms choose either product assimilation or product 
deviation as compared to rigid firms which are irresponsive (i.e., neither product assimilation nor 
 
10 Hoberg and Phillips (2010) uses a 5% threshold, and Hoberg and Phillips (2016) uses 10%, 25%, and 100% 
thresholds.  
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deviation) to its rivals’ threats and maintain the status quo, it is worth investigating how firms on 
average choose between product assimilation and product deviation. Also, the choice between 
product assimilation and product deviation may depend on firms’ current status (e.g., cash 
holdings, profitability, R&D investment, industry concentration, age). Therefore, I run pooled OLS 
regression of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  on 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , and interactions between 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and firm status variables. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 shows that firms on average choose product deviation, as shown by the negative 
coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, which is consistent with the negative mean values of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 in 
Table 2. These results are in line with the previous evidence of a positive relationship between 
product market competition and innovation (Nickell, 1996; Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 
1999; Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright, 2004; Schmitz, 2005; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenan, 
2011) to the extent that product deviation can be achieved from innovation. In addition, the 
coefficients of interaction variables indicate that the degree of product deviation is even greater 
for firms with higher cash holdings, lower profitability, higher R&D expenditures, in higher 
industry concentration, or that are younger when facing rivals’ threats.11 These findings suggest 
 
11 It is worth pointing out that I do not argue that the observed firms’ behaviors under rivals’ threats are ex-ante 
optimal. However, the observed behaviors seem consistent with what can be expected intuitively. For example, cash-
rich firms have more capacities to develop new products than cash-poor firms when facing rivals’ threats. They could 
– rather than should – choose to develop new products as compared to their cash-poor counterparts. Also, firms that 
have invested more in R&D are able to introduce new products, whereas those who have invested less in R&D cannot.  
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that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, measured as the sensitivity of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 to 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, potentially 
represents firm behaviors which are expected intuitively, and, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  and 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are fine ingredients of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
If 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure truly represents a dimension of abilities, one might expect that there is some 
level of persistence in the measure within a firm over time. If, for example, a firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 level 
shows that it is very agile in a year and become very rigid in the next year, and again become very 
agile in the following year, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure has a limitation in capturing an ability of a firm. For 
this diagnostic, I follow the persistence test of Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) where a firm’s 
ability to translate its past R&D into future sales is measured. Specifically, I check how many 
firms in an 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile group remain in the same 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quantile group over time (i.e., 1, 
2,.., 5 years after the quintile formation).  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Table 4 Panel A shows that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  is quite persistent in each quintile, and the two 
extreme quintiles (i.e., quintiles 1 and 5) have higher persistence than the intermediate quintiles, 
especially in the early years. For example, “high” agility group (i.e., quintile 5) firms remain in 
the same quintile more than 50% of the time in the following year and 22.5% of the time after 5 
years. I then check migration rates of quintiles to different quintiles 1 year after the quintile 
formation to see how easily and frequently firms move from an agility quintile to another in the 
following year. Table 4 Panel B reports the transition matrix where each row represents migration 
rates of each quintile to other quintiles. The results show that the migration rate monotonically 
decreases as firms move further away from the current level of agility (i.e., firms remain in the 
 22 
neighborhood quintiles). For example, high agility group (quintile 5) firms stay in the same quintile 
55.8% of the time and move to low agility group (quintile 1) only 7.1% of the time.12  
However, it is also plausible that the persistence rates of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 shown in Table 4 might be 
merely side effects of the structure of the sample panel or construction process of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 where 
the observations used in estimating 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in consecutive years overlap within a firm. To relieve 
the concern, I also simulate the sample using the same parameters (i.e., the same firms in the same 
sample period) but with different values of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 to create 
a “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  measure. More specifically, I run 1,000 times of simulations using 
“fictitious” 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, which are normal variables with mean 
and standard deviation being the same as those of “true” 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  and 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, respectively. I then check the persistence of the fictitious 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for each 
simulation using quintile groups in Appendix A Table A2. When comparing this simulated 
persistence to the persistence of actual data, most of the figures in Panel A of Table 4 are lower in 
magnitude than those in Panel A of Appendix A Table A2. In addition, the figures in the same cell 
position are significantly different between Panel A of Table 4 and Panel A of Appendix A Table 
A2 at the 99% confidence level. Also, Panel B of Appendix A Table A2 shows that the simulated 
firms migrate more often to other 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles than the actual sample firms, and the migration 
 
12 Firm persistence of agility can be deliberately increased by lengthening the estimation window since a longer 
window uses more overlapping observations within a firm and thus leads to more constant estimates within a firm. At 
a glance, within-firm (i.e., within-GVKEY) variation decreases from 63.3% of the total variation to 45.5% of the total 
variation as the estimation window changes from 5 years to 10 years. The within-firm variation of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (63.3%) is 
comparable to that of other firm variables; it falls between that of 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 (3.0%) and that of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 (77.9%), which show 
the minimum and maximum variation among firm variables, respectively. Section 4.9.1 explores further details. 
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rates are significantly different between Panel B of Table 4 and Panel B of Appendix A Table A2 
at the 99% confidence level. Overall, the results support that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is persistent over time and 
the observed persistence is not the side effects of the sample structure or construction process of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Firm-level Agility 
Table 5 Column 1 and 2 report examples of top 30 agile firms for the 1st half sample period 
(the year 2003-2010) and 2nd half sample period (the year 2011-2018), respectively. For the first 
(second) 8-year period, each firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010]  (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018] ) is computed as the 
average of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 only when the firm has at least 4 non-missing 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values in the period.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 9 of 30 firms continuously show a high level of agility in both periods. For example, 
CELGENE CORP, a pharmaceutical firm, ranked 14th and 7th in the first and second periods, 
respectively. According to an article from McKinsey & Company, the firm has invested both in-
house R&D and “search and development” (i.e., R&D partnerships and investment or acquisitions 
of firms in the earliest stages of development), and which led the firm as one of the most successful 
players in the pharmaceutical industry where innovation environment is increasingly varied and 
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fast-moving.13 CELGENE CORP’s recent acquisition of JUNO THERAPEUTICS in 2018 reflects 
its high agility; CELGENE CORP acquired the firm as a response to rivals seeking to sell generic 
versions of its major product (“Revlimid”), the patent of which was to be expired in a few years. 
JUNO THERAPEUTICS was one of a handful of U.S. firms developing CAR-T therapy that was 
unique in the blood cancer market, and field analysts expected that CELGENE CORP could add 
to its existing drug pipeline and diversify the product portfolio through the acquisition.14  
 Table 5 Column 3 demonstrates the top 30 firms with respect to the increase in agility 
from the 1st period to the 2nd period (i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018] - 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010]). Among those, 
PEPSICO INC (ranked 21st of 251) is well known for its diversification strategies. The company 
started to produce a wide range of products in the consumer packaged goods industry as well as 
the beverage industry following the decline in consumption of carbonated soda drinks and 
increased pressure from competitors such as DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, RED BULL 
GMBH, and NESTLÉ in the beverage industry. On the other hand, the biggest competitor, COCA-
COLA CO (ranked 100th of 251 firms), adopted a different strategy even though it had experienced 
 
13  “R&D in the ‘age of agile’”. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-
insights/r-and-d-in-the-age-of-agile#  
14  “Celgene in Talks to Buy Juno Therapeutics”. https://www.wsj.com/articles/celgene-in-talks-to-buy-juno-
therapeutics-1516140153 
“Celgene diversifies portfolio with purchase of Juno Therapeutics”.  
https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/01/22/celgene-buys-juno-therapeutics.html  
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the same pressure as PEPSICO INC; 15 COCA-COLA CO focused more on carbonated soda drink 
products, or, diversified product portfolio only within the beverage industry.16 Consistent with the 
evidence, PEPSICO INC ranks higher than COCA-COLA CO with respect to the increase in 
agility in the sample used in Table 5.  
1.4.2 Industry-level Agility 
 To provide a further diagnostic of  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, I examine between-industry differences of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 with time series average values of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 within the sample period.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Table 6 shows that retail trade industries (SIC 2-digit code 53, 56, 57, 58) rank highest in 
the list, followed by business or management services industries (73, 87). On the other hand, 
manufacturing industries (20-39) show dispersion in agility; low-Q manufacturing industries (27, 
30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38) rank low, but high-Q manufacturing industries (20, 23, 25, 28, 36) rank 
 
15 The values of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  of Pepsico inc and Coca-cola co are significantly positively correlated with 
correlation of 60.6% and have similar mean (-6.15E-6 vs. -8.32E-6) over the sample period, implying that the two 
firms experience similar magnitude and direction of competitive threats.  
16 Appendix A Figure A1 presents the word cloud of PEPSICO INC, COCA-COLA CO, and their competitors as an 
illustration. As the competitors increase the usage of “beverage” and “drink” from year 2003 to 2010, PEPSICO INC 
increases the usage of “food” and “snack” from year 2011 to 2018. On the other hand, COCA-COLA CO’s  usage of 
“beverage” stays similar from year 2011 to 2018.  
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high. Also, IT industries (36, 73) rank fairly high, but not in top, reflecting the difference between 
agility and innovativeness. In addition, asset heavy industries (13, 16) and public service industry 
(49) rank low, illustrating that firms that cannot operate agilely due to their asset structure or 
regulation have a low level of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.  
 Next, I delve into industry-level agility to see whether firms in industries that are expected 
to be agile have higher values of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 than those in rigid industries in time-series with a more 
granular level (SIC 3-digit). For this purpose, I first compare four industries that are expected to 
have substantial differences in product characteristics, operation, asset structure, and therefore, 
agility between each other: software (SIC 3-digit code 737), pharmaceutical (SIC 3-digit code 
283), and oil and gas (SIC 2-digit code 29 and 3-digit code 131) industries. The average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
of firms in each of the industries is shown in Fig 1A. Average values are reported from 2007-2018 
since there are only limited number of firms (less than 10 firms) before 2007 in the oil and gas 
industry. 
 
[Insert Fig 1 here] 
 
 Fig 1A demonstrates that industry averages fluctuate over time, but there is some 
persistence within each industry in terms of agility. On average, the software and pharmaceutical 
firms have higher agility than the metal industry and oil and gas industry, which is presumably due 
to the fact that metal firms and oil and gas firms have asset-heavy business and difficulties in rapid 
product development (e.g., development of new oil well) and metal firms have lower growth 
opportunities. On the other hand, the software and pharmaceutical industries seem to have similar 
agility levels on average, but the pharmaceutical firms have more volatile agility than the software 
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firms. It could be the case that the pharmaceutical firms are more regulated (by the FDA) than the 
software firms even though both firms strive for new products (as implied by their high R&D 
expenditures).  
 In the meantime, the oil and gas industry has a noticeable pattern in the 2008-2010 period. 
After the decline of agility in 2008, the agility level of oil and gas firms had soared for two years. 
My interpretation is that this pattern is related to the US shale gas and oil boom led by a new 
drilling technology called fracking, and, firms’ response to the boom. The shale boom changed the 
competitiveness of the industry, and the firms reacted to the changed environment agilely. For 
example, Exxon Mobil Corp., one of the industry leaders, initiated an acquisition of XTO Energy 
Inc. to resist the increased competition of the industry. In fact, Exxon Mobil Corp. expressed its 
concern about the increased competitive threats as identified in its 2009 10-K filing when 
compared to the 2008 10-K filing. The business description of its 2009 filing expresses “… The 
energy and petrochemical industries are highly competitive. There is competition within the 
industries and also with other industries in supplying the energy, fuel and chemical needs of both 
industrial   and individual consumers. The Corporation competes with other firms in the sale or 
purchase of needed goods and services in many national and international markets and employs 
all methods of competition which are lawful and appropriate for such purposes…”17 Exxon Mobil 
Corp.’s acquisition of XTO Energy Inc. (which is specialized in the production of shale oil and 
gas) seems to be the breakthrough for the increased rivals’ competition. In fact, a news article 
depicts,  
 
17 In fact, the firm used the words “competition”, “competitive”, or “compete” in Item 1 or Item 1A much more than 
before in 2009 (15 times vs. 6 times). 
 28 
“…Exxon made its big move into the shale game in 2010, when it paid $36 billion for Fort 
Worth’s XTO Energy, a leader in the Barnett Shale fracking boom…”18 
 Next, in Fig 1B, 1C, and 1D, I contrast the agility of industries in various dimensions apart 
from the usual SIC classifications: household items vs. non-household items; less regulated vs. 
more regulated; high-Q vs. low-Q industries. Fig 1B shows that the industries supplying 
households with items, such as food and clothes, are more agile than the industries producing non-
household items, such as raw materials or industry equipment, which require standardized process. 
Fig 1C demonstrates lower average agility values of firms in more regulated industries, such as 
natural resources, public utilities, transportation, healthcare, and tobacco, than less regulated 
industry firms (i.e., firms producing nonessentials or under less safety precaution in the process of 
production or consumption). However, more regulated industries have more volatile agility, 
implying that corporate agility can be affected by industry regulations. Lastly, Fig 1D compares 
agility between high-Q industries (i.e., SIC-3 industries with market-to-book ratio above the 
median) and low-Q industries (i.e., SIC-3 industries with market-to-book ratio below the median). 
Firms in industries with more growth opportunities have higher agility than those not even though 
there is not a big gap.  
1.4.3 Validation of Agility Measure: Investigation of Pharmaceutical Industry 
 A critical part of this study is to confirm the validity of the newly introduced measure of 




firm agility, I provide further evidence to confirm the validity of the measure by specifically 
concentrating on the pharmaceutical industry that is highly regulated and governed by a federal 
agency, the FDA. Given that the FDA has an influential control over pharmaceutical firms in 
developing new products or expanding existing products as sole authority, their agility level is 
likely to be subject to and influenced by the FDA’s decisions. Whereas, it is not clear which 
government agencies or entities potentially affect the agility level of firms in other industries.  
 There are two exploitable industrywide variations, which arguably are correlated with the 
agility of those firms: the FDA’s new drug approval time and rates. To wit, the pharmaceutical 
firms, which observe a faster drug approval speed and higher approval rates on average in their 
industry, will anticipate the expected time of drug approvals to decrease and the expected approval 
likelihood to increase, respectively. Hence, faster drug approval speed and higher approval rates 
can increase the introduction of new drug products (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) from pharmaceutical 
firms for a given level of the rivals’ threats (i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), and consequently, improve 
their agility.19  
 As a proxy for approval times, I use New Drug Application (NDA) and Biologic License 
Application (BLA) approval times for the period from 1993-2015.20 More specifically, the median 
total approval times of standard or priority drugs are used. As for the proxy of approval rates, I use 
approval rates for CDER NME NDA and BLA applications.21 
 
19 However, to the extent that the FDA’s drug approval speed and rates affect the 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 as much as 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in the same direction, we would expect a lower correlation between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and drug approval 





[Insert Fig 2 here] 
 
 Fig 2A (2B) shows the time trends of the industry average of agility and the approval rates 
(inverse of approval times).22 Particularly, the industry agility and approval rates appear to have 
similar time trends in that both have an oscillating downward (upward) trend in the first (second) 
half of the period. On the other hand, both the industry agility and inverse of approval times, by 
and large, have an upward trend, but the industry agility seems to have a higher time-series 
variation. For more quantitative analysis, I also run firm-level OLS regressions using the 
pharmaceutical industry firms.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 Table 7 shows that drug approval rates (drug approval time) is positively (inversely) 
associated with the agility supporting that higher approval rates (faster drug approval) can induce 
pharmaceutical firms to improve agility. Column 2 shows that the relation holds even after 
controlling for firm characteristics.23 In addition, Column 3 demonstrates qualitatively similar 
 
22 Approval rates and times are separately plotted in Fig 2A and 2B, respectively, since they are on different scales 
and have differential time-series variations.  
23 The firm characteristics include cash, leverage, net leverage, board size, board independence, CEO duality, firm 
age, firm size, number of business segments, and firm HHI index that are more closely investigated as determinants 
of firm agility in the next section. However, long-term bond ratings (which is also examined in the next section) is not 
included as a firm control because most pharmaceutical firms (87%) of the sample do not have long-term bond ratings.  
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results when the median total approval times of standard drugs is used as the alternative proxy for 
drug approval time. Overall, the results support the validity of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure in the subsample 
of the pharmaceutical industry.  
1.4.4 Determinants of Agility 
 Having established that industry characteristics can shape firm agility in the previous 
sections, I also examine what and how firm characteristics are related to firm agility in this section. 
To the extent that agility measures the ability to respond to business environment changes, 
“flexible” firms are likely to be endowed with agility. As an illustration, Lehn (2018) proposes 
that decentralized firms can promote agility with their low knowledge transfer costs (i.e., costs 
occurred when transferring knowledge from those with relevant knowledge to those with decision 
rights within a firm), which are especially valuable in the periods of rapid changes in the 
environment. In the same vein, organizationally flexible firms, such as firms with diverse business 
segments, are likely to be decentralized and thus agile. On the other hand, Lehn (2018) also points 
out that certain governance structures such as board independence and board size can be related to 
agility.  
 In addition to Lehn (2018)’s idea that organizational or governance characteristics can be 
relevant with agility, I conjecture that financial flexibility and operating flexibility can also 
promote agility by responding in a timely manner to changes in the environment. Once the 
surrounding environment changes, investment opportunities or cash flows are also influenced, and 
financial flexibility can protect firms from those unexpected changes. For instance, financially 
flexible firms can modify their product market strategies (i.e., choose either product assimilation 
or product deviation) with their financial strength in terms of speed and cost of external financing 
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when the degree of competitive threats in the product market increases. Also, to the extent that 
product assimilation or differentiation requires shifts in operation, firms with high operating 
flexibility can react more easily to the increased competitive threats, and therefore, likely have 
high agility.  
 In the meantime, the countervailing effect can arise when firm flexibility is a substitute for 
agility. For example, financially flexible firms may not behave agilely under the consideration that 
they can maintain their firm values with their financial flexibility when their lack of agility comes 
into adverse effect (e.g., decline in cash flows). Alternatively, even though financial flexibility 
enhances agility overall, firms in some specific spectrum of financial flexibility might have 
different marginal benefits of agility. It is, therefore, an empirical question whether firm flexibility 
always promotes agility.  
 In accordance with the conjectures that firm flexibility can increase agility, I specifically 
categorize potentially relevant firm variables into three sets (i.e., financial flexibility, governance 
flexibility, organizational flexibility, and operating flexibility) and examine how they are related 
to agility. I use various proxies for each flexibility category since flexibility is usually measured 
in alternative ways in the past studies: 
- Financial flexibility: cash-to-asset, leverage, net leverage, long-term bond ratings 
- Governance flexibility: board size, board independence, CEO duality, short-term 
investors (%) 
- Organizational flexibility: firm age, firm size, number of business segments, firm HHI 
index 
- Operating flexibility: capital-to-labor (K/L), CAPEX-to-asset, asset redeployability, 
geographic dispersion 
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 Note that net leverage is included to isolate the effect of debt from that of cash that is 
commonly regarded as “negative” debt. Short-term investors (%) is defined as the proportion of 
shares outstanding held by transient investors and serves as a governance flexibility measure 
considering that firms with short-term investors may have nimble decision-making process since 
they cater to the investors and are pressured by exit threats of the investors (Giannetti and Yu, 
2020).24 In addition, firm HHI index (i.e., sales concentration of business segments within a firm) 
is included as well as the number of business segments since more diversified firms (i.e., low firm 
HHI index) are likely to be organizationally flexible. Capital-to-labor (K/L) ratio is defined as the 
logarithm of fixed capital stock (net property, plant, and equipment) per employee, which is used 
in Mackay and Phillips (2005) and Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007). Firms with capital-
intensive technology (i.e., high K/L) are less likely to be flexible in their operation with their high 
fixed capital stock and high fixed cost. On the contrary, firms with labor-intensive technology (i.e., 
low K/L) can operate flexibly with their high labor cost that is more variable. Similarly, firms with 
high tangibility (i.e., high CAPEX-to-asset ratio) may find it hard to change their current 
production line due to the irreversibility of investments on physical assets. Thus, high CAPEX-to-
asset can lead to low operating flexibility; in the meantime, high CAPEX-to-asset ratio also relates 
to high asset pledgeability or redeployability, which can promote financial flexibility (Almeida 
and Campello, 2007). In this sense, Kim and Kung (2017)’s asset redeployability measure is also 
used to isolate the effect of redeployability, which facilitates product transition by enabling firms 
 
24 I use Bushee’s classification of 13F investors (Bushee 1998, 2001; Bushee and Noe 2000) available from Professor 
Brian Bushee’s website (https://accounting-faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/bushee/). I am grateful to Professor Brian 
Bushee for making this data available.  
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to trade their assets in the secondary market.25 Apart from these variables related to cost or asset 
structure, I next focus on geographic decentralization that likely leads to operational 
decentralization and flexibility; Garcia and Norli (2012) introduces geographic dispersion of a 
firm’s business operations using state counts from 10-K filings, and I define geographic dispersion 
as one minus geographic concentration (HHI) of business operations.26 
 
[Insert Fig 3 here] 
 
Fig 3 demonstrates the relation between each firm variable (in year t-1) and agility (in year 
t) through estimating local linear regressions of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on the variable. The local linear regression 
is estimated with the Gaussian kernel function and Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth selection. 
Given that there is no preexisting theory about what and how firm variables shape its agility, I take 
advantage of this non-parametric estimation in that it does not require a functional specification.27 
 
25 I use Asset Redeployability measure, which is constructed upon the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) capital 
flow, available from Professor Hyunseob Kim’s website (https://blogs.cornell.edu/hyunseobkim/asset-
redeployability/). Industry-adjusted Asset Redeployability is used because it has substantial variation between 
industries in Kim and Kung (2017). I am grateful to Professor Hyunseob Kim for providing the dataset.   
26 I use Geographic Dispersion measure available from Professor Diego Garcia’s website  
(https://sites.google.com/site/financieru/resources/software). I am grateful to Professor Diego Garcia for making this 
data available.  
27 The local linear regression approach has disadvantages that it requires computational intensity and large and densely 
sampled data. However, the current sample alleviates the concern for being fairly large and dense, as can be seen in 
the scatter plots. To alleviate the disadvantage, I also report the pair-wise correlation matrix in the Appendix A as 
Table A3.   
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Besides, the countervailing effect (i.e., substitute effect) deters from specifying the functional form 
uniformly across the spectrum of each variable.  
 Regression estimates on some of the variables (long-term bond ratings, board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, number of segments) look unstable as they have big confidence 
intervals at some points, presumably because they are constructed on discrete or categorical values. 
Except for those variables, each firm flexibility variable shows a relation with agility as 
conjectured. For example, in Panel A, cash holding is positively related to agility, and the relation 
is pronounced at the top 20%. Net leverage is inversely related to agility even though the raw 
leverage variable does not show a clear relation. In the meantime, the convex relation between 
agility and cash holdings (or net leverage) does not support the substitute effect between financial 
flexibility and agility. In Panel B, board size is negatively associated with agility, and the negative 
association is pronounced at the top 20%, implying that a substantially large (and thus inflexible) 
board deteriorates firm agility. Next, Panel C shows that organizationally flexible (i.e., younger, 
smaller, and diversified) firms appear to have a high level of agility. Lastly, in Panel D, K/L and 
Capex-to-asset are inversely associated with agility as predicted. However, positive association is 
observed in the right-end of K/L possibly because the number of employees is very low, and hence, 
labor costs can be quite fixed. Also, Capex-to-asset has some positive association with agility at 
its right-end, reflecting the effect of asset pledgeability or redeployability.28 The pure effect of 
 
28 However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the positive association might result from AT (total assets) in the 
denominator of CAPEX/AT, which is inversely related to agility. Likewise, the observed relations between firm 
flexibility measures and agility may not be mutually exclusive, and which is also consistent with that the notions of 
different firm flexibility can be interrelated as shown in the previous literature. (e.g., Choi, Ju, Trigeorgis, and Zhang, 
2021; Lambrecht, Pawlina, and Teixeira, 2016) 
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asset redeployability on agility appears to be positive. In the meantime, geographic dispersion has 
an inversed U-shaped relation with agility possibly because a firm’s extremely high geographic 
dispersion and large geographic footprints may involve an excessive shipping cost increase when 
it changes its product set.  
 A related question might be whether agility increases firm flexibility. If agility increases 
firm flexibility, given the above results that firm flexibility promotes agility, then agility will serve 
as a necessary and sufficient condition of firm flexibility. If this is the case, then the measured 
agility will be no more or less than a measure of firm flexibility, and its impacts on product market 
performance or firm survival likelihood can be confounded. As an illustration, if an agile firm 
arranges its financial structure in a way that it is more financially flexible than before, then any 
observable impact of agility on product market performance or survival likelihood can result from 
the impact of increased financial flexibility.  
 To check the possibilities, I also estimate local linear regressions of each firm flexibility 
variable (in year t+1) on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (in year t) in the Appendix A Fig A2. The results do not show 
clear relations between agility and firm flexibility variables as compared to Fig 3. The only 
noticeable pattern is that there seems to be an upward relation between agility and leverage or 
long-term bond ratings in the latter half range of agility, but there is also noisy relation in the first 
half range of agility similar to other firm flexibility variables. Overall, the results imply that firm 
flexibility promotes agility, and at the same time, agility is a unique firm characteristic as being 
differentiated from firm flexibility variables.  
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1.4.5 Agility and Performance 
 In this section, I investigate how agility influences product market performance. Although 
it is convincing that firms’ agility can improve their performance, it is an empirical question 
whether the performance improvement can last in the long run or agility can eventually increase 
the survival rates. For example, even if agility can enhance firm performance in the short term, the 
enhancement may fade away over time. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
 In Table 8 Column 1, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 significantly increases the market share growth in the next 
year where firm, industry, and year fixed effects are controlled for. In Column 2, the effect of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  on the market share growth is still significantly positive even after including various firm 
characteristics. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is 
associated with an 8.97 percentage points higher market share growth, relative to mean percentage 
of market share growth of -0.01%. In addition, the positive effect is observed for the market share 
growth after 3 years in Column 3. The effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on the market share growth after 5 years 
is positive but not statistically significant in Column 4.29 Thus, the results support the role of agility 
in improving product market performance, especially in the short run.  
 
29 The number of observations drops down to almost half in Column 4 as compared to Column 2, and which could 
reduce the test’s power. 
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1.4.6 Agility and Survival 
 The previous section finds that agility seems to improve the product market performance 
in the short run (up to 3 years) but not afterward. According to the findings, agility can increase 
firm survival likelihood with the improved performance in the short run, but it might also take time 
for the performance improvement leads to higher survival likelihood ultimately. Also, it is 
plausible that agile firms are targeted more frequently by acquirers that seek after agility or strong 
product market performance of agile firms.30 Thus, it is an empirical question whether agility 
increases or decreases survival likelihood.  
To identify a firm’s survival status, I use CRSP delist codes (CRSP DLSTCD 200 and 
above) and delist dates. I run logistic and linear probability regressions of firm survival status (as 
of year t+1, t+3, and t+5) on 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (i.e., firms with the top 20% 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in each industry 
and year) and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (i.e., firms with the bottom 20% 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in each industry and year) 
measured at year t.31  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
 
30  However, note that it is not clear whether an agile firm being acquired is always the value-decreasing to 
shareholders.  
31 The coefficients of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are not statistically significant when survival likelihood is regressed by raw 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
variable, possibly because (i) there is nonlinear relation between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and survival likelihood, (ii) the effect of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on survival likelihood is concentrated among high 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 group, or, (iii) there is an endogeneity bias within 
the relation between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and survival likelihood (which is addressed in Section 4.7.) 
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 The coefficient of 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in Table 9 Column 1 is negative but not statistically 
significant. The coefficients in Column 2 and 3 are significantly negative, implying that firm 
agility increases the survival likelihood, especially in the long run. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is insignificant in Column 1, 2, and 3. In Column 4, 5, and 6, I opt for 
the linear probability models in order to accommodate high-dimensional firm fixed effects. In 
Column 4, the coefficient of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient of 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) is significantly positive (negative) in Column 5 (6). In terms of 
economic magnitude, the odds of a 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firm being delisted are about 11.31% lower than 
that of an average firm in Column 3. Therefore, it is concluded that firms benefit from a sufficiently 
high level of agility with respect to survival rates, especially in the long run. 
 Also, Table A11 in the Appendix A reports the unconditional probabilities of delisting of 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firms based on the reasons for delisting. I follow the classification 
of delisting codes in Fama and French (2004): voluntary delisting (CRSP DLSTCD 570 and 573), 
involuntary delisting or delisting for cause (CRSP DLSTCD 400 or above, excluding 570 and 
573), and delisting for mergers (CRSP DLSTCD 200 – 399). Failure (i.e., either voluntary, 
involuntary, or merger delisting) rates are greater for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firms over time, and which is 
consistent with the results of Table 9. Whereas, voluntary delisting (e.g., going dark and going 
private without subsequent trading), which follows the considerations of mitigating agency 
conflicts, decreasing registration or compliance costs, or alternative sources of financing, does not 
show a consistent pattern between 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firms. On the other hand, both 
involuntary delisting and delisting for mergers, which are akin to bankruptcy, liquidation, failure 
to meet listing requirements, and distress, are more frequent among 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firms over time. 
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Thus, the results in the Appendix A Table A11 support the role of high level of agility in firm 
survival, which would otherwise have been (involuntary) firm delisting.  
1.4.7 Endogeneity 
 The previous results show that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 increases both product market performance and 
survival likelihood; however, the results could be driven by the endogeneity of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. More 
specifically, there could be unobservable and thus omitted factors that are correlated with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
and product market performance or survival likelihood. Also, it is plausible that firms expecting 
good future prospects in terms of competitiveness in the product market or survival likelihood 
could have arranged their operation in a more agile way. To relieve those endogeneity concerns, I 
estimate IV estimations in the subsample of the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, I again 
exploit two exogenous variations induced by the FDA introduced in Section 4.3., drug approval 
rates and approval times, as IVs of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.  
While the results in Section 4.3. show that the drug approval rates and approval times 
correlate with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for the pharmaceutical firms, there is little reason to believe that they have 
a direct influence on the product market performance or survival likelihood other than through 
their association with firm’s introduction of new drug products, and hence, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. However, one 
might argue that individual firms can affect those two variations for some reason; in fact, the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), which was first introduced in 1992, requires drug 
developers to pay user fees when they submit drug applications to the FDA. The FDA explains, 
“… Since the passage of PDUFA, user fees have played an important role in expediting the drug 
approval process”. As previous studies (e.g., Vernon, Golec, Lutter, and Nardinelli, 2009; Gabay, 
2018) note, the FDA used the collected fees to hire more staff and upgrade the data system to 
 41 
expedite the drug review process. Thus, it might be plausible that firms seeking agility paid high 
user fees with many applications to shorten the approval times. However, this plausible effect is 
unlikely to present in this paper’s identification for two reasons; first, the effect is likely to be 
concentrated in the early years after the introduction of PDUFA in 1992, which is quite a long time 
(10 years) before this paper’s sample period. Second, it is not clear whether a firm tries to pay high 
user fees where the benefit accrues to all the industry rivals as well as itself. On the other hand, 
drug approval rates are likely to depend on the quality of submitted drugs rather than individual 
firms’ agility levels; firms will submit as high-quality drugs as possible regardless of their agility 
levels. 
On the other hand, it is problematic if lobbying activities of the pharmaceutical firms 
influence the FDA’s drug approval process. Alternatively, the lobbying activities may affect the 
political economy surrounding the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., election outcomes of the FDA 
Commissioner) that can impact the FDA’s decisions. To rule out the possibility of this omitted 
variable problem, I include the firm-level lobbying expenditures, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 ($𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), as a control 
variable in the IV estimations. 32 Also, one-year lagged firm flexibility variables are used as 
additional instruments since 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is likely to be affected by those variables, as seen in Section 
4.4.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
 
32 The firm-level lobbying expenses are available from the Center for Responsive Politics  
(https://www.opensecrets.org/).  
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 Table 10 Column 1 and 2 display IV regression results confirming the positive (negative) 
effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance (delisting likelihood). First stage regressions are 
qualitatively similar to regression results of Table 7 (i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positively associated with the 
drug approval rates and inverse of drug approval times) with slightly different magnitudes of 
coefficients probably because of the additional instruments (i.e., one-year lagged firm flexibility 
variables) and further dropped observations, and thus, omitted in Table 10. 
 To enhance the external validity from the previous results, I also use difference-in-
differences framework using industry-level regulation changes. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) 
shows that a rise in regulation increases fixed cost component or introduces barriers to entry. Also, 
compliance costs increase with regulatory stringency, which are incurred when firms change their 
product sets or even when they try to maintain their current productions. As such, an increase in 
regulations can restrict firms’ scope of product differentiation or assimilation, and hence, capacity 
to increase their agility in the industry, especially among firms with a low level of agility.  
 Following unexpected regulation increases, firms should depend on their pre-established 
agility levels to compete in the product market environment where firms’ capability to increase 
agility is limited by exogenous regulation increases. Therefore, if agility really gives a competitive 
advantage, then the low agility firms, which have not reconfigured their product sets (and thus 
more affected by the regulation changes), should experience worse product market outcomes than 
the high agility firms, which already have expanded or concentrated their product sets, when there 
is an unexpected increase in industry regulations. Accordingly, the interaction effect between 
agility and regulation increases on the product market outcomes should be positive.   
 An advantage of this quasi-natural experiment is that different industries experience 
regulation jumps at different times. The staggered jumps in the regulations imply that the control 
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group in year t contains not only industries that never face a regulation jump but also industries 
that have already experienced one or will experience one later on but not in year t. Therefore, the 
concerns that the experiment could be confounded by other unrelated, concurrent events are 
mitigated. Also, another advantage of this identification strategy is that a regulation increase in an 
industry is not perfectly foreseeable or overseen by the industry since one single industry is 
regulated by multiple government agencies (on average xxx agencies per industry), and regulations 
from one government agency apply to multiple industries (on average xxx industries per 
government agency). Hence, the identification is unlikely to be contaminated by the predictability 
or unobservable factors such as lobbying activity or political connection of firms.  
 Following Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) and Duan, Larkin, and Ng (2019), I use the 
RegData US datasets from McLaughlin (2020) to identify the industry-level regulation jumps in 
1997 – 2018.33 The RegData US provides the level of regulations (“Industry Regulation Index”) 
applied to each NAICS industry in each year, as introduced in Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2017). 
As regulations become more stringent over time (i.e., have time trends), I define an industry’s 
regulation increase as a 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 if its magnitude is three times greater than the median 
magnitude of the industry’s regulation increases in the period in order to capture the sizeable 
increases in regulations. Table 10 Columns 3 and 4 report the difference-in-differences estimation 
results in which the interaction between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 significantly increases 
the market share growth and decreases the delisting probability, respectively.  
 Taken together, the results of IV regression and difference-in-differences estimation 
relieve the concerns that the endogeneity of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 could drive the main results. 
 
33 The RegData US dataset is available from (https://www.quantgov.org/download-data). 
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1.4.8 Benefits of Agility 
 In this section, I investigate possible channels through which agile firms attain competitive 
benefits in terms of the product market performance and survival. More specifically, agile firms 
may be willing and able to respond more proactively when facing industry-wide common shocks 
relative to rigid counterparts. In order to check whether this is the case, I focus on two large and 
prevalent types of corporate investments: R&D and acquisitions. To the extent that the both types 
require time and resources until completion, agile firms may undertake investments in R&D or 
acquisitions more proactively to win the R&D race or competition in the takeover market. For the 
analysis, I construct 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 defined as the ratio of the transaction value for each 
year and industry (classified by the 3-digit SIC code) to the total assets of all Compustat firms in 
the same year and industry following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) and Uysal (2011). 
Analogously, I create 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 as the ratio of R&D value for each year and 
industry to the total assets of all Compustat firms in the same year and industry. 
In addition, I examine whether agile firms can maintain their better product market 
performance when confronted by industry-level import tariff cuts. Tariff cuts lessen trade barrier 
and raise import penetration, escalating pressures from foreign rivals (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 
2006). Given that agile firms, by definition, respond intensively to encroachment of their domestic 
rivals (as measured by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), it is likely that they are also responsive to challenges 
from foreign rivals (as measured by 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ), and hence, have better product market 
performance than rigid firms. I follow the procedures in the previous literature (e.g., Valta, 2012; 
Xu, 2012) to identify the major tariff cuts at the SIC 3-digit level. For each industry-year, I first 
calculate the tariff rate as the ratio of duties collected from the industry’s imports to the dutiable 
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value of imports.34 Next, to identify meaningful changes in trade barrier, I classify a negative tariff 
change as a 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 if its size is 3 times greater than the median magnitude of the industry’s 
negative tariff changes. Also, following Frésard (2010), I exclude tariff cuts that are followed by 
comparable positive changes (i.e., 80% of the negative tariff changes) in the next two subsequent 
years, or, are not preceded by tariff cuts in the past year. Also, negative tariff changes smaller than 
1% are excluded from tariff cuts.  
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
Table 11 Column 1 demonstrates that firms ramp up R&D following industry-wise intense 
R&D investments on average, and the sensitivity of R&D to industry-wise R&D investments 
increases with agility. In addition, Column 2 and 3 show that the relation holds for the next two 
years even though average firms do not appear to significantly increase their R&D investments. 
Next, Column 5 implies that firms’ acquisition investments significantly increase with industry-
wise M&A waves only among those with a high agility level. The coefficients of the interaction 
between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 are significantly positive in Column 7, 8, and 9, indicating that 
the effect of agility on market share growth is magnified in the tariff cuts, and thus, trade barrier 
reductions.35 The results also serve to alleviate the endogeneity concern arising between agility 
 
34 The import data is available from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) and Schott (2010) and downloaded from 
Professor Peter Schott’s website (https://sompks4.github.io/sub_data.html). I am grateful to Professor Peter Schott for 
making this data available. 
35 An interesting observation is that the coefficient of 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 is either positive or insignificant. This is consistent 
with the empirical results in the past literature (e.g., Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006; Frésard, 2010). Some firms 
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and market share growth by establishing difference-in-difference regressions; major tariff 
reductions do not reflect individual firms’ policy or decision and are not completely predictable 
by industry or market conditions (Xu, 2012; Frésard and Valta, 2016). Therefore, the positive 
coefficient of the interaction between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (measured in year t) and 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 (measured in 
year t+1, t+2, and t+3) implies that the sensitivity of market share growth to agility is greater for 
firms that face unpredicted tariff cuts than firms that do not. Overall, a firm’s agility is beneficial 
in strengthening its competitiveness, especially when facing industry-wide common shocks such 
as R&D or acquisition waves, or trade barrier reductions.36  
1.4.9 Seeking Agility 
 Prior studies have established that firms attempt to acquire innovation and technology by 
acquiring target firms having accumulated innovation and technology (Harford, 2005; Bena and 
Li, 2014; Harford, 2005; Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013; Sevilir and Tian, 2012). In the same vein, 
rigid firms are likely to acquire agile firms to the extent that agility is a determinant of product 
market performance and survival rates. On the other hand, a firm, which is already agile, may have 
fewer incentives to acquire another agile firm. 
 
will increase their domestic market share facing tariff cuts, whereas others lose their share accordingly. However, the 
findings do not undermine the role of agility in improving market share growth under tariff cuts in Table 10.  
36 However, the relations are not observed for CAPEX or advertisement expenses. I presume that they are less 
discretionary types of investments or demand less time or resources relative to R&D or acquisitions, and hence, 
interpret that firms do not find it much useful to increase their investments in CAPEX or advertisement rapidly even 
when facing industry-wide shocks of CAPEX or advertisement.  
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 The acquisition of CELGENE CORP, which rank high in Table 5 for its agility, by 
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, a big player in the pharmaceutical industry, in 2019 provides an 
example of this. In an interview after the acquisition, Executive Vice President Christopher 
Boerner expressed:37 
 “The integration of Celgene makes us an even stronger combined company… This merger 
was the culmination of a long-term strategy at Bristol Myers Squibb to combine the reach and 
resources of an established pharmaceutical company with the agility of a biotech. The integration 
presented a fresh opportunity to take some of the lessons from our new colleagues about 
simplifying how we operate and moving with greater speed, and marry them with the scale, 
resources and centralized capabilities that existed at Bristol Myers Squibb.”38 
 In order to examine the possibilities within the sample, I observe acquisition attempts of 
each sample firm (in year t) up to five years (i.e., year t+1, t+2,…, t+5). More specifically, the 
latest acquisition attempt within five years is collected for each firm-year observation.39 Within 
 
37 “Building a company for the future”. https://www.bms.com/life-and-science/news-and-perspectives/building-a-
company-during-pandemic-with-celgene-integration.html  
38 Even though the acquisition deal is allegedly from “seeking agility” motive according to the interview, it could be 
the case that it was from another motive, for example, “killer acquisition” (Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma, 2021). More 
specifically, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB might have acquired CELGENE CORP to interrupt innovation and preempt 
future competition given that CELGENE CORP was active in both its own innovation and licensing deals with other 
drug-makers. However, the assessment of these other motivations is beyond the scope of this study.  
39 The best way for estimation might be to observe acquisition attempts of each sample firm in year t+1. However, it 
keeps too few observations (22 observations). 
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the intersection of the sample and SDC database, observations with non-missing agility values of 
both acquirer and target are used for the estimation.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
 Table 12 Column 1 exhibits that the agility of acquirers and that of targets have a negative 
association. In addition, under the consideration that acquirers can only observe the 
contemporaneous, not future, agility of target firms (i.e., 10-K business description of target firm, 
which is available to acquiring firm, is observable at the latest fiscal year-end of the target firm), I 
also run the regression of target’s agility right before the deal on acquirer’s agility in Column 2. 
The results show that the agilities of acquirer and target are negatively correlated.  
 Next, I investigate the dynamics of the absolute difference between acquirer’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 
target’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. More specifically, the absolute deviation of acquirer’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in t, t+1,…, t+5 
from target’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in t is observed where t is the year when their acquisition is completed.  
 
[Insert Fig 4 here] 
 
 In Fig 4, the mean and median of absolute 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 difference are plotted across t, t+1,…, 
t+5. The difference continues to drop two years after the deal completion (year t+1 and t+2) and 
returns to the initial level afterward. The results indicate that acquirers absorb the targets’ agility 
after deal completions even though the absorption rate gradually decreases.  
 49 
1.4.10 Costs of Agility 
 The previous section explores how agility brings competitive benefits under industry-wide 
shocks, however, it does not directly assess the costs of agility. Agile firms choose either product 
deviation or assimilation when confronting competitive threats, and these choices entail costs. For 
instance, firms could pioneer new markets, innovate, and increase advertisement to differentiate 
their products that are encroached. Meanwhile, firms can assimilate their product sets to that of 
rivals by augmenting the current product lines, locking in customers, or lowering product prices. 
The costs of such actions should be reflected in profitability. In sum, firms can increase agility at 
the expense of current profitability. To identify sizeable changes in agility, I characterize 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 (𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽) as the positive (negative) changes in 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 from the previous year that are three 
times greater than the median of positive (negative) changes. The medians are defined at year, 
industry, or industry-year level, separately.  
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
 Table 13 Column 1 reports that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 (from t to t+1) is significantly associated 
with a 1.2 percentage points decrease in 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 (from t to t+1) when the median is defined at the 
year level. Column 2 exhibits a similar coefficient estimate of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 when the median is 
defined at industry level. The results imply that sizeable increases in agility bring decreases in 
profitability as measured by 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 . Interestingly, Column 3 shows that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽  is 
significantly associated with 0.7 percentage points increase in 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 (when the median is defined 
at industry-year level), indicating that firms can increase profitability by reducing agility. In 
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unreported results, the change in 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 from t to t+3 (or t+5) is insignificantly associated with both 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽, indicating that only short-term profitability is affected by an 
abrupt change in agility.  
 The results show that firms exercise agility at the expense of concurrent profitability and 
explain why not all firms maintain a high level of agility despite its competitive benefits. On the 
other hand, there could be other aspects of costs of agility. For example, firms might be willing to 
bear the costs of reshaping their governance, organizational, or operational structure to secure 
decentralization, and hence agility. Or, they might need to rebalance capital structures or adjust 
cash ratios to achieve financial flexibility, which can promote agility. However, it is empirically 
challenging to incorporates these types of costs because it is difficult to observe their magnitudes 
and timing. I acknowledge these limitations of the cost analysis presented in this paper. 
1.4.11 Stock Return Predictability 
 Failure to build up agility leads to loss in market share, and eventually, likelihood of firm 
discontinuation according to the previous results. Therefore, if agility is negatively associated with 
priced distress risk, then agile firms are expected to earn lower stock returns than rigid firms. 
Besides, firms that cannot maintain agility will find it difficult to deal with uncertainty which 
arrives randomly, such as competition or technology shocks, and hence, investors raise the 
required rate of return. Meanwhile, to the extent that agility carries firm innovativeness, agile firms 
bear innovation risk which is priced and earn higher returns.  
 I examine the ability of agility to predict stock returns using monthly Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions with controlling for beta, size, book-to-market (Fama and 
French, 1992), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), short term reversal (Jegadeesh, 1990), 
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illiquidity (Amihud, 2002), industry concentration (Hou and Robinson, 2006), profitability, asset 
growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008; Fama and French, 2015), and idiosyncratic volatility 
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006) where four return holding periods are considered; 1-
month, 3-month, 6-month, and annual returns.  
 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
 Table 14 presents the average slope coefficients whose standard errors are Newey-West 
adjusted. Column 1 of Table 14 presents the average slop coefficients of -0.108, which translates 
into 13 basis points increase in return per month for a one standard deviation decrease in 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
The results for longer holding period are consistent with the 1-month results although the 
magnitudes of the slopes are smaller, suggesting that the return predictability is not a short term 
phenomenon. Overall, the results point to the risk associated with low agility, rather than 
innovation risk, also implying that agility unlikely carries innovativeness.  
1.4.12 Robustness & Additional Tests 
1.4.12.1 Robustness: Estimation Window of Agility 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is estimated by firm-by-firm regression of (3), which requires 5-year consecutive 
observations for a firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  value. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  has considerable time-series variation even 
within each firm due to the short estimation window (i.e., 5 years), and thus, one might argue that 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 has a limitation in measuring true agility level if it fluctuates too much over time within a 
firm. Also, it is arguable that a longer estimation window can make the estimated measure more 
reliable. However, the estimation window could be extended but with some expenses; first, sample 
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observations would be dropped due to the shrunken sample period. For example, a 10-year 
estimation window pushes the starting year of the sample period forward to 2008, which would 
have been 2003 for a 5-year estimation window. Second, extending the estimation window 
downsizes the weight on more recent observations that are critical as far as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measures the 
speed of a firm’s response to competitive threats it encounters.  
To ensure that the main results are robust to changes in the estimation window, I also 
estimate 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 through firm-by-firm regression of (3) with a longer estimation window of 6, 
7,…, or 10 years.  Table A4 in the Appendix A revisits the main regression results (i.e., Tables 8 
and 9) when a 10-year estimation window is used, and it finds that the main results are robust to 
the change in the estimation window. The results for the estimation window of 6, 7, 8, or 9 years 
are also qualitatively invariant and thus not reported.  
1.4.12.2 Robustness: Magnitude of Competitive Threats 
A firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is defined as the degree of its product assimilation or deviation relative 
to its rivals’ products (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) when the rivals’ threats (i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) 
arise, but some threats are too small to merit any responses or even detect. In that case, the firm’s 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  value may inflate its actual agility level since the observed 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  has 
nothing to do with competitive threats. Or, a firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  value could just represent how 
innovative it is, not how agile it is, particularly when its 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is too small; for 
instance, an innovative firm, as the first mover in the market, may change its product even though 
there is no encroachment from rivals, and its 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 would be estimated to be very high for 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 being high whereas 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 being low or even close to zero. If 
then, the firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 would capture its innovativeness, not its agility. To address these potential 
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measurement problems, I redefine 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  from firm-by-firm regression of (3) where the 
observations are eliminated if their 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values are in the bottom quintile of the 
same year. Next, the main regressions in Tables 8 and 9 are implemented by using the redefined 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. The results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix A, and they show qualitatively 
similar estimates to that of Tables 7 and 8. If anything, the magnitudes and significance of the 
coefficients of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are larger than that in Tables 7 and 8. 
1.4.12.3 Robustness: Falsification Tests 
For more robustness of the main results, I also perform a series of falsification tests to see 
if the main effects are still observable when the original 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is replaced by “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
(which is introduced in Section 3). “Fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is created from 1,000 times of simulations 
as in Section 3, and each of “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is included artificially as the main independent 
variable of estimation models in Tables 8 and 9 rather than the original 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 variable. I then re-
estimate the falsification tests and plot a histogram of the distribution of coefficient estimates for 
“fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. A dashed vertical line is also drawn to represent the true estimates in Tables 
8 and 9. If the main effects were just coincidental outcome, then we would expect to see a 
distribution where similar coefficient estimates as in Tables 8 and 9 were observed in sufficiently 
many simulations.  
 Appendix A Figure A3 shows the resulting histograms that are all centered around zero, 
implying that the main effects are absent when “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is used. In addition, it supports 
that the positive effects of  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and survival probabilities are 
unlikely driven randomly.  
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1.4.12.4 Robustness: Reporting Quality of 10-K Filings 
 Even though Item 101 in Regulation S-K requires business descriptions in 10-K filings be 
representative and accurate, firms might omit their product information in the business descriptions 
intentionally or unintentionally. In any event, their business descriptions would not be reliable 
sources for the measures 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and hence 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.  
 Previous literature (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Maksimovic and Pchler, 2001) suggests that 
disclosing proprietary information to product market competitors can decrease a firm’s 
competitive advantage. Verrecchia and Weber (2006) and Boone, Floros, and Johnson (2016) 
show that firms redact proprietary information by receiving permission for confidential treatments 
from the SEC, especially among young and small firms. On the other hand, large firms with diverse 
products may omit information of their products unintentionally due to the complexity of their 
product portfolios, or at least some changes in their products could be less noticeable within their 
large product sets. Taken together, these possibilities would lead to business descriptions for these 
firms that are less informative, and thus, their measured 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 less accurate.  
 To minimize these possibilities, I first exclude firms that are younger than 5 years old or 
appear in the sample for the first time. Columns 1 through 6 of Table A6 in the Appendix A confirm 
the results of Tables 8 and 9 even after excluding these young firms. Next, Columns 7 through 12 
again show consistent results with Tables 8 and 9 when firms whose size is in top 20% of the 
sample are excluded.  
1.4.12.5 Product Differentiation vs. Assimilation 
 Given that the sensitivity of product differentiation or assimilation to competitive threats 
(i.e., agility) brings better product market outcomes, it is also worth investigating whether 
differentiation or assimilation is more effective in inducing better outcomes. For this purpose, I 
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contrast outcomes between assimilators (i.e., firms with positive 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 s in Equation (3)) and 
differentiators (i.e., firms with negative 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡s in Equation (3)) by defining the following variables: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,+ = �
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 > 0
0                𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,− = �
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 < 0
0                𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼
 
 In this way, the coefficient of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,+ (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,−) represents the effect of agility on 
product market outcomes among assimilators (differentiators) while satisfying 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,+ + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,−.40  
 Table A7 in the Appendix A shows that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+ and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+ have significantly 
positive effects on product market performance and survival likelihood, whereas 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴− and 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴− do not, implying that product assimilation rather than differentiation is likely to 
bring better product market outcomes. However, in every column of Table A7, the coefficients of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+ (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+) and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴− (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−) have the same sign as 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ), and thus, it is potentially possible that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−  or 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−  can have some 
significant effects with increased power of tests from, for example, extended sample period. More 
specifically, it is plausible that product differentiation takes longer time to take effect compared to 
product assimilation. On the other hand, product assimilation appears ex-post optimal in the 
results, but it is not clear which strategy is ex-ante more optimal.  
 
40  𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,+  and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,−  are defined in a similar way. However, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,+  and 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,− are redundant since 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 group firms already have 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values close to zero (i.e., 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡s are 
close to zero).  
 56 
1.4.12.6 Quasi-agility 
 A firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is measured as the change of its product set relative to rivals’ products 
under their threats, however, the change of its products could be centered around its own products 
in the past. More specifically, a firm’s product set might either converge to or diverge from its past 
product set rather than rivals’ past product set. However, to the extent that the responsiveness 
relative to rivals’ products is more effective in resolving competitive threats, the responsiveness 
relative to its own products would bring lower improvement in product market outcomes. To 
explore this, I replace (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  (i.e., 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) by (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  in 
firm-by-firm regression of (3) to define 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. Column 1 through 3 in Panel A and B of 
the Appendix A Table A8 show that 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 increases market share growth and survival 
likelihood. However, the coefficients of 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 - 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  lose significance when 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  is 
included in Column 4 through 6 in Panel A and B, implying that a firm’s product responsiveness 
that centers on rivals’ products rather than its own products is more beneficial in the adverse shift 
of competitive landscape. 
1.4.12.7 Residual Agility 
 Is agility a mere composite of various dimensions of firm flexibility? Even though the 
local linear regression results in Fig 3 and the Appendix A Fig A2 show that agility is not a 
necessary and sufficient condition of each dimension of firm flexibility, those firm flexibility 
measures might together constitute agility. It could be the case, then, that the previous results are 
accounted for by the effect of firm flexibility, not agility, on the product market outcomes. To 
examine this possibility, I run regression of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in t on firm flexibility measures from each 
flexibility category in t-1 that are most significant in the local linear regression results in Fig 3 
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(i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 from financial flexibility, 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹  𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  from governance flexibility, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 from organizational flexibility, 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 from operating flexibility) in each industry. As 
a result, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, the residual from the regression, is orthogonal to those flexibility 
variables, and can be interpreted as the component of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 not explained by firm flexibility. 
 Next, the main regressions in Tables 8 and 9 are implemented by using 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
The results are reported in Table A9 in the Appendix A, and they show qualitatively similar 
estimates to that of Tables 8 and 9. Also, the results remain unchanged when predicted value of 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  is additionally included in the unreported regressions, and which implies that the 
unexplained component of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 serves as a more significant role in product market outcomes. 
In addition, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , which is obtained from the regression of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  in t on the 
contemporaneous firm flexibility variables in t (not t-1), presents similar coefficient estimates. The 
results indicate that even agility of firms, which arrange their firm structure in a way such that both 
firm flexibility and agility are enhanced simultaneously, improves product market performance. 
1.4.12.8 Manufacturing Industry 
 Corporate agility can be more relevant for manufacturing firms than firms in other 
industries such as public services or construction industry. In the meantime, the previous results 
in Table 6 show that manufacturing firms have dispersion in agility, implying that the benefits 
from agility can vary even within the industry. More specifically, low-Q manufacturing industries 
(SIC 2-digit 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38) appear to have low level of agility presumably because 
they benefit less from agility than high-Q manufacturing industries. Table A10 in the Appendix A 
explores these possibilities. 
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 Panel A reports coefficients of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 that are more 
statistically and economically significant than in Tables 8 and 9. The results indicate that 
manufacturing firms can enjoy more benefit from high agility than other industry firms. In the 
meantime, the results in Panel B imply that the benefit is less realized for low-Q manufacturing 
firms.  
1.4.12.9 Product Homogeneity 
 Product assimilation or differentiation may not be an effective response to the rivals’ 
competitive threats for industries producing homogeneous goods compared to those not. Product 
assimilation may be less effective in homogeneous goods industries where the ability of price 
discrimination is limited due to regulations (e.g., Robinson-Patman Act in 1936) or industry-wide 
conditions (e.g., price fixing) (Hay and Kelley, 1974). On the other hand, product differentiation 
can be less effective in homogeneous goods industries because pioneering new markets and 
customers is challenging. In this sense, the virtue of agility might not be much realized in the 
homogeneous goods industries. 
 I use the product classification from Rauch (1999), where products at 4-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) level are categorized into three subsets: those traded on 
organized exchanges, those which are reference-priced, and differentiated goods. Following the 
literature, I group the first two categories into homogeneous goods and compare the effects of 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market outcomes between industries producing homogenous goods and those 
producing differentiated goods.41  
 Panel A of Table A12 demonstrates the positive effects of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market 
outcomes for industries producing differentiated goods, consistent with Tables 8 and 9. However, 
the pattern is not observed for industries producing homogeneous goods in Panel B. If anything, 
Column 6 of Panel B shows that 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 firms have a lower likelihood of delisting, indicating 
that firms irresponsive to competitive threats rather have a higher likelihood of survival in 
homogeneous goods industries.  
1.5 Conclusion 
 This paper studies how corporate agility affects product market performance and firm 
survival rates. Motivated by the research of Alchian (1950) and Lehn (2018) on corporate agility, 
this paper introduces a novel measure of agility derived from business descriptions in firms’ SEC 
10-K filings. I analyze the characteristics and diagnostics of the newly constructed measure of 
agility to affirm its validity. I establish internal fluidity (i.e., the degree of product assimilation) 
has a negative sensitivity to external fluidity (i.e., the degree of rivals’ threats) and the sensitivity 
depends on a firm’s status or industry conditions. Thereby, I confirm that firms either increase or 
decrease their internal fluidity when external fluidity changes and define agility as the (absolute 
 
41 Each 4-digit SITC is matched with 4-digit U.S. SIC code using the concordance table from Tang (2012). I use 
“liberal” classification from Rauch (1999), however, the results are invariant when “conservative” classification is 
used. I am grateful to Professors James Rauch and Heiwai Tang for making this data available.   
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value of) sensitivity of internal fluidity to external fluidity. Also, the agility measure is stable in 
that it does not vary much with different permutations of input parameters (i.e., common word 
threshold, local vs. main dictionary, etc.). Additionally, the measure is fairly persistent over time 
within the same firm. Lastly, I find that two industrywide exogenous shocks in the pharmaceutical 
industry (i.e., new drug approval time and approval rates) are associated with the agility measure 
further validating the measure as a proxy for the true level of agility.  
 I observe that firm flexibility (i.e., financial flexibility, governance flexibility, 
organizational flexibility, operating flexibility) promotes firm agility but not vice versa. These 
results suggest that agility is a unique firm characteristic distinct from other firm flexibility 
variables used in prior literature. Also, I find evidence that agility significantly increases market 
share growth, especially in the short run. In the long run, greater firm agility increases the survival 
likelihood (i.e., decreases the probability of delisting).  
 Further, the results show that agile firms ramp up R&D investments (acquisition 
investments) following industry-wide R&D (M&A) waves more intensively than rigid firms. The 
results also suggest that agile firms have better product market performance than rigid firms when 
facing industry-level tariff reductions. In addition, acquirers’ agility measures and targets’ agility 
measures are generally negatively correlated implying that firms potentially seek to increase agility 
via acquisitions. On the other hand, firms increase agility at the expense of short-term profitability.  
 Lastly, I find that agility is a negative predictor of future returns even after controlling for 
other firm risk and characteristics in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. The 
results indicate that firms that fail to build up agility involve priced risk.  
 One limitation of this study is that the measurement of agility depends on the product 
market space (due to observability and definability) and may not capture agility that would 
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otherwise have been observed in other types of business environmental changes such as consumer 
demand changes, technological changes, social norm changes, or legal environment changes. 
However, I believe this paper’s approach can be extended to these specific changes; for example, 
a financial institution’s agility might be measurable as the degree of changes in its financial 
products (or portfolio) as a response to the increased similarity of rival institutions’ products (or 
portfolio). If then, the financial institution’s agility might bear the same relationship to 
performance in the financial market as this study’s agility does to performance in the product 
market. Also, the degree of product changes in pharmaceutical firms (e.g., vaccine developments) 
in the pre- and post-COVID 19 pandemic period may allow a more meticulous investigation of 
corporate agility.   
In sum, this paper introduces a new measure of corporate agility and examines how it 
affects firm performance and survival likelihood, which has not been deeply studied in the 














2.0 Second Essay: Is Innovation Always Beneficial? Externalities of Innovation on Product 
Market Relationship 
2.1 Introduction 
Technology innovation has been regarded as an important corporate investment decision 
and outcome (e.g., Schumpeter, 1911; Solow, 1957; Hall et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2015). While 
previous studies highlight the role of innovation in firm productivity, growth and survival, a firm’s 
innovation also can affect the other stakeholders as well as the firm itself and its security holders. 
In other words, stakeholders, such as its supplier, customer, competitor, employee, and even 
government, can be affected through their economic relationship with the innovative firm even if 
they don’t have direct monetary stake in the innovative firm. While the innovation literature mostly 
focuses on the spillover effect of innovation on customer or supplier firm, the literature has so far 
paid little attention to how innovation shapes the dynamics between customer and supplier. 42 This 
paper helps bridge that gap by investigating how a firm’s innovation affects the relationship with 
its customer or supplier firm as the innovation changes its bargaining power.  
 
42 For example, one source of such externality takes place in the technology dimension. More specifically, Hsu (2011) 
finds that firms can save innovation costs by taking advantage of innovation made by their competitors or 
geographically close firms. Bloom et al. (2013) investigates a positive effect from knowledge spillovers and negative 
business stealing effects from rival firms. Li (2018) finds that supplier experience improved performance from its 
customer innovation and emphasizes the positive externality of innovation. Whereas, this paper focuses on the 
negative externality from the innovator’s bargaining power. 
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 The relationship between Apple and Samsung illustrates how innovation of one party is 
critical to its counterparty in the trade relationship. With its advanced screen technology, Samsung 
has been the major supplier of Apple and now Apple relies heavily on the OLED screens supplied 
by Samsung because the supplier has a technological merit that it is the only supplier which can 
mass-produce OLED screens.43 The growing dependence of Apple on Samsung implies its weak 
bargaining power against Samsung, for instance, over its pricing on OLED screens (in fact, this 
component is said to be one reason why iPhone X has a steep price tag). Samsung could charge 
the price of its OLED at least to the price of OLED from alternative suppliers. Also, we would 
expect Apple to be granted less trade credit or allowed for shorter payment delay by Samsung due 
to its stronger dependence on Samsung than before.  
 The changed dynamics stemming from one party’s innovation can show up in various 
ways; for instance, trade credit (or payment delay), cash before delivery (or advanced payment), 
delivery delay, pricing on traded product, length of customer-supplier trade relationship, or long-
term supply contract can appear or be affected as relative bargaining power between two firms 
changes. In this paper, I specifically focus on trade credit for the following reasons. To the extent 
that trade credit proxies for relative bargaining power as documented in the literature, it can also 
be a good measure for identification process of this paper. Also, given that contract-level variables 
(such as product price or contract terms) are not observable, trade credit, which is observable in 
annual filings, can be the important measures of bargaining power.  Additionally, as the importance 
 
43 In fact, the market demand of iPhone XR (a more budget friendly version in the iPhone X lineup) fell short of 
expectations, and which is allegedly due to the lower quality of display (LCD screen) and camera compared to the 
previous iPhone X lineup (X and XS). As a result, Apple is looking to drop LCD screens from its iPhone lineup 
(starting with the 2020 iPhone) and switching to OLED screens. 
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of trade credit in the balance sheet of US firms grows, investigation of determinants which 
potentially influence the trade credit policy is interesting in its own right. 44 
 On this ground, I investigate how a firm’s innovation affects the trade credit provision of 
its supplier. 45   First, customer’s more active innovation can generate higher degree of 
appropriation of quasi-rent and lead to more extension of trade credit from supplier (“holdup 
channel”). The innovation can generate completely new technology and products which enable the 
innovator to switch to another trade relationship and end up terminating the current relationship. 
46   Meanwhile, note that this quasi-rent is not necessarily identical to the monopoly rent as 
explained in Klein et al. (1978).  Going back to Apple and Samsung case, Apple cannot give up 
OLED-screen iPhones since the next best use of the devices (before installing screens) is only 
through equipping the devices with LCD screens, and which couldn’t satisfy consumers just as 
turned out in the poor sales record of iPhone XR. Thus, we can say that Apple’s assets (i.e., iPhone 
devices) are specialized to Samsung’s product (i.e., OLED screen). Also, there is no market closure 
or restriction on other screen makers in the OLED screen market. Even if free and open 
 
44 Freeman (2020) documents that trade credit constitutes 73% of short-term liabilities among Compustat firms as of 
2016.  
45 In this paper, I only focus on the innovation from the customer side because the Compustat segment file provides 
important customers of each supplier (i.e., customers comprising 10% or more of each supplier’s total sales). Hence, 
the data only identifies whether a firm is an important customer of a firm, but not whether a firm is an important 
supplier of a firm. 
46 However, it is not clear whether it is supplier or customer that leads to the decision of increased trade credit; 
customer firm may demand more trade credit with its strengthened bargaining power, but it is also possible that 
supplier may voluntarily offer more trade credit. Even if it is the decision of supplier side, the explanation is still 
consistent with the holdup hypothesis. Unfortunately, the decision process is not observable even in the 10-K filings.  
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competition for entry is possible, other screen suppliers cannot just catch up Samsung’s technology 
because it is too costly for them.47 In other words, their lack of innovation enables Samsung to be 
the major supplier of Apple. Even if the example demonstrates the holdup of Apple (“customer”) 
by Samsung (“innovative supplier”), the inverse relation (i.e., holdup of supplier by innovative 
customer) is also applicable.  
 To the extent that the customer innovation creates holdup problem, the effect should be 
more pronounced for suppliers with higher asset specificity (i.e., more relationship-specific 
investments) compared to those with lower asset specificity (i.e., less relationship-specific 
investments). This is because, as Klein et al. (1978) claims, specialized assets create quasi-rents 
that are appropriable by counterparties due to their low salvage value.   
 On the other hand, it is also possible that supplier is able to extend more trade credit with 
increased demand from customer (“demand channel”). Customer’s innovation can lead to more 
active transactions with its supplier and thus more solid trade relationship between them if the 
innovation increases customer's demand for input products and/or decreases supplier's cost when 
supplier has a fixed cost of production. Accordingly, the supplier might be willing to extend more 
trade credit to customer. If then, supplier’s provision of trade credit increases mechanically after 
customer’s innovation, and which has nothing to do with the change in relative bargaining power 
supported by the holdup channel. If this channel is at work, then we should expect that the 
 
47 In fact, Apple is collaborating with LG Display as another supplier to break its reliance on Samsung, but this strategy 
is not going as planned due to technological limitations. Apple needs smaller, power-efficient displays, which require 
a different manufacturing process from the one LG uses to create its larger OLED panels. 
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supplier’s sales to the customer or the customer’s cost of goods sold increases after customer’s 
innovation.  
 Another possibility arises from the monetary innovation cost of customer; after innovation, 
the customer might ask more trade credit to cover its innovation cost (“financing channel”). If the 
customer lacks liquidity and cannot pay its supplier in full before it recoups the innovation cost 
from its final sales, then it might request more trade credit. This channel is accounted for by the 
change in the liquidity, not change in the bargaining power, from the innovation. If this channel 
holds, then we should observe that the supplier extends even more trade credit to innovative 
customer which is more credit- or cash-constrained.  
 My approach to this study is as follows. I first document descriptive statistics on the 
sample to how customer and supplier in the sample differ in firm characteristics dimensions. Also, 
using a firm’s patenting activity as the proxy for its innovation level, I report how suppliers whose 
customer has no innovation activity and those whose customer has positive innovation activity 
differ. As for the main results, I find that supplier extends more trade credit 1, 2, and 3 years after 
its customer increases innovation activity and the effect is both statistically and economically 
significant. Since industry-specific market condition can shape the trade credit, I perform a battery 
of additional tests using different combination of fixed effects, such as supplier industry-year fixed 
effect. Next, because the possible channels (i.e., holdup, demand, and financing channel) predict 
the same outcome and are not mutually exclusive, I examine which mechanism drives the result 
using cross-sectional heterogeneity tests. Given that the impact of customer innovation on 
supplier’s trade credit is stronger when the supplier’s asset specificity is high, it is likely that 
holdup problem between customer and supplier drives the main effect.  Whereas, I do not observe 
any results which are implied by the demand and financing channel.  
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 A potential concern with the main results is that a supplier may motivate its customer to 
increase innovation activity with its ability to provide a large amount of trade credit. Alternatively, 
a supplier being capable of extending much trade credit could attract innovative customers in the 
first place. Another concern is that customer innovation could be correlated with unobservable 
confounding factors such as product market or political conditions that affect supplier’s trade credit 
decision. To further limit the potential effect of endogeneity, I conduct two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression with two instrumental variables (IVs) following Hsu et al (2015). More 
specifically, I use average R&D expenditures per patent and average duration from application 
filing to issue or grant of patent in customer’s industry level as the two IVs. Because these two 
measures proxy for monetary cost and time cost of innovation at customer’s industry level, 
respectively, they should affect customer’s incentive to innovate but are unlikely to be related to 
supplier’s trade credit policy. The 2SLS test confirms that the observed main effects are not driven 
by potential endogeneity.  
 Next question I address is whether the technological class of customer’s innovation affects 
the positive sensitivity of supplier’s trade credit provision to customer’s innovation. If the 
customer’s innovation is closely related to the supplier’s existing product technology, and hence, 
is likely to be relationship-specific, then it should mitigate the holdup problem. Consistent with 
this prediction, I find that the positive sensitivity of supplier’s trade credit to customer innovation 
decreases when customer’s new patent cites supplier’s existing patent, or, customer’s new patent 
class overlaps with existing patent classes of supplier. On the other hand, it is not observed that 
the sensitivity changes when customer’s patent cites its own existing patents, or, its patent class 
overlaps with its original patent classes. Again, these results are consistent with the holdup 
channel. In addition, the results highlight the difference between “product innovation” and 
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“process innovation”. The innovation literature (Levin and Reiss, 1988; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; 
Lin and Saggi, 2002; Lin, 2009) classifies corporate innovation into two types: innovation to 
generate new product (i.e., product innovation) and innovation to increase the productivity of 
existing assets (i.e., process innovation). Customer’s product innovation can give the customer the 
opportunity to switch to another supplier and increase its bargaining power against its original 
supplier. To the extent that deviation of customer’s technology space from that of supplier is 
interpreted as customer’s making product innovation, the result implies that product innovation 
can cause holdup problem. In the meantime, it is not clear whether customer’s process innovation 
increases or decreases its bargaining power. On one hand, customer, for instance, can develop a 
new product with its extra resources attained additionally from its process innovation. In turn, the 
customer will be able to hold up its supplier with the new product. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that customer’s process innovation increases its production efficiency and lowers its 
production costs where the extra surplus can be appropriated by its supplier. To the extent that the 
overlapping between new technology space and original technology space within a firm implies 
process innovation, the results indicate that process innovation neither increases nor decreases 
bargaining power.   
 Next, I explore how customer innovation shapes financial and investment decision of 
supplier. A supplier, when faced with holdup by its customer, might change its financial and 
investment policy to protect itself from the holdup. The supplier might need to maintain 
conservative policies to cover the increased trade credit provision, cover the cost of searching new 
customer, build a new factory line for self-production of final product, prepare the cost of vertical 
acquisition of the customer, and so on. At the same time, it can increase its own innovative activity 
to increase bargaining power against its customer. It may also learn from customer’s innovation 
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for the purpose of providing input products customized for customer’s new product, and thus, 
preventing the customer from switching to another supplier. In fact, the result shows that suppliers 
seem to adopt more conservative financial policy through holding higher cash holdings and 
lessening payout when customers innovate. At the same time, suppliers increase their own 
innovation activities after their customers innovate. Moreover, their patents cite patents of their 
customers more frequently, that is, they learn from customers’ innovation. 48  This analysis implies 
that customer innovation influences supplier’s internal policy as well as its policy in the dimension 
of interfirm relationship (i.e., trade credit policy).   
 This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, my study emphasizes the 
negative externality of innovation, which has not been much documented in the innovation 
literature. Some studies (e.g., Hall et al (2010)) note that a firm’s innovation can affect the 
productivity of other firms within the same industry, or, even other firms in distant regions. In this 
paper, I focus on the impact of innovation along the supply chain. Li (2018) finds that customer 
innovation increases the profitability of its supplier through the knowledge diffusion channel and 
demand channel. On the contrary, this paper emphasizes that customer innovation can cause 
negative externalities on supplier through the holdup channel. Also, this paper is related to the 
product market literature which investigates the externalities along the supply chain. It documents 
that customer-supplier relationship is influenced by various dimensions of counterparty risk: 
 
48 In an untabulated logistic regression, it is not more likely for customer-supplier relationship to be terminated after 
customer innovation. In fact, only 15 customer-supplier pairs out of 13,093 pairs execute vertical integrations in my 
sample. Thus, it is plausible that suppliers try to maintain their trade relationship with customers even after customer 
innovation (which potentially results in holdup problem) by adopting conservative financial policy and customizing 
their innovation for customers.  
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downstream merger activities (Fee and Thomas, 2004), bankruptcy risk (Hertzel et al., 2008), 
takeover risk (Cen et al., 2016), and so on. This paper argues that customer-supplier relationship, 
as measured by trade credit, is affected by counterparty’s innovation. Lastly, this paper explains 
post-contractual opportunistic behavior, which is emphasized in the transaction cost theory 
literature (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008), especially 
after innovation.  
2.2 Data Description 
The data for customer-supplier relationship is obtained from Compustat which is collected 
for Cohen and Frazzini (2008). It is based on Compustat Segment file and uses a phonetic matching 
algorithm to match customer names with their PERMNOs. The data for patenting activity is 
collected for Kogan et al (2017) and is based on Google Patents Data49. It has an advantage that it 
includes more detailed information about patent (e.g., patent class code, citation information) 
relative to the US Patent Office (USPTO) data. I first define Principal Customer as the customer 
which takes the largest sales portion of each supplier in each year to construct customer-supplier 
pairs.50 Next, I merge the customer-supplier data with the patent data at the Principal Customer 
 
49 The patent data is provided on Noah Stoffman’s website. The website address is https://kelley.iu.edu/nstoffma/ 
50 I focus only on principal customers because they are likely to be most influential in supplier’s corporate policy (e.g., 
trade credit provision) among all customers with their greatest sales portion. Also, SFAS No. 14 requires suppliers 
report customers which take at least 10% of total sales, and thus, I exclude customers other than principal customers 
to minimize the selection bias.  
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level. Observations are treated as zero patents when patent information is missing. The database 
of Cohen and Frazzini (2008) covers the period from 1980 to 2011, and, the patent data of Kogan 
et al (2017) has the period from 1926 to 2010. Thus, my sample period spans from 1980 to 2010 
and my sample consists of 39,003 customer-supplier-year observations (13,093 customer-supplier 
pairs).  
 The main dependent variable, Trade Credit, is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable 
attributable to its Principal Customer and is calculated as 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 =
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ×




 The main independent variable, Customer Innovation, is measured by Principal 
Customer’s patenting activities and is calculated as 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 (1 + 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡) 
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
 Table 15 shows summary statistics for my sample. Customer and supplier firms are 
different in various dimensions as documented in Panel A. For example, customer firms are larger 
in size, more profitable (i.e., higher ROA), and hold less cash balances. In Panel B, suppliers with 
positive customer innovation are larger, less levered, and hold more cash than those with zero 
customer innovation. Also, suppliers undertake more R&D and make more innovation when they 
have customers with positive innovation. On the other hand, suppliers extend more trade credit 
when customers have positive innovative activities, but the difference is not significant. 
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2.3 Empirical Results 
In this section, I perform various regression tests to analyze the hypotheses explained in 
Section 1. 
2.3.1 Base Line Results: Customer Innovation and Supplier’s Trade Credit 
In this section, I test whether supplier extends more trade credit after customer innovation 
using panel OLS regressions. The regression models include 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 (the main 
independent variable) and several supplier firm characteristics such as size, MTB, and ROA 
measured at year t. Also, the models contain year fixed effects and supplier-industry fixed effects 
(3-digit SIC code) to control for economic conditions. The dependent variable, 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 
allows time lags of 1 to 3 years since it might take time for customer innovation to take effect 
along supply chain. In addition, all models control for serial correlation by clustering the standard 
errors at customer-supplier pair level.  
 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
 
 Table 16 exhibits that customer innovation induces more trade credit provided by supplier. 
The coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 are both statistically and economically significant in 
all specifications. For example, a one standard deviation increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 leads 
to 0.319 percentage points increase in 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  after 3 years. Given that the dependent 
variable 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is scaled by supplier’s total assets, the effect size is substantial.  
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[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
 Further, to rule out the possibility that industry-specific market condition can be correlated 
with both customer innovation and supplier trade credit, I perform a battery of additional tests 
using different combination of fixed effects such as supplier’s industry-year fixed effects and 
customer’s industry-year fixed effects. In all specifications, the coefficients of 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 is statistically significant at a 1% level. Therefore, the result implies that 
the baseline effect is robust after controlling for time-varying customer or supplier industry effects. 
2.3.2 Mechanisms 
 In Section 3.1., I observe that supplier provides more trade credit after customer innovates. 
Since the possible channels (i.e., holdup, demand, and financing channel) predict the same 
outcome and are not mutually exclusive, I examine which mechanism drives the result using cross-
sectional heterogeneity tests. 
2.3.2.1 Holdup Channel 
 According to the holdup channel, customer’s more active innovation can generate higher 
degree of appropriation of quasi-rent and lead to more extension of trade credit from supplier. 
Customer innovation can generate completely new technology and products which enable the 
customer to switch to another supplier and end up terminating the current relationship.  
 Klein et al. (1978) explains that holdup problem becomes more serious as the assets of 
exploited party are more relationship-specific since specialized assets create quasi-rents that are 
appropriable by counterparties due to their low salvage value. Thus, the holdup channel predicts 
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that supplier with higher asset specificity extends even more trade credit when faced with customer 
innovation.  
 To measure supplier’s asset specificity, I introduce four proxies of asset specificity since 
it is hard to observe how much firms’ assets are relationship-specific individually.51  
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 =
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼




𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 (1 + 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)
 




𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 (1 + 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 utilize the information of customer firms of 
each supplier as identified in the Cohen and Frazzini (2008) data. 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 measures 
the current sales dependence on 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and is likely to be positively associated 
with the degree of specificity of supplier’s assets to its 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 
measures inverse of the number of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶. Here, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 of 
a supplier are the customer firms which are in the same industry as 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 
whose suppliers are in the same industry as the supplier, and hence, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 are 
the firms which the supplier can potentially switch to without adjusting its current product line.  
 On the other hand, 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 is related to intangible assets which are likely to 
be specific. For example, a supplier’s knowledge or human capital can be already specific to 
current customer. The last measure, 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4, measures the length of trade relationship 
 
51 Fan (2000) focuses on a single industry (“petrochemical industry”) and estimates asset specificity of a firm in the 
industry using its input material. However, concentrating on a single industry limits the data coverage of this paper.  
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with 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 in the sense that supplier’s assets could have been specialized to its 
customer through years of trade relationship.  
 Using each measure of asset specificity, I first divide the sample into “High” asset 
specificity and “Low” asset specificity groups with its median value. I then contrast the coefficients 
of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 estimated in the two groups.  
 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
 
 In Column 1 and 2 of Table 18, the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 is statistically 
significant only among the high asset specificity group when 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 is used. Even if 
Column 3, 5, and 7 show that the coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 are significantly positive 
among low asset specific group, but the magnitude is smaller than that among high asset specific 
group in Column 4, 6, and 8. In the meantime, note that the results in fact contradict an alternative 
explanation that is seemingly related to, but not perfectly in accordance with, the holdup 
explanation; when a supplier’s customer makes innovation, it may spontaneously extend trade 
credit as an investment expecting some benefits, such as technological spillover, from the 
customer’s innovation.52 This can simultaneously occur even when the supplier faces (potential) 
threat from customer arising from its greater bargaining power (i.e., when the holdup problem 
arises), and thus, this explanation differs from the holdup mechanism. However, the results of 
 
52 This alternative explanation is based on the benefits which are different from the avoidance of losses from holdup 
problem; in other words, the benefits don’t include, for instance, the continuation of the current trade relationship 
which is endangered under the holdup problem.  
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Table 18 do not support this explanation in that both high and low asset specificity groups can 
enjoy the same benefits according to the explanation. On the other hand, consistent with the holdup 
channel, Table 18’s results imply that it is high asset specificity firms that can enjoy more benefit 
(or avoid more potential losses from the holdup problem) by extending more trade credit rather 
than low asset specificity firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the prediction of holdup 
channel that supplier with high asset specificity extends even more trade credit when faced with 
customer innovation than that with low asset specificity.  
2.3.2.2 Demand Channel 
 Previous section exhibits the results which are consistent with the holdup channel, but an 
alternative mechanism, demand channel, might be at work. Customer innovation can lead to more 
active transactions with its supplier and thus more solid trade relationship between them if the 
innovation increases customer's demand for input products and/or decreases supplier's cost when 
supplier has a fixed cost of production. Accordingly, the supplier might be willing to extend more 
trade credit to customer. If then, supplier’s provision of trade credit increases mechanically after 
customer’s innovation, and which has nothing to do with the change in relative bargaining power 
supported by the holdup channel. If this hypothesis holds, then we should expect that the supplier’s 
sales to the customer or the customer’s cost of goods sold increases after customer’s innovation. 
More specifically, I construct two customer-level variables as follows and test whether they are 
affected by Customer Innovation.  




𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹




[Insert Table 19 here] 
 
 In the regressions, I run regressions with customer-level control variables (e.g., size, MTB, 
ROA) and customer industry fixed effects because the dependent variables are measured at 
customer-level. Also, I allow up to 3 years of time lag because the effect could show up with some 
time lag.  
 Table 19 shows that neither 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶  nor 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
 is influenced by 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼. The coefficients are not significantly different from zero and effect is not 
observed even after 3 years of time lag. In sum, the demand channel is not supported by the 
regression results.  
2.3.2.3 Financing Channel 
 Prior results support the holdup channel but are inconsistent with the demand channel, and 
this section explores possibility of another channel: financing channel. After innovation, the 
customer might ask more trade credit to cover its innovation cost. If the customer lacks liquidity 
and cannot pay its supplier in full until it recoups the innovation cost from its final sales, then it 
might request more trade credit. If this hypothesis holds, then we should observe that the supplier 
extends even more trade credit to innovative customer which is more credit- or cash-constrained.  
 To test whether this hypothesis is true, I use three customer-level financial measures: cash 
ratio, payout, and leverage. The financing channel predicts that supplier extends even more trade 
credit when its customer has low cash ratio, high payouts, and/or high leverage. To check these 
possibilities, I run regression with interaction between 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼  and each 
customer-level financial measure.  
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[Insert Table 20 here] 
 
 In Table 20, none of the interaction variables is significantly different from zero. Thus, the 
results imply that the sensitivity of supplier trade credit to customer innovation doesn’t vary across 
firms with different liquidity. Overall, the financing channel is not supported by the results.  
2.3.3 Endogeneity  
 A potential concern with the prior result is that a supplier may motivate its customer to 
increase innovation activity with its ability to provide a large amount of trade credit. Alternatively, 
a supplier being capable of extending much trade credit could attract innovative customers. Also, 
it could be case that customer innovation is correlated with unobservable confounding factors such 
as product market conditions that affect supplier’s trade credit decision. To address this potential 
endogeneity, I conduct 2SLS regression with two IVs following Hsu et al (2015). More 
specifically, I use average R&D expenditures per patent and average duration from application 
filing to issue or grant of patent in customer’s industry-year level as the two IVs.53 Because these 
two measures proxy for monetary cost and time cost of innovation at customer’s industry level, 
respectively, they should affect customer’s incentive to innovate but are unlikely to be related to 
supplier’s trade credit policy. To check whether the baseline result is robust to endogeneity 
 
53 When industry-year level instruments are not available, average R&D expenditures per patent and average duration 
from application filing to issue or grant of patent, measured in firm level using the past three-year information, are 
used as the instruments.  
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problems, I re-estimate the OLS coefficients of Customer Innovation in Table 2 in the 2SLS 
regression framework.  
 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
 
 Table 21 Column 1 reports the results of the first-stage regression.54 Consistent with Hsu 
et al (2015), 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1  and 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1  are inversely related to 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡. The reported IV F-statistics, Durbin’s p-value, and overidentification p-
value support that the monetary and time costs of innovation are valid instruments regarding weak 
IV problem, exogeneity condition, and overidentification restriction problem, respectively.  
 Table 21 Column 2 and 3 show the insignificant coefficients of (predicted) 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 possibly due to endogeneity or lowered test power from the decreased sample size, 
however, Column 4 shows that the positive effect of customer’s innovation on trade credit 
extension is not driven by the endogeneity issues.  
 For more robustness, I also use difference-in-differences test with Wrongful Discharge 
Laws (WDL) as an exogenous shock to the customer’s innovation activities. Acharya, Baghai, and 
Subramanian (2013) and Bena, Ortiz-Molina, and Simintzi (2020) show that WDLs are state-level 
legal changes that spur firm innovation by protecting employees against unjust dismissal. WDLs 
were adopted by several U.S. states since the 1970s to early 1990s, more specifically, consist of 
 
54 Table 7 Column 1 demonstrates the first-stage regression for the specification in Column 4 where the dependent 
variable is trade credit in year t+3. The first-stage regression results for Column 2 (year t+1) and 3 (year t+2) are 
qualitatively identical, and thus, are omitted for brevity.  
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“good faith exception (GF)”, “implied contract exception (IC)”, and “public policy exception 
(PP)”. I exploit the staggered adoption of WDLs in the states where the customers’ headquarters 
are located, but the suppliers’ headquarters are not, to avoid any confounding effects of WDLs on 
trade credit decisions.55  
 
[Insert Table 22 here] 
 
 Table 22 shows that customer’s IC has positive impacts on trade credit even though GF 
and PP do not have a significant effect. The results demonstrate that WDLs, which spur customer’s 
innovation, increase trade credit, indicating that the positive effect of customer’s innovation on 
trade credit extension is not likely obtained from the endogeneity bias.  
2.3.4 Technological Space of Customer Innovation 
 In this section, I examine whether the technological class of customer’s innovation affects 
the positive sensitivity of supplier’s trade credit provision to customer’s innovation. If the 
customer’s innovation is closely related to the supplier’s existing product technology, and hence, 
is likely to be relationship-specific, then it should mitigate the holdup problem. To measure the 
relatedness of customer’s innovation to supplier’s technology, I use the citation and technology 
class information recorded in Kogan et al (2017)’s data. More specifically, 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is the indicator 
variable which equals to 1 if a customer’s patent (issued in year t) cites any of its supplier’s patent 
 
55 I follow the coding from Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006). I am grateful to Professor Autor for making this data 
available on his website.  
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(issued previously as of year t).  𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 is the indicator variable which equals to 1 if 
technology class of customer’s patent (issued in year t) overlaps with historical technology classes 
of supplier’s patents (issued previously as of year t).  
 
[Insert Table 23 here] 
 
 In Table 23, the interaction between 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼  and 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  has negative 
associations with 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 even though it is significantly negative only in Column 1. On the 
other hand, the interaction between 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼  and 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡   has negative 
associations with 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in all specifications. Consistent with this prediction, I find that 
the positive sensitivity of supplier’s trade credit to customer innovation decreases when customer’s 
patent cites supplier’s existing patent, or, customer’s patent class overlaps with existing patent 
classes of supplier. Again, these results are consistent with the holdup channel. 
 
[Insert Table 24 here] 
 
 On the other hand, it is not observed that the sensitivity changes when customer’s patent 
cites its own existing patents, or, its patent class overlaps with its original patent classes. In Table 
24, the interaction between 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 and 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥 (or 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥) is not 
significantly different from zero.  
 Arguably, the results in Table 23 and 24 may highlight the difference between “product 
innovation” and “process innovation”. The innovation literature (Levin and Reiss, 1988; Cohen 
and Klepper, 1996; Lin and Saggi, 2002; Lin, 2009) classifies corporate innovation into two types: 
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innovation to generate new product (i.e., product innovation) and innovation to increase the 
productivity of existing assets (i.e., process innovation). Customer’s product innovation can give 
itself the opportunity to switch to another supplier and increase its bargaining power against its 
original supplier. To the extent that deviation of customer’s technology space from that of supplier 
is interpreted as customer’s making product innovation, the result implies that product innovation 
can cause holdup problem. In the meantime, it is not clear whether customer’s process innovation 
increases or decreases its bargaining power. On one hand, customer, for instance, can develop a 
new product with its extra resources attained additionally from its process innovation. In turn, the 
customer will be able to hold up its supplier with the new product. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that customer’s process innovation increases its production efficiency and lowers its 
production costs where the extra surplus can be appropriated by its supplier. To wit, increased 
production efficiency can enable the supplier to hold up the customer. To the extent that the 
overlapping between new technology space and original technology space within a firm implies 
process innovation, the result indicates that the impact of customer’s process innovation on its 
bargaining power is neutral.  
2.3.5 Financial and Investment Decision of Supplier 
 In this section, I explore how customer innovation shapes financial and investment 
decision of supplier. A supplier, when faced with holdup by its customer, might change its financial 
and investment policy to protect itself from the holdup. The supplier might need to maintain 
conservative policies, for instance, to cover the increased trade credit provision, cover the cost of 
searching new customer, build a new factory line for self-production of final product, prepare the 
cost of vertical acquisition of the customer, and so on. At the same time, it can increase its own 
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innovative activity to increase bargaining power against its customer. It may also learn from 
customer’s innovation for the purpose of providing input products customized for customer’s new 
product, and thus, preventing the customer from switching to another supplier.  
 To examine these possibilities, I test whether supplier’s financial variables (i.e., cash ratio, 
payout, leverage) and investment variables (i.e., R&D expenditures, Supplier Innovation, 
Technology Spillover). 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of patents of 
supplier. 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the number of 
customer’s past patents cited by supplier’s patent at year t over the number of supplier’s patent at 
year t.  
 
[Insert Table 25 here] 
 
 Table 25 demonstrates that suppliers seem to adopt more conservative financial policy 
through holding higher cash holdings and lessening payout when customers innovate. The 
sensitivity of supplier’s leverage to customer’s innovation is not significantly different from zero. 
At the same time, Column 5 shows that suppliers increase their own innovation activities after 
their customers innovate. Moreover, Column 6 implies that their patents cite patents of their 
customers more frequently, that is, they learn from customers’ innovation. However, the impact 
of customer’s innovation on supplier’s R&D expenditures is positive but statistically insignificant. 
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This analysis implies that customer innovation influences supplier’s internal policy as well as its 
policy in the dimension of interfirm relationship (i.e., trade credit policy). 56 
2.3.6 Robustness 
2.3.6.1 Measurement of Trade Credit 
 The previous results show that suppliers extend more trade credit to their customers where 
the trade credit is measured as the proportion of a supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its 
Principal Customer and customer innovation is measured by Principal Customer’s patenting 
activities. These measurements rely on the assumption that a supplier provides its customers with 
trade credit proportionate to their portions of sales. Meanwhile, Freeman (2020) explains that a 
supplier extends less trade credit to its customer with higher sales dependence to avoid credit 
concentration. Thus, this section loosens the assumption and examines whether the main results 
are robust.  
 First, I use a supplier’s aggregated trade credit (i.e., total trade receivables) as the 
dependent variable and aggregated patenting activities of all other customers as well as Principal 
Customer as the independent variable. In this way, the concern of the measurement error in trade 
credit received by Principal Customer can be mitigated by measuring trade credit and patents in 
 
56 In an untabulated logistic regression, it is not more likely for customer-supplier relationship to be terminated after 
customer innovation. In fact, only 15 customer-supplier pairs out of 13,093 pairs execute vertical integrations in my 
sample. Thus, it is plausible that suppliers try to maintain their trade relationship with customers even after customer 
innovation (which potentially results in holdup problem) by adopting conservative financial policy and customizing 
their innovation for customers.  
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the aggregated level. Panel A of Appendix B Table B1 aggregate the patenting activities by 
counting the number of patents of all customers, and Panel B use the number of patents of all 
customers averaged using sales portion as the weights. The results are robust to the aggregation of 
trade credit and patenting activities.  
 Second, I focus on the suppliers whose Principal Customers are most influential customers 
in order to minimize any confounding effects of the other customers and their relationship with 
the suppliers. More specifically, the sample is restricted to the suppliers that have Principal 
Customer as the sole customer, or the suppliers whose Principal Customer takes more than 80% 
of the suppliers’ sales. Panel C and D of Appendix B Table B1 report the regression results with 
the restricted samples, and the results are robust to these restrictions.  
2.4 Conclusion 
 This paper investigates negative externalities of innovation along supply chain by 
analyzing the effect of customer innovation on supplier trade credit. Main finding of this paper is 
that supplier extends more trade credit after customer makes innovation, and the effect is robust 
after controlling for various firm characteristics and industry-specific market conditions, and, to 
potential endogeneity issues.  
 Second, I analyze three possible channels (i.e., holdup, demand, and financing channels) 
which can derive the main effect. My results are only consistent with the holdup channel which 
predicts the stronger effect size of high asset specificity group than low asset specificity group.  
 Next, I claim that the technological relatedness of customer’s innovation to supplier’s 
innovation downsizes the positive sensitivity of supplier’s trade credit provision to customer’s 
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innovation. Also, this result highlights that product innovation causes holdup problems, whereas 
process innovation neither strengthens nor weakens holdup problems.  
 Lastly, I find that supplier adopts more conservative financial policy (i.e., higher cash 
holdings and less payouts) and produces more innovation by learning from customer’s innovation. 
Thereby, I conclude that customer innovation impacts supplier’s internal policy as well as its 
policy in the dimension of interfirm relationship (i.e., trade credit policy).  However, the trade 
relationship per se does not appear to terminate after customer innovation.  
 Overall, my results propose a unique channel through which corporate innovation can 
influence upstream or downstream firms. While this paper emphasizes the negative externalities 
of innovation along supply chain, a firm’s innovation can have externalities on its other 
stakeholders such as employee, union, and government, and which is not deeply studied in the 
literature. For instance, a firm’s innovation might endow its management with its increased 
bargaining power against its employees in the midst of wage negotiation process. I believe this 







3.0 Third Essay: Spillover Effect of Corporate Fraud: Evidence from Financial Constraints 
of Intra- and Inter-Industry Firms 
3.1 Introduction 
“Global Crossing’s sudden implosion has done more than sting shareholders, creditors 
and employees. It’s burdened the suffering telecom industry with new worries about solvency and 
accounting irregularities while prompting some investors to flee the sector. “Global Crossing was 
a wake-up call for a lot of people that didn’t realize how bad the telecom sector had become,”....” 
- March 14, 2002, Simon Avery, AP Business Writer 
 
Previous studies investigate the influence of corporate fraud on a firm in several aspects 
such as credibility and credit ratings. For example, Chava, Cheng, Huang, and Lobo (2010) 
documents that class action lawsuits increase the cost of equity capital in the plaintiff firms. Deng, 
Willis, and Xu (2014) finds that fraud firms face higher cost of bank debt (i.e., higher loan spread 
and up-front fees, and, enhanced covenants and collateral requirement). Also, frauds can 
negatively affect the stock prices, and which proves the negative perception of market on the firm 
and reputational loss after frauds. For instance, Gande and Lewis (2009) shows that corporate fraud 
revelation induces value decline in the fraud firms. These effects may lead to fraud firms’ facing 
greater financial constraints than before the frauds are publicized (or they are known to capital 
market indirectly before announcement.) Arena and Julio (2011) finds that future litigation risk is 
a determinant of cash holdings and investment decisions and explains that firms with higher 
litigation risk give up investment and hoard cash anticipating future settlement costs. In addition, 
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the literature includes investigation of impact of litigation risk on IPO underpricing (Lowry and 
Shu, 2002) and M&A behavior (Gormley and Matsa, 2009). 
 Another strand of literature concentrates on the externality of a firm’s event or policy on 
other firms. Overall, the literature falls into two main categories: intra-industry or inter-industry 
spillover effect. The first strand of literature investigates the externality of a firm’s action or 
behavior on the peer firms in the same industry. In fact, the intra-industry spillover or contagion 
effect is studied using various corporate events, such as firm bankruptcy (Lang and Stulz, 1992), 
dividend announcement (Firth, 1996), mergers and acquisitions (Akhigbe and Martin, 2000), stock 
repurchases (Massa, Zahid, and Theo, 2007). In particular, Gande and Lewis (2009) observes that 
peer firms experience negative stock price reactions to the announcement of lawsuits within the 
same industry. Similarly, Yu, Zhang, and Zheng (2015) focuses on the effect of corporate fraud of 
China firms and observes the negative stock price response of peer firms within the same industry 
when a firm’s fraud is announced. Also, the paper explains that this negative spillover effect can 
be mitigated for peer firms with good governance. On the other hand, Arena and Julio (2011) finds 
that fraud of a firm increases intra-industry firms’ cash holding level and interprets that increase 
in the likelihood of a future lawsuit, caused by announcement of the fraud, induce peer firms to 
hoard more cash. In the meantime, Kumar and Langberg (2009) proves by its model that inflated 
performance report or disclosure by a firm can result in overinvestments of competitors, and the 
prediction is different from the result of Arena and Julio (2011). Consistent with Kumar and 
Langberg (2009), Beatty, Liao, and Yu (2013) empirically investigates high-profile firms’ 
accounting frauds and finds that peer firms’ investment is greater during the fraud period compared 
to the pre-fraud period. Thereby, the papers confirm that frauds have spillover effect on peer firms’ 
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corporate policy as well as stock price reaction. However, to my knowledge, there is no past 
research about the spillover effect of corporate fraud in the perspective of financial constraints.  
 In addition, some studies focus on the externality which ripples through product market 
relationship. This inter-industry externality is studied previously; Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers 
(2008) studies the spillover effect of bankruptcy filings along the supply chain and finds negative 
stock price effects for supplier firms (but not much for customer firms). Itzkowitz (2013), on the 
other hand, shows that suppliers in important relationships with customers hold more cash than 
other suppliers and the behavior is assumed to be based on the precautionary motive of suppliers 
before they lose important customers. Also, there is also research about information transfer 
between industries. For example, Ahern and Harford (2014) investigates propagation of merger 
waves along the product market chain. However, I cannot find past research about inter-industry 
(or supply chain) spillover effect of frauds regarding financial constraints up to now.  
 In this paper, I investigate whether corporate frauds affect financial constraints of intra-
industry peer firms, customer or supplier industry firms. Using the securities class action lawsuits 
listed in the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse as the fraud sample, I obtain the information 
of cases such as plaintiff firm name, filing date, timeline of case, settlement cost, and so on. Even 
though firms are exposed to other types of lawsuits such as antitrust and copyright lawsuits, 
securities class action lawsuit sample is a useful database for this research given that securities 
class action lawsuits are filed by investors who purchased or sold securities of a firm during class 
period. That is, investors are likely to pay attention to the securities class action lawsuits and 
respond to them. In addition, the database provides detailed information about cases and is publicly 
available at the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website  
(http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html) at Stanford University.  
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 Also, I utilize dollar value of production or consumption on commodities of each industry 
which is obtainable from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to identify important 
supplier or customer industries of a fraud industry (i.e., industry in which one or more frauds arise) 
in product market relationship. Thereby, the top-supplier and top-customer industries of each 
industry are found. 
 Using cash flow sensitivity of investment, annual payout ratios, and Standard & Poor’s 
debt rating as the measures of financial constraints, I investigate how each measure of intra-
industry firms, top-supplier industry firms, and top-customer industry firms respond to the 
announcement of frauds. The literature regarding financial constraints has suggested several 
measures for financial constraints, but each of them is subject to measurement error problem, and, 
several past studies raise doubts on the validity of each measure. Hence, I use the three measures 
and check if results are consistent with each other.  
When a fraud occurs, then intra-industry firms can take advantage of decreased competition 
in the product market since fraud firms may produce less or consumption on their products may 
become rigid, and as a result, the other firms within the same industry can gain additional market 
share. Then, this “competitive effect” in the product market would alleviate the financial 
constraints in intra-industry firms. If this competitive effect generates the positive spillover effect, 
then concentrated industry will experience more positive spillover in terms of financial constraints 
than competitive industry when a fraud occurs within industry because firms would gain more 
market share in concentrated industry. 
Whereas, investors may suspend financing fraud firms and find another firms for 
alternative investments when a fraud occurs. In that case, intra-industry firms of a fraud firm can 
be good places to transfer the investors’ money. Especially, investors with diversification purpose 
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would try to find another firm in the same industry as the fraud firm. If then, intra-industry firms 
will find it easier to receive financing and their financial constraints will be mitigated. This 
explanation for positive intra-industry spillover is not necessarily identical to the competitive 
effect explanation; while the competitive effect channel demonstrates that intra-industry firms 
receive gains from their enhanced product market performance, this explanation explains that those 
firms receive reflected benefit directly from capital market when a fraud arises. Then, the next 
question is, do intra-industry firms receive reflected benefit evenly? If the positive spillover stems 
from just transfer of liquidity to peer firms in the same industry (“liquidity effect”), then those 
firms will receive the reflected gain evenly, or at best, more visible firms will receive relatively 
more gain in intra-industry. On the other hand, investors may turn their attention from fraud firms 
to other peer firms and this will move their money. In turn, investors, who are subject to limited 
attention and monitoring ability, may pay more attention to less visible firms up to then. Thus, if 
the positive spillover is caused by transfer of attention (“attention effect”), then less visible firms 
will receive more financing. As such, a firm’s visibility to investors is an important factor to 
differentiate between the liquidity effect and attention effect, and thus, I use the number of analysts 
covering the firm so as to measure its visibility. 
In addition, I explore one additional channel which may lead to negative intra-industry 
spillover outcome while the competitive effect, liquidity effect, and attention effect results in 
positive intra-industry spillover outcome; peer firms in the same industry would receive 
reassessment from investors when a fraud of a firm is publicized (“reassessment effect”). That is, 
if fraud occurrence seems to be an inherent problem in that industry, then investors may focus on 
the likelihood of governance failure in intra-industry firms which are also likely to be susceptible 
to weak governance and fraud. Besides, given the anecdotal evidence that corporate frauds cluster 
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within an industry, investors would reassess them. Consequentially, peer firms’ financial 
constraints can rise and frauds can lead to negative intra-industry spillover effect. To investigate 
this possibility, I utilize Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which was introduced as a reaction to big 
corporate frauds such as Enron and WorldCom cases. To the extent that enactment of SOX was 
aimed at preventing frauds, I assume that investors’ concern over future governance failure in peer 
firms has been relieved after SOX and reassessment effect would be weakened. Hence, if the 
reassessment effect provides a channel of negative spillover on intra-industry firms, then negative 
spillover should be mitigated in post-SOX period. 
Next, I explore whether frauds impact financial constraints of top customer and top supplier 
industry firms positively or negatively. If a fraud arises and is detected or alleged, then the fraud 
firm’s management, operation, and production can be brought to a halt due to fraud investigation 
and litigation process. As a result, firms which are closely related to the fraud firm in the product 
market chain may need to suspend their production. Also, they will face increased uncertainty in 
the case that they need to replace their customer or supplier which is under fraud investigation. As 
a result, decline in cash flows and imposition of searching costs and contracting costs will escalate 
their financial frictions even though the degree of information asymmetry or moral hazard problem 
stays the same within them; they need to borrow more. Unfortunately, I cannot find a proper 
observable measure to test this hypothesis even if this mechanism can be an instant explanation of 
negative spillover on supplier or customer firms’ financial constraints. 
On the other hand, there is a more direct channel through which spillover regarding 
financial constraints on supplier and customer industry firms is conveyed; the idea is that, if the 
fraud firm is in adverse selection due to its fraud investigation, then supplier firms which have 
provided trade credits may find it hard to collect the trade credits at the right time. Thereby, the 
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supplier firms will face more financial frictions than before and hence experience negative 
spillover outcome. On the other hand, it is not certain whether customer firms which have been 
provided with trade credits from the fraud firm will face negative or positive spillover effect from 
fraud. All else equal, customers which have depended on the fraud firm’s provision of trade credits 
may delay their repayment if the fraud firm suspends its operation and management, and which 
will alleviate their financial constraints for a while. Whereas, if a large amount of settlement money 
is imposed on the fraud firm and it urges the customer firms to reimburse the trade credits, then 
the customer firms should hasten the repayment unexpectedly. Then, their financial constraints 
would be aggravated. Therefore, whether frauds generate different degree of spillover effects on 
customer firms with different usage of trade credits is an empirical question.  
Aside from the above explanation which supports the negative spillover effect on customer 
or supplier industry firms, it is also plausible that investors transfer their attention or liquidity from 
the fraud industry to other industries. This channel would result in positive spillover effect on the 
customer or supplier industries, however, the explanation is also applicable to all other industries 
and the positive spillover effect would be widespread over all other industries.  
3.2 Data Description 
3.2.1 Fraud Data 
The sample for corporate fraud is obtained from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
website (http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html) at Stanford University for the period 1996 to 
2017 and 4,377 securities class action lawsuits are identified. Among sued firms, only firms with 
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tickers present in the Compustat universe are left in the sample. Also, if name of a sued firm is 
different from that of the matched Compustat firm, then it is excluded from the fraud sample to 
improve the quality of matching.57 As Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) explains, the potential 
problem in using the securities class action data is to include frivolous cases, but not to omit critical 
cases. Thus, I filter out cases using the following requirements; firms with total assets less than 
$750 million in the last fiscal year before the filing date are excluded,58 and, this leaves 828 cases 
in the fraud sample. After that, settled cases in which the settlement is at least $2 million are 
included59, and, 191 cases are left in the sample eventually. In each year, fraud industry is defined 
as the BEA IO industry where at least one corporate fraud is detected.  
3.2.2 BEA IO Data 
To identify supplier and customer industry of fraud industry, I use the benchmark IO 
relationships provided by the BEA following Becker and Thomas (2008) and Ahern and Harford 
(2014). The BEA provides dollar flows between all customer industries and supplier industries 
according to its industry classification (“IO industry classification”). The IO tables record the 
dollar flows based on the data from the Economic Census and are updated every five years. Since 
 
57 I searched google and each firm’s website manually to see if the name has changed during the sample period. 
58 As Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) notes, firm size or assets may decrease after fraud is detected or revealed.  
59 According to Choi, Nelson, and Pritchard (2009), the dollar value cutoff of $2 million in settlement is likely to sort 
out cases which have merit. 
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the fraud data cover the period 1996 to 2017, I use the IO tables for 1997, 2002, and 2007.60 In 
each of the three years, a table for definition of IO industries, a make table, and a use table are 
provided. In the table for IO industry definition, IO industry codes and their description are 
reported, and, related NAICS codes are also reported for every IO industry. The make table shows 
the dollar value of each commodity produced by supplier industries. A commodity is any good, 
output, or service which is produced, and, multiple industries used to produce the same 
commodity. Typically, a supplier industry is dominated by one type of commodity. On the other 
hand, the use table records the dollar value of each commodity purchased by customer industries. 
For consistency, I use producers’ prices throughout the data work.  
 In order to identify the product market relationship, I follow the matrix construction 
process following Becker and Thomas (2008) and Ahern and Harford (2014); first, I construct an 
Industry-by-Commodity matrix where each component represents the percentage of each 
commodity that is produced by each industry (i.e., market share of each industry for a commodity). 
Accordingly, this matrix is calculated from the values in the make table through dividing each 
element of the make table by the sum of all the elements in column which it belongs to. Next, I 
construct an Industry-by-Industry matrix where each component shows the dollar value flowing 
from the customer industry to the supplier industry by multiplying the above Industry-by-
Commodity matrix (i.e., market share matrix) by the use table. The row and column represent 
supplier industries and customer industries, respectively. Therefore, each matrix component (i, j) 
divided by the total values of commodities that supplier industry i  produced is equal to the 
 
60 As of September 2017, IO table for 2007 is the most recent information available since tables are updated every 
five years with a five-year lag. 
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proportion of supplier industry i’s commodity outputs purchased by customer industry j. Thereby, 
the customer industry with the highest proportion is defined as the top customer industry of 
supplier industry i . Similarly, each matrix component (i, j)  divided by the total values of 
commodities that customer industry j purchased is equal to the proportion of customer industry j’s 
commodity inputs that are purchased from supplier industry i. Hence, the supplier industry with 
the highest proportion is defined as the top supplier industry of customer industry j.61 
 The above process of defining the top customer or top supplier industries is applied to each 
of the IO tables in 1997, 2002, and 2007. Also, I assume that the top customer or top supplier 
relationship of an industry is fixed until the next IO table is updated. For instance, the relationship 
defined by using the 1997 IO table is assumed to hold until 2001.  
 Next, I classify each fraud firm into IO industry using its NAICS code and the 
corresponding IO industry code. Accordingly, top customer or top supplier industry is identified 
for a fraud firm by merging the fraud sample and the BEA IO database.  
3.2.3 Compustat Firm Data 
 To match the sample period of the fraud data, I focus on U.S. public firms whose 
information is available during the period 1996 to 2017 in the Compustat universe according to 
their fiscal years. For each firm-year observation, necessary firm variables are constructed and the 
 
61 Note that some industries have themselves as the top customer (supplier) industries, and, I choose the industry with 
the second highest proportion as the top customer (supplier) industry in order to differentiate between the spillover 
effect of frauds on intra-industry and that on top customer (supplier) industry. 
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definition of the variables is summarized in the Appendix C.62 In particular, long- and short-term 
bond ratings variables are obtained through merging the Compustat Fundamental Annuals file and 
Rating file provided in the WRDS. Following the convention of previous research, financial firms 
(SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are excluded from the Compustat 
sample. In addition, firm-year observation with total assets less than 30 million dollars in 2000 
dollars are deleted from the sample.63  
 Next, for each Compustat firm-year observation, occurrence of fraud within the same 
industry, the bottom industry, or the top industry is identified by merging the Compustat sample 
and fraud-BEA IO merged sample. More specifically, if a fraud occurs within the same industry, 
then the indicator variable FraudWithin is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, if a fraud occurs 
within the bottom (top) industry along product market relationship in the last fiscal year, then the 
indicator variable FraudBottom (FraudTop)is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. In the final sample, 12.1%, 
8.1%, and 5.3% of the firm-year observations experience fraud within the same industry, the 
bottom industry, and the top industry, respectively. Table 26 shows the summary statistics for 
intra-industry, top-supplier, and top-customer industry firms. Also, Table 26 presents the statistics 
for industries which are not classified as either of the three industries. 
 
[Insert Table 26 here] 
 
62 In each year, all variables (except indicator variables) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to alleviate the 
influence of extreme values throughout the paper.  
63 Total assets values are calculated in 2000 dollars using the CPI index data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The empirical results of this paper are similar even if the different cutoff values for screening total assets are used; 
cutoff values of 10, 15, 20, or 25 million dollars in 2000 all lead to the similar empirical results. 
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3.3 Empirical Results 
 
3.3.1 Overall Spillover in Financial Constraints 
This section analyzes how financial constraints of firms in intra-industry, top industry, and 
bottom industry respond to corporate frauds. To measure financial constraints, I utilize cash flow 
sensitivity of investment, annual payout ratio, long-term bond rating, and short-term bond rating. 
Each of these is frequently used in research of financial constraints literature, but I use all those 
measures since they are proxies for financial constraints which are not directly observable to 
econometricians.  
First, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) introduces the sensitivity of a firm’s 
investment to its cash flow as a measure of financial constraints. Under frictionless capital markets, 
a firm’s investments should be a linear function of the value of its investment opportunities and 
not be affected by its financial status. That is, the firm can undertake investments freely according 
to the value of its potential investments. However, with the existence of friction in capital markets, 
a firm should choose projects among its investments opportunities and its investments deviate from 
the first-best level. Thus, the firm can increase its investment when more financing is available or 
its cash flows increase. This is the notion of using cash flow sensitivity of investment for measuring 
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financial constraints. While there are critiques of this measure,64 previous studies such as Rauh 
(2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007) claim that it is a good measure of financial constraints. 
Next, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) finds that financially constrained firms have 
lower payout ratios than unconstrained firms, and thus, I employ annual payout ratios as one of 
the financial constraints measures in this paper. A drawback of this measure is that payout can be 
decided by other consideration such as signaling purpose rather than the degree of financial 
constraints. Also, it is widely known that firms engage in dividend smoothing and try to avoid 
cutting dividend. As a result, it is plausible that a firm’s payout ratio is static over time even though 
its financial constraints vary. 
Standard & Poor’s rates and reports credit rating grades of firms and several studies (e.g., 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Denis and Sibilkov, 
2009) classify firms into financially constrained group and unconstrained group according to their 
rating scores. More specifically, the studies define that firms are classified into financially 
constrained group if their debt rating is not available in the past (i.e., they have never been rated 
by S&P before) but they have outstanding debt. Availability of debt rating of a firm is quite static 
over time, and therefore, I use the rating score itself to observe variation in rating score which is 
one of the dependent variables in this paper. I implement the numerical transformation procedure 
of letter grade following Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang (2015) and Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003). 
 
64 Past studies including Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Erickson and Whited (2000), and Alti (2003) criticizes the use 
of investment-cash flow sensitivity for measuring financial constraints. The studies explain that cash flows capture 
investment opportunities and profitability as well, and thus the sensitivity is not a perfect measure for financial 
constraints. 
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To estimate responsiveness of financial constraints when frauds occur within intra-
industry, top industry, or bottom industry, I use the following specification: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊
𝐾𝐾
= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
+ 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾




× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∙
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∙ 𝐶𝐶 + 𝜖𝜖  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + +𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐶𝐶 + 𝜖𝜖 
∆𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + +𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝐶𝐶 + 𝜖𝜖 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆
𝐾𝐾
 is the ratio of investments over beginning-of-period capital stock and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
 is the 
ratio of cash flows over beginning-of-period capital stock. Payout Ratio is the ratio of total payouts 
(i.e., dividend plus repurchase) over total assets. Debt Rating is the numerical value of long- or 
short-term debt rating. Higher value of Debt Rating corresponds to lower letter rating grade and 
hence lower credit score by definition. In the third equation, ∆𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 (i.e., change in Debt 
Rating from last fiscal year) is used as the dependent variable. 𝐶𝐶 is the vector of firm control 
variables including Market-to-book ratio, leverage, ROA, and so on. The control variables are 
obtained from firm information in the last fiscal year. I also include firm fixed effects to control 
for time-invariant component of financial constraints which are not captured by firm variables in 
𝐶𝐶. Year dummies are included as well to control for U.S. economic condition. 
Table 27 presents the estimates for the above specifications. Column (1) and (2) represent 
the OLS estimates for the cash flow sensitivity of investment. Next, column (3) and (4) are the 
OLS results for Payout Ratio. In sequence, column (5) and (6) represent the estimates for Debt 
Rating in ordered logistic regression model. Since 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆
𝐾𝐾
 is likely to be autocorrelated within a firm, 
I include the lagged value of it as an explanatory variable in column (1), and, change in 𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆
𝐾𝐾
 from 




× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 is significantly negative. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  and 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵  are all significantly positive except the coefficient of 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in column (2). These results imply that the cash flow sensitivity of investment 
decreases for firms within the same industry as fraud firms. In contrast, the cash flow sensitivity 
of investment increases for firms in the top supplier or top customer industries of the industry in 
which a fraud occurs. Column (3) represents the result for Payout Ratio and the coefficient of 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥  is significantly positive. On the other hand, the coefficients of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  and 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵  are not significantly different from zero. In column (4), lagged Payout Ratio is 
included as an independent variable and the result is similar with that of column (3). Therefore, 
the results show that firms within the same industry as a fraud firm increase annual payout. In 
column (5), change in long-term debt rating is used as the dependent variable, and, the coefficients 
of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥  and 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  are significantly positive. Column (6) shows the result when 
change in short-term debt rating is used as the dependent variable, and, the coefficient of 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵  is significantly positive. Hence, long-term debt rating becomes worse for firms 
within the same industry or top customer industry and short-term debt rating becomes worse for 
firms in top supplier industry when frauds occur.  
 
[Insert Table 27 here] 
 
 Overall, the results in Table 27 support that firms’ financial constraints are mitigated when 
peer firms in the same industry commit frauds, and, financial constraints increase for firms in 
industries which are important to fraud firm’s industry in the product market relationship. 
However, there are two points to be noted about the results. First, the fact that there is no significant 
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impact of fraud on payout ratio in top supplier and top customer firms could be attributable to 
intention of firms to avoid cutting dividend and hence total payouts despite their escalated financial 
constraints. This should be an inherent problem in using payout ratio as financial constraint 
measure. Second, debt rating could be a more forward-looking measure of financial constraints 
than cash flow sensitivity of investment or payout ratio; while cash flow sensitivity of investment 
and payout ratio instantly capture today’s financial constraints, debt rating (especially long-term 
debt rating) reflect the assessment of credit rating company about future constraints given that it 
is constructed as the reference indicator for investors. Therefore, degeneration of debt rating in 
intra-industry firms may imply credit rating company’s intention to inform investors of the 
likelihood of future fraud events in intra-industry which is dominant over its assessment of today’s 
financial constraints.  
3.3.2 Channels for Intra-industry Spillover 
3.3.2.1 Competitive Effect 
If a fraud occurs, then intra-industry firms can take advantage of decreased competition in 
the product market and the other firms within the same industry can gain additional market share. 
Then, this competitive effect in the product market would alleviate the financial constraints in 
intra-industry firms. If the positive spillover effect is caused by competitive effect, then 
concentrated industry will experience more positive spillover in terms of financial constraints than 
competitive industry when a fraud occurs within industry because firms would gain more market 
share in concentrated industry. 
To test this, I first obtain the HHI index for each IO industry and classify IO industries into 
high HHI industry group (i.e., concentrated industry group) and low HHI industry group (i.e., 
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competitive industry group) in each year. Next, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ (i.e., indicator variable which equals to 
1 if HHI of an industry is higher than median for each year) is interacted with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
 and 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 
to differentiate change in cash flow sensitivity of investment among different HHI industry groups 
when frauds occur in the same industry. Table 28 shows the regression results when this three-way 
interaction is included in column (1) and (2). In column (1) and (2), the coefficients of 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ are significantly positive. This indicates that cash flow sensitivity 
of investment decreases more steeply for concentrated industries when a fraud occurs within the 
same industry. Column (3) and (4) show that 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ has significantly positive 
impact on annual payout ratio. Thus, increment in payout when a fraud occurs is more prominent 
in concentrated industries than competitive industries. However, 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ doesn’t 
show a significant coefficient in column (5) and (6).  
 
[Insert Table 28 here] 
 
In sum, the results in Table 28 support that positive intra-industry spillover regarding 
financial constraints measured by cash flow sensitivity of investment and payout ratios is stronger 
in concentrated industries. Hence, it can be interpreted that competitive effect is a channel through 
which frauds induce positive spillover effect within the same industry.  
 
3.3.2.2 Attention Effect vs. Liquidity Effect 
When a fraud occurs, investors may suspend financing fraud firms and find another firms 
for alternative investments. In that case, intra-industry firms of a fraud firm can be good places to 
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transfer the investors’ money. Especially, investors with diversification purpose would try to find 
another firm in the same industry as the fraud firm. If then, intra-industry firms will find it easier 
to receive financing and their financial constraints will be mitigated. This explanation for positive 
intra-industry spillover is not necessarily identical to the competitive effect explanation; while the 
competitive effect channel demonstrates that intra-industry firms receive gains from their 
enhanced product market performance, this explanation explains that those firms receive reflected 
benefit directly from capital market when a fraud arises.  
Then, the next question is, do intra-industry firms receive reflected benefit evenly? If the 
positive spillover stems from just transfer of liquidity to peer firms in the same industry (“liquidity 
effect”), then those firms will receive the reflected gain evenly, or at best, more visible firms will 
receive relatively more gain in intra-industry. On the other hand, investors may turn their attention 
from fraud firms to other peer firms and this will move their money. In turn, investors, who are 
subject to limited attention and monitoring ability, may pay more attention to less visible firms up 
to then. Thus, if the positive spillover is caused by transfer of attention (“attention effect”), then 
less visible firms will receive more financing.  
To test whether liquidity effect or attention effect is at work for the positive spillover effect 
on intra-industry firms, I use analyst coverage as the proxy for visibility of a firm. More 
specifically, I obtain the number of analysts on I/B/E/S providing earnings forecasts in each firm 
and define 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 as the natural logarithm of the number. Table 29 column (1) and 
(2) present the regression results when the interaction variable 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  is included as an explanatory variable. In column (1) and (2), 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
×
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 shows significantly positive coefficients. This implies that 
cash flow sensitivity of investment declines more for intra-industry firms with lower analyst 
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coverage. Column (5) and (6) exhibit the positive coefficients of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼, and, it denotes less downgrade in both long- and short-term debt ratings for 
firms with lower analyst coverage.  
 
[Insert Table 29 here] 
 
Therefore, Table 29 supports attention effect rather than liquidity effect as a possible 
channel of positive spillover effect on intra-industry firms of frauds. However, the positive 
spillover effect is not significantly different across firms with different visibility when payout 
ratios are used as the measure of financial constraints. One possible explanation for this is that 
more visible firms’ intention to maintain or increase payouts (due to its visibility to investors) 
could be strong enough to cancel out relatively more positive spillover outcome on less visible 
firms.  
3.3.2.3 Comparison of Possible Channels for Intra-industry Spillover 
In the last previous subsections, the results in Table 28 and Table 29 support that the 
competitive effect and attention effect provide channels through which frauds alleviate the 
financial constraints of intra-industry peer firms. However, the two effects are not mutually 
exclusive; it is possible that both effects can be at work simultaneously, or, that one effect is 
dominant over another effect. Thus, I analyze the two effects at the same time in this subsection.  
In addition, I explore one additional channel which may lead to negative intra-industry 
spillover outcome even though the results in Table 27 show positive spillover outcome overall; 
peer firms in the same industry would receive reassessment from investors when a fraud of a firm 
is publicized (“reassessment effect”). That is, if fraud occurrence seems to be an inherent problem 
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in that industry, then investors may focus on the likelihood of governance failure in intra-industry 
firms which are also likely to be susceptible to weak governance and fraud. Besides, given the 
anecdotal evidence that corporate frauds cluster within an industry, investors would reassess them. 
Consequentially, peer firms’ financial constraints can rise and frauds can lead to negative intra-
industry spillover effect. To investigate this possibility, I utilize Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which 
was introduced as a reaction to big corporate frauds such as Enron and WorldCom cases. To the 
extent that enactment of SOX was aimed at preventing frauds, I assume that investors’ concern 
over future governance failure in peer firms has been relieved after SOX and reassessment effect 
would be weakened. Hence, if the reassessment effect provides a channel of negative spillover on 
intra-industry firms, then negative spillover should be mitigated in post-SOX period. To check 
whether this channel is also at work, I define 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 which is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the year of observation is 2002 or later.  
In Table 30, I add 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾




𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶  as the independent variables to 
investigate how cash flow sensitivity of investment varies across each of the three variables. In 
column (1) and (2), the coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾




𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 are significantly negative and positive, respectively, and which is consistent 
with the results of Table 28 and Table 29. The coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 are 
both significantly positive in column (1) and (2), and thus, cash flow sensitivity of investment 
increases more after the enactment of SOX when frauds occur. In column (3) and (4), 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ shows a significantly positive impact on payout ratios as in Table 28, 
and, the coefficient of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 is not significantly different from zero 
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as in Table 29. In addition, 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 doesn’t exhibit a significant influence on 
payout ratios. Column (6) shows significantly positive impact of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  on change in short-term bond rating. In both column (5) and (6), the 
coefficients of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 are significantly positive, and which means that frauds 
lead to more downgrade in both long- and short-term debt rating in post-SOX period than in pre-
SOX period. 
 
[Insert Table 30 here] 
 
In sum, the competitive effect and attention effect are at work when financial constraints 
are measured by cash flow sensitivity of investment. When annual payout ratio (debt rating) is 
used as the financial constraint measure, the competitive effect (attention effect) is more dominant 
as the channel of positive spillover. In addition, every column of Table 30 implies that sensitivity 
of financial constraints to frauds for intra-industry firms increases, or at best, stays the same in 
post-SOX period compared to pre-SOX period. It doesn’t support the reassessment effect story 
and hence negative spillover effect of frauds on intra-industry firms.   
3.3.3 Channels for Supplier and Customer Industry Spillover  
If a fraud arises and is detected or alleged, then the fraud firm’s management, operation, 
and production can be brought to a halt due to fraud investigation and litigation process. As a 
result, firms which are closely related to the fraud firm in the product market chain may need to 
suspend their production. Also, they will face increased uncertainty in the case that they need to 
replace their customer or supplier which is under fraud investigation. As a result, decline in cash 
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flows and imposition of searching costs and contracting costs will escalate their financial frictions 
even though the degree of information asymmetry or moral hazard problem stays the same within 
them; they need to borrow more. Unfortunately, I cannot find a proper observable measure to test 
this hypothesis even if this mechanism can be an instant explanation of negative spillover on 
supplier or customer firms’ financial constraints. 
On the other hand, there is a more direct channel through which spillover regarding 
financial constraints on supplier and customer industry firms is conveyed; the idea is that, if the 
fraud firm is in adverse selection due to its fraud investigation, then supplier firms which have 
provided trade credits may find it hard to collect the trade credits at the right time. Thereby, the 
supplier firms will face more financial frictions than before and hence experience negative 
spillover outcome. On the other hand, it is not certain whether customer firms which have been 
provided with trade credits from the fraud firm will face negative or positive spillover effect from 
fraud. All else equal, customers which have depended on the fraud firm’s provision of trade credits 
may delay their repayment if the fraud firm suspends its operation and management, and which 
will alleviate their financial constraints for a while. Whereas, if a large amount of settlement money 
is imposed on the fraud firm and it urges the customer firms to reimburse the trade credits, then 
the customer firms should hasten the repayment unexpectedly. Then, their financial constraints 
would be aggravated.  
To proxy for trade credit usage, I assign 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  to be the ratio of accounts 
payable over total assets following Fisman and Love (2003) for top customer industry firms. 
Similarly, I assign 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 to be the ratio of accounts receivable over total assets for 
top supplier industry firms. Table 31 reports the regression results when interactions between 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and variables. In column (1) and (2), 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 
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shows significantly positive coefficients, and which denotes that top supplier firms’ financial 
constraints increase more steeply as their trade credit increases. On the other hand, 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 shows significantly negative coefficients, and which means 
that top customer firms with high trade credit usage face less increase in financial constraints. 
Column (5) shows significantly negative coefficient of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, and thus, 
top customer firms with high trade credit usage experience less downgrade in their debt ratings.  
 
[Insert Table 31 here] 
 
Overall, Table 31’s results support that trade credit can be a linkage through which 
spillover regarding financial constraints can arise in top supplier and top customer industry firms.  
3.4 Robustness Test 
In this section, I implement three types of additional tests for the robustness of the main 
results.  
3.4.1 Placebo Test: Matched Sample Analysis 
While the main result in Table 27 demonstrates the negative (positive) spillover effect on 
intra-industry firms (top supplier and top customer industry firms) regarding financial constraints, 
it is not certain whether the spillover effects would have appeared even if the firms had not been 
in the intra-industry (top supplier and top customer industry) of the fraud firm. However, change 
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in financial constraints of firms which were not in the intra-industry (top supplier and top customer 
industry) but similar to the intra-industry firms (top supplier and top customer industry firms) is 
observable, and, estimating the regression using the “matched” sample can provide a placebo test 
whether some other factors that are not controlled in the main regression drive the main results. 
To perform this placebo test, I match each sample observation with other observations having total 
assets between 70% and 130% of its total assets in each year among observations which are not 
“treated” (i.e., observations for which frauds don’t occur in intra-industry, supplier industry, and 
customer industry). Next, the observation having the closest market-to-book ratio is defined as the 
matched sample. The firm control variables for the matched sample are also obtained from 
Compustat. For the placebo test, I replicate the regression using the matched sample as if the 
matched firms were “treated”. 
 
[Insert Table 31 here] 
 
Table 31 presents the result of the main regression when the matched sample is used 
instead, and, the estimates are in sharp contrast to those for the treated firms. The positive spillover 
effect on intra-industry firms and negative spillover effect on top supplier and top customer 
industry firms are not observed in the regression; if any, FraudBottom  shows a significantly 
positive coefficient in column (5), but which is not present in Table 2. Overall, the placebo test 
implies that the matched sample doesn’t experience the spillover effect as the original sample, and 
hence, the main results are not driven by some other unobservable factors.  
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3.4.2 IV Estimation 
It is not much likely that individual firm’s investment-capital ratio, payout ratios, and debt 
rating can affect the occurrence of a fraud within intra-industry, supplier industry, or customer 
industry, but I also mitigate the possible endogeneity issue by employing IV estimation; for 
example, it can be argued that peer firms’ aggressive investment or payout policy might motivate 
a firm in the same industry to commit fraud. Alternatively, it could be claimed that downgrade in 
supplier firm’s debt rating might make its customer firm unstable and hence to engage in frauds.  
To construct instrumental variables for 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥, 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, and 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, I take 
advantage of finding in Gande and Lewis (2009) that the number of lawsuits within the same 
industry has an explanatory power for the propensity to be sued. For each firm-year observation, I 
calculate the number of lawsuits over the year before the last year which may have an explanatory 
power for fraud occurrence in the last year within the same industry. Here, I don’t restrict the 
lawsuits by the settlement cutoff (i.e., $2 million) because it is likely that small lawsuits affect the 
detection rates of frauds in the next year but don’t influence the individual firm policy.65 This 
variable is denoted as 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥  and is used as the instrumental variable for 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥. Similarly, the number of lawsuits over the year before the last year in the customer 
(supplier) industry is defined to be 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 (𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)  and is used as 
the instrumental variable for 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 (𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). Accordingly, the instrumental variables 
are interacted with firm control variables which are interacted with 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥, 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, and 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, respectively.  
 
65 This is the necessary condition for using the number of previous lawsuits as a valid instrumental variable.  
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Table 8 presents the IV estimation results for main regression specification.66 
 
[Insert Table 32 here] 
3.4.3 Potential Issue about Industries Closely Related to Frauds 
It is plausible that firms in some specific industries could drive the spillover effect reported 
in the regression results in the previous sections. More specifically, if there is an industry where 
fraud occurs frequently and the firms in that industry conventionally maintain low financial 
constraints compared to firms in other industries, then the positive intra-industry spillover effect 
could be driven by those firms. Alternatively, if there is an industry whose customer industry 
commits frauds frequently and the firms in that industry conventionally have high financial 
constraints compared to firms in other industries, then the negative spillover effect on top supplier 
and top customer industries could be nonexistent in reality.  
To check this possibility, I observe four sectors where frauds occur most frequently 
(Technology, Services, Financial, Healthcare) and four industries which take the most portion of 
frauds occurrence in their own sector (Semiconductor, Telecommunication, Insurance, 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing). Next, I construct indicator variables for each of the four industries 
(“Semi”, “Tele”, “Ins”, “Phar”) and interaction variables between those indicators and main firm 
variables. In addition, I define an indicator variable, FreqTop(FreqBottom) for industries which 
 
66  Specifications with respect to change in long- or short-term debt rating are estimated through ordered logit 
regression in the main result, and, IV estimation is impossible in this case. 
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are top customer (supplier) industries of “Semi”, “Tele”, “Ins”, and “Phar” so as to identify 
customer (supplier) industries which face frauds frequently from their supplier (customer) 
industry. Accordingly, their interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾
 are defined. 
 
[Insert Table 33 here] 
 
Table 33 shows the regression results when the above newly constructed indicator variables 
for the four industries (and their interactions with firm variables) and their top supplier or top 
customer industries are included. The coefficients of variables of interest have similar magnitude 
(and the same sign) as the coefficients in Table 27, and which implies that the above possibility 
attributable to industries which are closed related to frauds either industry-wise or product market 
network-wise is not persuasive.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates spillover effect of corporate frauds on financial constraints of intra-
industry, top supplier industry, and top customer industry firms. Using cash flow sensitivity of 
investment, annual payout ratios, and Standard & Poor’s debt rating as the measures for financial 
constraints, I examine how frauds affect other firms’ financial constraints. As a result, I find that 
intra-industry firms receive positive spillover effect (i.e., decrease in financial constraints), and, 
firms in top-supplier or top-customer industries receive negative spillover effect (i.e., increase in 
financial constraints) from frauds. As possible channels through which intra-industry firms 
experience positive spillover effect, I find that competitive effect and attention effect are at work. 
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Whereas, I observe that different trade credit usage leads to more (less) negative spillover effect 
on top-supplier (top-customer) firms. These results have implications for the literature regarding 
spillover effect of corporate frauds on different firms. Also, I believe consideration about 
characteristics of securities class action lawsuits (e.g., type of frauds, time to settle cases, amount 




















Table 1: Summary statistics 
Summary statistics are reported for the sample of 12,737 observations in the intersection of Compustat, 
CRSP, and 10-K database for the period of 2003-2018. First, firms in Compustat and CRSP are excluded if (i) they 
are financials (SIC code 6000-6999) or utilities (SIC code 4900-4949), (ii) they have a book value of equity less than 
$250,000, or (iii) they have asset value less than $500,000. After the screening procedure, firm-year observations with 
the fiscal year in 1997-2018 are included because the electronic filing on Edgar has been required since 1997. Next, 
firms whose 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 can be estimated are only included in the final sample. Variable definitions are described in 
Appendix A Table A1. Panel A reports firm characteristics of the sample and Compustat-CRSP firms which meet the 
same screening condition as the sample but whose agility cannot be estimated. The last column shows the difference 
between the sample and Compustat-CRSP firms. Panel B reports firm characteristics of quintile groups of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 
The last column shows the difference between Q1 (lowest 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) firms and Q5 (highest 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) firms. The symbol 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance for two-tailed t-tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Comparison between sample and Compustat-CRSP firms 
 Sample Compustat-CRSP Compustat-CRSP – Sample (t) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.193 0.231 0.039*** (18.166) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  0.201 0.187 -0.013*** (-7.483) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.418 0.282 -0.136*** (-29.067) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  6.534 5.359 -1.175*** (-58.626) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  2.196 2.985 0.789* (2.025) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.126 -1.316 -1.442*** (-4.099) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  0.078 -0.039 -0.118*** (-50.151) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.248 0.305 0.057*** (24.753) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.047 0.054 0.007*** (7.152) 
Observations 12,712 78,075  
 
Panel B: Comparison between quintile groups of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 – Q5 (t) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.183 0.187 0.196 0.194 0.204 -0.021*** (-3.515) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  0.208 0.200 0.197 0.206 0.191 0.017** (3.222) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.440 0.429 0.405 0.405 0.410 0.030* (2.166) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  6.627 6.583 6.504 6.505 6.451 0.176** (3.086) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  2.880 1.926 2.332 1.925 1.922 0.957 (0.912) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -0.532 0.762 -0.640 0.535 0.498 -1.030 (-0.753) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  0.086 0.084 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.013* (2.526) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.262 0.258 0.252 0.239 0.227 0.035*** (5.607) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.043 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.051 -0.008** (-2.825) 









Table 2: Summary statistics of text-based variables 
Summary statistics of text-based variables (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) are 
reported for the sample of 12,737 observations in the intersection of Compustat, CRSP, and 10-K database for the 
period of 2003-2018. Variable definitions are described in equation (1), (2), and (3). Panel A displays the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables when computed using a 5% threshold and local 
dictionary. Panel B displays the mean of the variables when permutations on the threshold level and dictionary version 
are allowed (e.g., 25% threshold with the main dictionary).  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
 Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.000014 0.000036 -0.001156 0.000299 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.000015 0.000035 -0.001213 0.000378 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 -0.048937 0.991680 -17.993642 20.252276 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.191198 1.281941 -10.197084 3.008267 
Observations 12,737 
 
Panel B: Permutation on dictionary version and threshold level  
 
Dictionary   Local     Main   
Threshold Level 5% 10% 25% 5% 10% 25% 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.000014 -0.000022 -0.000046 -0.000006 -0.000010 -0.000021 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.000015 -0.000025 -0.000033 -0.000006 -0.000012 -0.000015 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 -0.048937 -0.070594 -0.059434 -0.070541 -0.069160 -0.102622 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.191198 -1.143087 -1.010108 -1.227146 -1.154815 -1.053783 














Table 3: Product assimilation vs. Product deviation 
This table examines how firm choices between product assimilation and product deviation depend on threats 
of rivals as well as their interaction with firm status. The firm status variables are 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ, 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and industry 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼, and, are as defined in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent 
variable is 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. All specifications are estimated via OLS with year, firm, and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.026 -0.257*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.041 
 (0.263) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.108) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⅹ 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 -0.302** 0.013*** 0.015*** -0.533*** -0.531** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.154) (0.000) (0.235) (0.117) (0.016) 
Constant -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.751) (0.083) (0.397) (0.678) (0.751) 
      
Observations 12,736 12,736 12,584 12,736 12,736 
R-squared 0.254 0.255 0.254 0.253 0.253 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y 














Table 4: Persistence test 
This table reports the mean persistence of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure. Each row of Panel A displays the proportion of 
firms in the corresponding 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t, which remain in the same 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t+1, t+2, …, 
t+5. Each row of Panel B shows the migration rates of firms in the corresponding 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t to each of 
the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles in year t+1.  
 
Panel A: 5-year follow-up of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles 
 
Quintile 
(in year 𝐴𝐴) 
Proportion of firms remaining in the same quintile (as of year 𝐴𝐴) in year 
𝐴𝐴 + 1 𝐴𝐴 + 2 𝐴𝐴 + 3 𝐴𝐴 + 4 𝐴𝐴 + 5 
1 0.409 0.300 0.247 0.201 0.191 
2 0.356 0.268 0.235 0.212 0.204 
3 0.346 0.228 0.177 0.180 0.197 
4 0.383 0.273 0.229 0.211 0.193 
5 0.558 0.414 0.318 0.273 0.225 
 
Panel B: Year-to-year follow-up of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles 
 
Quintile 
(in year 𝐴𝐴) 
Proportion of firms migrating in year 𝐴𝐴 + 1 to Quintile 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.409 0.257 0.161 0.106 0.067 
2 0.260 0.356 0.193 0.119 0.072 
3 0.166 0.183 0.346 0.197 0.108 
4 0.103 0.121 0.198 0.383 0.196 













Table 5: Firm-level agility 
This table reports firms that score in the highest 30 according to their 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for the 1st half sample period 
(the year 2003-2010) and 2nd half sample period (the year 2011-2018) separately. Column 1 (2) includes the list of 
top 30 firms in the first (second) 8-year period based on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010] (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018]), and which is computed 
as a firm’s average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 only when it has at least 4 non-missing 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values in the period. Column 3 includes 
the list of top 30 firms based on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018]) - 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010]. The firms on each list are in alphabetical order.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010] 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018] 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2011,2018] - 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2010] 
ADOBE INC AKORN INC ASGN INC 
ASTRONICS CORP ASGN INC BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP INC 
ATRION CORP BED BATH & BEYOND INC BOOKING HOLDINGS INC 
BED BATH & BEYOND INC BEL FUSE INC BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 
BEL FUSE INC CEB INC CDI CORP 
CARMAX INC CELGENE CORP CHEESECAKE FACTORY INC 
CEB INC CMTSU LIQUIDATION INC CONSTELLATION BRANDS 
CELGENE CORP COTT CORP QUE COTT CORP QUE 
CMTSU LIQUIDATION INC CSS INDUSTRIES INC CSS INDUSTRIES INC 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INC FARO TECHNOLOGIES INC CYBEROPTICS CORP 
DATALINK CORP FTI CONSULTING INC CYTEC INDUSTRIES INC 
DOVER MOTORSPORTS INC GAIA INC DST SYSTEMS INC 
EXXON MOBIL CORP GENVEC INC ENDOLOGIX INC 
FUEL TECH INC GERON CORP FASTENAL CO 
GIBRALTAR INDUSTRIES INC GRAY TELEVISION INC FTI CONSULTING INC 
GLATFELTER HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTIC GENTEX CORP 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC INNODATA INC GRAHAM HOLDINGS CO 
INSIGNIA SYSTEMS INC INTEGER HOLDINGS CORP GRAY TELEVISION INC 
INTEGER HOLDINGS CORP INTRICON CORP HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTIC 
INTRICON CORP JOE'S JEANS INC INNOSPEC INC 
JOE'S JEANS INC KAMAN CORP INTEGRATED DEVICE TECH INC 
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC LIFETIME BRANDS INC INTEST CORP 
NEUROCRINE BIOSCIENCES INC MCKESSON CORP KFORCE INC 
SEACOR HOLDINGS INC PREMIERE GLOBAL SERVICES INC KINDRED HEALTHCARE INC 
SHIRE PLC REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS PEPSICO INC 
SNYDERS-LANCE INC REPROS THERAPEUTICS INC SPRINT CORP 
THESTREET INC STEPAN CO STEPAN CO 
TTEC HOLDINGS INC TELECOMMUNICATION SYS INC TOOTSIE ROLL INDUSTRIES INC 
WEIS MARKETS INC VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC TRIMBLE INC 




Table 6: Industry-level agility 
This table reports the fifteen most and fifteen least agile industries in SIC 2-digit level for the sample period 
of 2003 to 2018. Column 1 (2) includes the list of top (bottom) 15 industries with their time series average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
values (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2018]). Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services (49) contains firms with SIC 2-digit codes of 49 except 
firms with SIC codes 4900-4949.  
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Most agile  Least agile 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2018]  Industry (SIC 2) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����������[2003,2018]  Industry (SIC 2) 
-0.734 Apparel & Accessory Stores 
(56) 
-1.490 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 
(32) 
-0.923 Furniture & Homefurnishings 
Stores (57) 
-1.472 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary 
Services (49) 
-0.940 General Merchandise Stores 
(53) 
-1.347 Automative Dealers & Service 
Stations (55) 
-0.996 Engineering & Management 
Services (87) 
-1.345 Primary Metal Industries (33) 
-1.041 Apparel & Other Textile 
Products (23) 
-1.345 Oil & Gas Extraction (13) 
-1.062 Wholesale Trade – Nondurable 
Goods (51) 
-1.336 Heavy Construction, Except 
Building (16) 
-1.080 Business Services (73) -1.322 Miscellaneous Retail (59) 
-1.088 Eating & Drinking Places (58) -1.318 Rubber & Miscellaneous 
Plastics Products (30) 
-1.099 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Industries (39) 
-1.286 Transportation Equipment (37) 
-1.119 Chemical & Allied Products 
(28) 
-1.283 Printing & Publishing (27) 
-1.130 Furniture & Fixtures (25) -1.257 Fabricated Metal Products (34) 
-1.157 Food & Kindred Products (20) -1.256 Health Services (80) 
-1.160 Transportation by Air (45) -1.227 Communications (48) 
-1.170 Electronic & Other Electric 
Equipment (36) 
-1.221 Instruments & Related 
Products (38) 











Table 7: Investigation of pharmaceutical industry 
This table examines how 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 of firms in the pharmaceutical industry is associated with the FDA’s new 
drug approval time and rates. 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) and 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹) are the median total 
approval times of priority and standard drugs, respectively, obtained from New Drug Application (NDA) and Biologic 
License Application (BLA) approval times for the period from 1993-2015. 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 is the approval rates for 
CDER NME NDA and BLA applications for the period from 1993-2015. The dependent variable is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. All 
specifications are estimated via OLS with year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. I report 
p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 (𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹)
  324.536** 111.441**  
 (0.045) (0.024)  
1
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹)
    117.307** 
   (0.024) 
𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶  10.728*** 10.102** 5.875*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) 
Constant -53.335** -26.017** -14.295** 
 (0.029) (0.018) (0.023) 
    
Observations 849 691 691 
R-squared 0.477 0.550 0.550 
Firm Controls N Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 













Table 8: Agility and product market performance 
This table investigates the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance. The independent variables are 
measured at year t and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variable of Columns 1 
and 2 is market share growth in year t+1. The dependent variables of Columns 3 and 4 are market share growth in 
year t+3 and t+5, respectively. All specifications are estimated via OLS with year, firm, and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.083** 0.070* 0.095* 0.050 
 (0.040) (0.079) (0.055) (0.418) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   -0.713 1.076 2.451** 
  (0.256) (0.184) (0.023) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼   -0.960 -0.505 0.103 
  (0.178) (0.516) (0.929) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼   0.057 0.304 0.264 
  (0.750) (0.127) (0.315) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼   0.028 0.026 -0.069 
  (0.219) (0.698) (0.547) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼   -0.327 -0.776*** -0.103 
  (0.104) (0.001) (0.781) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼   -0.081*** -0.055* -0.236*** 
  (0.003) (0.062) (0.000) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀   -0.012 -0.050 -0.409** 
  (0.894) (0.600) (0.016) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴   -2.304*** -1.147 4.247* 
  (0.003) (0.270) (0.059) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   -1.709 -0.496 -0.394 
  (0.144) (0.753) (0.865) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   -1.728 0.798 10.092*** 
  (0.428) (0.789) (0.008) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  -1.142** 1.993 3.470** 2.069 
 (0.013) (0.135) (0.027) (0.419) 
     
Observations 11,246 10,885 8,310 5,768 
R-squared 0.348 0.348 0.429 0.433 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 






Table 9: Agility and firm survival 
This table examines the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on firm survival likelihood. 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in year t is in the top (bottom) quintile within the same industry-
year. All other independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table 
A1. The dependent variables in Column 1, 2, and 3 (4, 5, and 6) are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted 
from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. Specifications are estimated via logit (linear probability) models 
with year and industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3 (4, 5, and 6). I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Logit   LPM  
 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.129 -0.121* -0.118* -0.003 -0.005 -0.013* 
 (0.205) (0.062) (0.057) (0.507) (0.492) (0.076) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.121 0.048 -0.106 0.003 0.014* -0.004 
 (0.334) (0.559) (0.201) (0.648) (0.095) (0.700) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.559** -0.524*** 0.202 -0.060** -0.138*** 0.045 
 (0.047) (0.004) (0.259) (0.016) (0.000) (0.223) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  1.525*** 1.808*** 1.653*** 0.104*** 0.226*** 0.160*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -0.406*** -0.456*** -0.494*** 0.001 -0.021* -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.885) (0.078) (0.136) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -0.006 -0.013** -0.005 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.116) (0.015) (0.306) (0.000) (0.476) (0.043) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  -0.186*** -0.194*** -0.179*** -0.048*** -0.084*** -0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 0.015*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 
 (0.355) (0.345) (0.397) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  -0.011 -0.015** -0.254*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.007* 
 (0.201) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.633) (0.084) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -0.489 -0.513** -0.427* -0.061** -0.151*** -0.104** 
 (0.122) (0.027) (0.078) (0.018) (0.000) (0.010) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.418 -0.655*** -0.795*** -0.059 -0.045 -0.009 
 (0.205) (0.003) (0.000) (0.146) (0.416) (0.886) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.247 -0.424 -0.411 -0.098* -0.195** -0.356*** 
 (0.661) (0.280) (0.337) (0.089) (0.013) (0.000) 
       
Observations 10,971 10,403 8,428 12,289 11,084 8,927 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0415 0.0535 0.0638 0.432 0.687 0.803 
Firm FE N N N Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Table 10: Endogeneity 
This table addresses the potential endogeneity by using IV estimation in the sample of the pharmaceutical 
industry and difference-in-differences framework with industry-level regulation increases. Columns 1 and 2 report 
second stage OLS and probit models based on the IV approach, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 display OLS and probit 
models in difference-in-differences estimation, respectively. The independent variables are measured at year t and the 
definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are market 
share growth and an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, respectively. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 
is dropped automatically because of the collinearity in Column 2. Columns 1 and 2 do not include industry fixed 
effects since only pharmaceutical industry is used as the sample. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV (Second Stage) Diff-in-Diff 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹)  1.298*** -0.509*   
 (0.000) (0.074)   
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴    0.076 0.027 
   (0.107) (0.484) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 × 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽    0.176* -0.198* 
   (0.085) (0.081) 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽    0.249 -0.142 
   (0.131) (0.547) 
Observations 604 590 8,998 9,111 
R-squared 0.921  0.371  
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 









Table 11: Benefits of agility 
This table explores the benefits of agility. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼 , 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 , and their interactions with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  are 
included as well as other firm control variables (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 , 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 , 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ). The 
independent variables are measured at year t (except Tariff Cut), and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. Tariff Cut is measured as of year t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 in Column 7, 8, and 9, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 1, 2, and 3 are 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in year t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. The dependent 
variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  in year t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 7, 8, and 9 are 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ in year t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. All specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed effects and firm control 
variables. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 




















𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴. 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴. 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+2 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴. 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.071* -0.006 0.094* 
 (0.440) (0.176) (0.504) (0.492) (0.855) (0.968) (0.075) (0.900) (0.057) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⅹ
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   0.144*** 0.137*** 0.126** 
      
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.031)       
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.318** 0.213 0.297       
 (0.026) (0.295) (0.209)       
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⅹ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼     0.021 0.023** 0.009    
    (0.157) (0.032) (0.490)    
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼     0.006 0.003 -0.005    
    (0.626) (0.752) (0.646)    
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ⅹ 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴        1.963*** 1.196*** 1.177* 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴        3.877*** 2.025*** 1.758 
       (0.000) (0.001) (0.178) 
Observations 11,001 9,855 8,408 12,289 11,652 11,084 10,886 9,746 8,311 
R-squared 0.589 0.413 0.366 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.348 0.380 0.429 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 12: Agility and acquisition 
This table examines the association between the acquirer’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and the target’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. The target firm 
in the latest acquisition attempt within five years (year t+1, t+2,…, t+5) is collected for each sample firm in year t. 
Within the intersection of the sample and SDC database, observations with non-missing 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  values of both 
acquirer and target are used for the estimation. The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions 
are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variable in Column 1 is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 of the target in the year of the 
acquisition attempt. The dependent variable in Column 2 is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  of the target in the preceding year of the 
acquisition attempt. All specifications are estimated via OLS with year fixed effects. I report p-values in parentheses. 
The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴′𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴′𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.421** -0.818*** 
 (0.014) (0.003) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.879 -4.346 
 (0.506) (0.246) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  0.427 -1.965 
 (0.749) (0.514) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.365 0.129 
 (0.431) (0.878) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -0.384 0.081 
 (0.312) (0.855) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  0.061 0.140 
 (0.516) (0.467) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.116 -0.108 
 (0.190) (0.211) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  0.708** 0.860* 
 (0.021) (0.085) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -3.921 -13.974 
 (0.468) (0.139) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.812 2.210 
 (0.527) (0.207) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  3.818 9.451 
 (0.285) (0.196) 
Constant -2.423* -2.846 
 (0.084) (0.142) 
   
Observations 55 48 
R-squared 0.484 0.532 






Table 13: Costs of agility 
This table explores the costs of agility. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽 are included as well as other firm 
control variables (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 , 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 , 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 , 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴). The firm control variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. In 
Column 1, 2, and 3, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽 (𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s positive (negative) change 
in Agility (i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 – 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡) is 3 times greater than the median of positive (negative) changes in Agility in 
the same year, industry, and industry-year, respectively. The dependent variable, ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1, is the change in ROA 
from year t to t+1 (i.e., 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 – 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡). All specifications are estimated via OLS with firm, year, and industry fixed 
effects and firm control variables. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐽𝐽𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽  -0.012*** -0.011** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.660) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐽𝐽  -0.003 -0.003 0.007* 
 (0.410) (0.325) (0.088) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.161) (0.166) (0.162) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.152) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.152) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -0.729*** -0.729*** -0.728*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.067** -0.067** -0.068** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.091 -0.091 -0.090 
 (0.322) (0.321) (0.324) 
Constant 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Observations 9,863 9,863 9,863 
R-squared 0.471 0.471 0.470 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 




Table 14: Stock return predictability 
This table reports the average slopes (in percent) from Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for 
multiple holding period returns; 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, and annual returns. Excess returns from July of year t to 
June of year t+1 on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and a set of control variables in fiscal year ending in year t-1 except log (𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸) (measured 
at the end of June of year t), 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 (measured in the prior 11 months with a one-month gap), 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 
(measured in the prior month), 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (measured within the current month using daily returns and dollar trading 
volume), and 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹.𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 (measured in the prior 12 months with a one-month gap using daily returns). The definitions of 
the independent variables are described in Appendix A Table A1. The regressions only use stocks with lagged price 
greater than five dollars. The return data are from July of 2004 to December of 2020. Average R-squared is the average 
of the adjusted R-squared from the cross-sectional regressions. All specifications include industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are Newey-West adjusted, and I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴1 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴3 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴6 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴12 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.108*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.218 -0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (0.322) (0.596) (0.815) (0.970) 
log (𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸)  -0.077* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.066) (0.290) (0.484) (0.322) 
log (𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀)  0.323 0.005 0.009 0.008 
 (0.226) (0.333) (0.283) (0.591) 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚  -0.739* -0.021** -0.034** -0.037* 
 (0.057) (0.020) (0.023) (0.073) 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  -3.520*** -0.046*** -0.049** -0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) 
𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  2.230 0.114 0.244 0.565* 
 (0.553) (0.176) (0.133) (0.089) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  3.823** 0.100*** 0.198*** 0.224*** 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹.𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴  -15.305 -0.195 -0.281 -0.843 
 (0.234) (0.529) (0.600) (0.266) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼  6.882 0.052 0.158 0.339** 
 (0.236) (0.629) (0.252) (0.028) 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ  0.124 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.753) (0.921) (0.960) (0.715) 
Observations 96,944 96,944 96,944 96,945 
Average R-squared 0.423 0.426 0.432 0.432 







Table 15: Summary statistics 
Panel A Customer Supplier (3)  
Firm Variables 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹.𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊. 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹.𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊. 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 9.199 2.229 4.332 2.231 4.87*** (299.47) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 1.818 3.976 2.294 6.487 -0.48*** (-11.11) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 0.136 0.614 0.015 0.664 0.12*** (25.92) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 0.253 0.177 0.279 0.527 -0.03*** (-9.12) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.096 0.117 0.191 0.226 -0.10*** (-73.22) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.075 0.056 0.073 0.098 0.00* (2.17) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.046 0.067 0.080 0.234 -0.03*** (-26.48) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 2.314 2.593 0.446 0.996 1.87*** (132.78) 
Observations 39003  39003  78006  
 







𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹.𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊. 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹.𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊. 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 4.204 2.166 4.439 2.278 -0.24*** (-10.42) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 2.272 4.311 2.313 7.852 -0.04 (-0.60) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 0.011 0.809 0.018 0.514 -0.01 (-1.00) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 0.291 0.478 0.270 0.565 0.02*** (4.02) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.173 0.211 0.205 0.236 -0.03*** (-13.90) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.075 0.114 0.072 0.082 0.00** (3.24) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.067 0.245 0.090 0.224 -0.02*** (-9.58) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 0.334 0.854 0.539 1.091 -0.21*** (-20.88) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  
(%) 
4.206 5.171 4.236 4.876 -0.03 (-0.48) 












Table 16: Baseline regression 
This table shows results of OLS regressions examining the effect of customer’s innovation on supplier’s trade 
credit provision. The dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal 
customer at year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The main independent variable is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. All other independent variables are 
measured in year t at supplier’s level. Standard errors are clustered at customer-supplier pair level and reported in 
parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.122*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 -0.671*** -0.635*** -0.632*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  0.003 -0.008 -0.027 
 (0.424) (0.142) (0.527) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 1.159*** 0.220 -0.546 
 (0.000) (0.677) (0.393) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 -2.940*** -3.077*** -3.499*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 -0.111 0.011 -0.053 
 (0.631) (0.972) (0.875) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 -3.734*** -3.395*** -3.187*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 0.960 -0.011 -0.936 
 (0.284) (0.991) (0.461) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 6.978*** 6.960*** 7.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 19,042 13,973 10,450 
R-squared 0.206 0.210 0.228 
Year FE Y Y Y 




Table 17: Multiple fixed effects 
This table shows results of OLS regressions examining the effect of customer’s innovation on supplier’s trade credit provision with different combination 
of fixed effects. The dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal customer at year t+1. The main independent 
variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. All other firm control variables are measured in year t at supplier’s 
level. Year, supplier’s industry, customer’s industry, supplier’s industry-year, and customer’s industry-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at customer-supplier pair level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 
      
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.122*** 0.143*** 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 6.978*** 8.107*** 4.979*** 5.478*** 6.232*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 19,042 19,042 19,042 19,042 19,042 
R-squared 0.206 0.167 0.239 0.388 0.316 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y N N 
Supplier Industry FE Y N Y N Y 
Customer Industry FE N Y Y Y N 
Supplier Industry X Year FE N N N Y N 








Table 18: Holdup channel 
This table compares the OLS estimates of customer’s innovation between subgroups divided according to supplier’s asset specificity. The dependent 
variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal customer at year t+1 in every column. The main independent variable is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. All other independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. The 
sample is divided into low asset specificity and high asset specificity group using the median value of asset specificity. In each odd (even) column, firms with low 
(high) asset specificity are used in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at customer-supplier pair level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4 
VARIABLES Low High Low High Low High Low High 
         
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.036 0.157** 0.153*** 0.181*** 0.100*** 0.176*** 0.102*** 0.153*** 
 (0.262) (0.013) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 1.961** 4.937*** 6.641*** 5.795*** 3.720*** 1.671 4.832*** 4.650*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Observations 3,605 3,727 5,449 5,932 9,464 9,578 7,771 8,590 
R-squared 0.391 0.357 0.216 0.285 0.288 0.291 0.231 0.313 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 







Table 19: Demand channel 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of customer’s innovation on two customer-level variables: supplier’s sales to the 
customer and customer’s cost of goods sold. In column 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variable is supplier’s sales to the principal customer at year t+1, t+2, and t+3, 
respectively. In column 4, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is the ratio of principal customer’s cost of goods sold over its total assets at year t+1, t+2, and t+3, 
respectively. The main independent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. All other independent 
variables are measured in year t at customer’s level. Standard errors are clustered at customer level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  6.383 9.182 7.547 0.014 0.012 0.009 
 (0.408) (0.283) (0.420) (0.141) (0.280) (0.465) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 -179.135** -226.049** -243.517** 2.027*** 1.942*** 1.951*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 12,288 9,024 6,714 17,621 17,278 16,920 
R-squared 0.195 0.314 0.342 0.695 0.756 0.755 
Customer Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 









Table 20: Financing channel 
This table shows the OLS estimates of customer’s innovation and its interaction with customer’s financial variable on supplier’s trade credit provision. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal customer at year t+1 in column 1, 4, and 7. The same dependent 
variable is measured at year t+2 (t+3) in column 2, 5, and 8 (3, 6, and 9). The main independent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents 
of principal customer at year t. In column 1, 2, and 3, the main independent variable is interacted with the customer’s leverage in year t. In column 4, 5, and 6, the 
main independent variable is interacted with the customer’s cash to asset ratio in year t. In column 7, 8, and 9, the main independent variable is interacted with the 
customer’s payout ratio in year t. All other independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. Standard errors are clustered at customer-supplier pair 
level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 



















𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.115*** 0.145*** 0.172*** 0.118*** 0.125** 0.125** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.115** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.019) (0.034) (0.002) (0.006) (0.023) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.067 -0.015 -0.099       
× 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 (0.652) (0.923) (0.535)       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡     0.115 0.128 0.166    
× 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡    (0.537) (0.576) (0.535)    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡        -0.124 -0.041 0.518 
× 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡        (0.688) (0.911) (0.198) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 -0.586* -0.346 -0.270       
 (0.092) (0.307) (0.449)       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡    -0.536 -0.750 -1.234    
    (0.366) (0.339) (0.184)    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡        3.229*** 3.914*** 1.433 
       (0.005) (0.006) (0.368) 
Observations 18,948 13,923 10,414 18,970 13,937 10,424 18,980 13,944 10,429 
R-squared 0.240 0.247 0.268 0.239 0.247 0.268 0.240 0.248 0.269 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Customer Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 21: 2SLS regression 
This table shows the second stage estimates of customer’s innovation in 2SLS regressions. The dependent 
variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal customer at year t+1, t+2, and t+3 
in column 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The main independent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
patents of principal customer at year t. All other independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. In 
the first stage regression, monetary cost (i.e., average R&D expenditures per patent) and time cost (i.e., average 
duration from application filing to issue or grant of patent) of innovation measured at customer’s industry level are 
used as the instrumental variables for the main independent variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 











𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1  -0.065***    
 (0.010)    
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1  -0.319***    
 (0.000)    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡    -0.076 0.164 0.707** 
  (0.717) (0.477) (0.019) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   -0.699*** -0.637*** -0.643***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡    -0.001 -0.016*** -0.029  
 (0.802) (0.001) (0.305) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   1.005*** -0.649** -1.103***  
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.010) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   -1.512* -2.238** -1.801  
 (0.071) (0.022) (0.145) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.032 0.023 0.160  
 (0.843) (0.924) (0.647) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   -3.747*** -3.360*** -2.224***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   1.141*** -0.233 -0.926 
  (0.001) (0.649) (0.194) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴   3.314 1.140 -11.720 
  (0.431) (0.854) (0.132) 
Observations 4,057 7,983 5,680 4,057 
R-squared 0.600    
IV F-statistics 43.22    
Durbin’s p-value 0.063      
Overidentification p-value 0.639    
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y Y 





Table 22: Diff-in-diff regression 
This table shows the second stage estimates of customer’s innovation in diff-in-diff regressions. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable to its principal customer at year t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 in column 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The main independent variables are implied contract exception (IC), 
good faith exception (GF), and public policy exception (PP) measured at the state level where a customer’s headquarter 
is located. All other independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 0.440** 0.666*** 0.678** 
 (0.042) (0.009) (0.026) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 -0.136 0.159 0.068 
 (0.655) (0.664) (0.872) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 -0.219 -0.074 -0.003 
 (0.370) (0.784) (0.991) 
    
Observations 9,080 6,843 5,271 
R-squared 0.258 0.276 0.311 
Firm Controls Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y 














Table 23: Overlapping of technology space between customer and supplier 
This table shows the OLS estimates of customer’s innovation and its interaction with technological 
relatedness between customer and supplier. The dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable 
attributable to its principal customer at year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in column 1, 2, and 3 (4, 5, and 6), respectively. The 
main independent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. 
In column 1, 2, and 3, the main independent variable is interacted with an indicator variable which equals to 1 if a 
customer’s patent (issued in year t) cites any of its supplier’s patent (issued previously as of year t). In column 4, 5, 
and 6, the main independent variable is interacted with an indicator variable which equals to 1 if technology class of 
customer’s patent (issued in year t) overlaps with historical technology classes of supplier’s patents (issued previously 
as of year t). All other independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. Standard errors are clustered 
at customer-supplier pair level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.248*** 0.271*** 0.291*** 0.278*** 0.308*** 0.341*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  -0.190* -0.130 -0.131    
× 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 (0.065) (0.314) (0.374)    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡     -0.159** -0.185** -0.234** 
× 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡     (0.027) (0.032) (0.018) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 0.647 0.447 0.498    
 (0.259) (0.526) (0.541)    
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡     0.779** 1.071*** 1.421*** 
    (0.012) (0.005) (0.001) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 4.866*** 4.832*** 5.113*** 4.873*** 4.801*** 4.987*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Observations 11,464 8,530 6,380 11,464 8,530 6,380 
R-squared 0.259 0.260 0.274 0.259 0.261 0.275 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 









Table 24: Overlapping of technology space between customer and itself in the past 
This table shows the OLS estimates of customer’s innovation and its interaction with technological 
relatedness with itself in the past. The dependent variable is the proportion of supplier’s trade receivable attributable 
to its principal customer at year t+1, t+2, and t+3 in column 1, 2, and 3 (4, 5, and 6), respectively. The main independent 
variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. In column 1, 2, and 
3, the main independent variable is interacted with an indicator variable which equals to 1 if a customer’s patent 
(issued in year t) cites any of its patents (issued previously as of year t). In column 4, 5, and 6, the main independent 
variable is interacted with an indicator variable which equals to 1 if technology class of customer’s patent (issued in 
year t) overlaps with any of its historical technology classes of patents (issued previously as of year t). All other 
independent variables are measured in year t at supplier’s level. Standard errors are clustered at customer-supplier pair 
level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.374** 0.451*** 0.538*** 0.185*** 0.201*** 0.211*** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  -0.149 -0.196 -0.258    
× 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥 (0.317) (0.206) (0.197)    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡     0.060 0.079 0.084 
× 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥    (0.179) (0.132) (0.150) 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡Own 0.216 0.261 0.307    
 (0.408) (0.383) (0.387)    
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡Own    -0.206 -0.291 -0.085 
    (0.245) (0.154) (0.699) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 4.852*** 4.731*** 4.945*** 5.175*** 5.162*** 5.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 11,464 8,530 6,380 11,464 8,530 6,380 
R-squared 0.258 0.260 0.274 0.258 0.260 0.274 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Supplier Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Customer Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 25: Financial and investment decision of supplier 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of customer’s innovation on financial and investment decisions of supplier. In 
column 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variables are financial variables of supplier (cash to asset ratio, payout ratio, and leverage) in year t+1. In column 4, 5, and 6, the 
dependent variables are investment variables of supplier (R&D to asset ratio, logarithm of one plus the number of supplier’s patents, and logarithm of the ratio of 
the number of customer’s past patents cited by supplier’s patents over the number of supplier’s patents) in year t+1. The main independent variable is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of patents of principal customer at year t. All other independent variables are measured in year t at customer’s level. Standard 
errors are clustered at supplier level and reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




       
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 0.001 0.012** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.502) (0.214) (0.019) (0.000) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 0.014 -0.001 0.041 0.074*** -0.225 -0.059 
 (0.168) (0.785) (0.435) (0.001) (0.284) (0.758) 
       
Observations 26,072 26,078 26,040 16,560 27,931 27,931 
R-squared 0.751 0.053 0.418 0.214 0.362 0.282 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 





Table 26: Summary statistics 
 Intra-industry Top-supplier industry Top-customer industry Other industry 
Variable Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
Market-to-book 2.165 42.497 0.296 1.730 38.998 0.296 1.57 42.497 0.296 1.845 54.415 0.248 
Log(Assets) 5.868 11.043 -0.548 5.998 10.953 0.472 6.348 11.248 0.102 6.059 11.561 -2.187 
Leverage 0.220 3.346 0 0.253 2.530 0 0.288 3.722 0 0.250 4.771 0 
Sales Growth 0.333 14.069 -0.999 0.311 14.069 -0.999 0.239 14.069 -0.999 0.255 14.069 -1.000 






















Table 27: Overall spillover in financial constraints 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵) equals to 1 if fraud occurs in the supplier (customer) industry for which the firm is in the top-
customer (top-supplier) industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. I also include their interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 in 
column (1) and (2). Each model contains firm- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 







 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴  
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 
∆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.012* -0.002 0.001** 0.001* 0.160*** 0.083 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.038) (0.095) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.004*** -0.005***     
 (0.000) (0.001)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.018** 0.018 -0.001 -0.001 0.148*** 0.029 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.112) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.002*** -0.000     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.002 -0.010 0.001 0.001 0.059 0.275** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.130) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.007*** 0.009***     
 (0.001) (0.002)     
Inv
K 𝑡𝑡−1
 0.067***      
 (0.002)      
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1    0.055***   
    (0.002)   
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 -0.007*** -0.007***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡−1
   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt−1 0.052*** 0.013*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.034*** -0.030** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.014) 
Log(Assetst−1) -0.188*** -0.163*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.043*** 0.042** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) 
Leveraget−1 -0.207*** 0.016 -0.026*** -0.032*** 0.348*** 0.456*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.106) 
Sales Growtht−1 0.022*** -0.126*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.096*** -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.028) 
ROAt−1 0.072*** 0.104*** 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.658*** -0.483*** 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.052) (0.109) 
Aget -0.003 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 
R-squared 0.515 0.275 0.435 0.454   
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Table 28: Competitive effect as a channel for intra-industry spillover 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. I 
also include its interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ in column (1) and (2). Each model contains firm- and year-fixed 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 







 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
∆Long − term 
Bond Rating 
∆Short − term 
Bond Rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.009 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.196*** 0.069  





    
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
    
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ 
-0.002** -0.010*** 
    
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
    
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ 
  
0.003*** 0.002* 0.018 0.202    




     
 
(0.003) 
     
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 
   
0.056*** 
  





 -0.007*** -0.007*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) 





0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt−1 0.052*** 0.012*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.035*** -0.031**  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) 
Log(Assetst−1) -0.187*** -0.163*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.042*** 0.041**  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) 
Leveraget−1 -0.206*** 0.018 -0.026*** -0.032*** 0.356*** 0.463***  
(0.011) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.106) 
Sales Growtht−1 0.022*** -0.126*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.095*** -0.012  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.028) 
ROAt−1 0.072*** 0.105*** 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.650*** -0.474***  
(0.010) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.052) (0.110) 
Aget -0.003 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.024***  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 






Table 29: Attention effect vs. liquidity effect as a channel for intra-industry spillover 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. I 
also include its interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 and 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 in column (1) and (2). Each model contains firm- and 
year-fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 







 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
∆Long − term 
Bond Rating 
∆Short − term 
Bond Rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.160*** 0.010  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043) (0.107) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.004*** -0.006***      
(0.000) (0.001)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 0.002*** 0.002***     
× 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 (0.000) (0.001)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥   0.000 0.000 0.055* 0.147** 
× 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼   (0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.071) 
Inv
K 𝑡𝑡−1
 0.067***      
 
(0.002)      
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1    0.055***    
   (0.002)   
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 -0.007*** -0.007***     
 
(0.000) (0.000)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡−1
   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt−1 0.053*** 0.013*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.036*** -0.033**  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) 
Log(Assetst−1) -0.187*** -0.162*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.043*** 0.038**  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) 
Leveraget−1 -0.206*** 0.017 -0.026*** -0.032*** 0.360*** 0.470***  
(0.011) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.106) 
Sales Growtht−1 0.022*** -0.126*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.095*** -0.012  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.028) 
ROAt−1 0.072*** 0.104*** 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.650*** -0.473***  
(0.010) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.052) (0.109) 
Aget -0.003 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.024***  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 





Table 30: Comparison of possible channels for intra-industry spillover 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. I 
also include its interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 , 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ, and 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 in column (1) and (2). Each model contains 
firm- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Firm control variables such as market-to-book ratio and 












∆Long − term 
Bond Rating 
∆Short − term 
Bond Rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.014** -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.299*  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.065) (0.161) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.020*** -0.011***      
(0.001) (0.002)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ -0.004*** -0.010***      
(0.001) (0.002)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 0.001*** 0.001*     
× 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 (0.000) (0.001)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 0.020*** 0.010***     
× 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 (0.001) (0.002)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ   0.003** 0.002* -0.029 0.120  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.077) (0.187) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼   0.000 0.000 0.046 0.127*  
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.071) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶   0.002 0.001 0.267*** 0.430**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.073) (0.182) 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 










Table 31: Matched sample analysis 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6) using the matched sample instead of the original sample. 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the 
same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵) equals to 1 if fraud occurs in the 
supplier (customer) industry for which the firm is in the top-customer (top-supplier) industry, and 0 otherwise during 
last fiscal year. I also include their interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 in column (1) and (2). Each model contains firm- and year-
fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Firm control variables such as market-to-book ratio and ROA are included 


















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.016** 0.019 -0.001 -0.001 0.297*** 0.126  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.062) (0.149) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.002*** 0.001      
(0.001) (0.001)     
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × Trade CreditTop -0.009*** -0.013***      
(0.001) (0.002)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × Trade CreditTop   0.000 0.001 -0.194** -0.138  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.084) (0.204) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.001 -0.013 0.002* 0.002 0.025 0.153  
(0.009) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.076) (0.185) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.006*** 0.006***      




× Trade CreditBottom 
0.008*** 0.013***     
 
(0.002) (0.004)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 × Trade CreditBottom   -0.001 -0.001 0.120 0.261  
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.103) (0.247) 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 









Table 32: IV estimation 
This table shows IV estimates in column (1) through (4). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the 
same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵) equals to 1 if fraud occurs in the 
supplier (customer) industry for which the firm is in the top-customer (top-supplier) industry, and 0 otherwise during 
last fiscal year. I also include their interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 in column (1) and (2). The instrumental variables are 




model contains year-fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 







 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴  
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 0.111*** 0.093 0.012*** 0.007* 
 (0.038) (0.060) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.040*** -0.062***   
 (0.012) (0.018)   
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.076*** -0.085** -0.003* -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.084*** 0.112***   
 (0.017) (0.027)   
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.129*** 0.018 -0.004* -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.017*** 0.003   
 (0.006) (0.009)   
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 Y Y Y Y 












Table 33: Potential issue about industries closely related to frauds 
This table shows OLS estimates in column (1) through (4), and, ordered logit regression estimates in column 
(5) and (6). 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 equals to 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵) equals to 1 if fraud occurs in the supplier (customer) industry for which the firm is in the top-
customer (top-supplier) industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year. I also include their interactions with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 in 
column (1) and (2). In addition, indicator variables 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 , and 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  and their interaction with 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
 are 
included. Each model contains firm- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Firm control variables such 












∆Long − term 
Bond Rating 
∆Short − term 
Bond Rating 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.012** -0.002 0.001** 0.001* 0.171*** 0.138 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.039) (0.097) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 -0.004*** -0.005***     
 (0.000) (0.001)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.019** 0.017 -0.001 -0.001 0.137*** -0.040 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.117) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 0.002*** -0.001     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.002 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.053 0.278** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.131) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.009*** 0.011***      
(0.001) (0.002)     
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴   0.001 -0.001 0.072 -0.165  
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.074) (0.186) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 -0.005** -0.014***     
 
(0.002) (0.003)     
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼   0.004* 0.004** 0.372*** 0.632***  
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.078) (0.172) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 0.001 -0.005***     
 
(0.001) (0.001)     
Ins   -0.009 -0.009 -1.267* 0.050  
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.722) (2.358) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 -0.036** -0.005     
 
(0.017) (0.029)     
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼   0.000 -0.002 -0.159** -0.533***  
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.071) (0.176) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 0.003*** 0.004***     
 
(0.000) (0.001)     
FreqTop   0.001 0.001 -0.039 0.101 
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  (0.004) (0.004) (0.079) (0.193) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.028*** 0.062***      
(0.004) (0.007)     
FreqBottom   0.001 0.000 -0.078 -0.080  
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.169) (0.427) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝐾𝐾 𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.036*** 0.037***      
(0.008) (0.013)     
Firm controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 83,165 83,165 83,118 75,365 83,118 83,118 




Figure 1: Industry-wise agility 
These figures exhibit the time-series values of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in the industry level; Figure 1A plots yearly averages of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for the industries of software (SIC 
3-digit code 737), pharmaceutical (283), metal (331-339, 341-349), and oil and gas (131, 291-299) industries. Figure 1B plots yearly averages of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for the 
industries of household items (201-209, 231-239, 541-549, 561-566, 581) and non-household items (011-179, 351-359, 371-379). Figure 1C plots yearly averages 
of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for less regulated industry (231-239, 271-279, 391-399, 501-509, 511-519, 531, 539, 541-549, 551-559, 561-566, 571-573, 581, 591-599, 701-899) and 
more regulated industry (011-149, 211-214, 241, 261, 283, 311, 384, 385, 401-497, 801-809). Figure 1D plots yearly averages of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for high-Q industry and 
low-Q industry.  
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Figure 2: Investigatin of pharmaceutical industry 
These figures present the time series of average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA’s new drug approval rate, and new drug approval times. 
𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶  is the approval rates for CDER NME NDA and BLA applications for the period from 1993-2015.  𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼  (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)  and 
𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹) are the median total approval times of priority and standard drugs, respectively, obtained from New Drug Application (NDA) and 
Biologic License Application (BLA) approval times for the period from 1993-2015. Figure 2A shows the time trends of average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶. 
Figure 2B shows the time trends of average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and the inverse of 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴). The left vertical axis represents the average 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and the 
right vertical axis represents the 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶  (𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) ) in Figure 2A (2B). 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶  and 𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)  are 
separately plotted because they are on different scales and have differential time-series variations.  
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Figure 3: Local linear regression of agility (in year t) on firm variables (in year t-1) 
These figures present how 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (in year t) changes with firm flexibility measures (in year t-1). Firm 
flexibility measures are categorized into financial flexibility measures (Cash/AT, Leverage, Net Leverage, Long-term 
Bond Rating), governance flexibility measures (Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Duality, Short-term Investors 
(%)), and organizational flexibility measures (Firm Age, Firm Size, Number of Business Segments, Firm Herfindahl 
Index). I estimate a local linear regression of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (in year t) on each firm flexibility measures (in year t-1) with 
Gaussian kernel function and Silverman’s rule-of-thumb bandwidth choice. Vertical and horizontal axes represent 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  and firm flexibility variables, respectively. The black (green) line represents the local linear regression 
estimates (95% confidence interval).  
 

























































Figure 4: Agility dynamics after acquisitions 
This figure exhibits dynamics of the absolute difference between the acquirer’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and target’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
after their acquisition is completed in year t. The absolute deviation of the acquirer’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in t, t+1,…, t+5 from 
the target’s 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in t is observed for each acquirer-target pair. The solid (dotted) line represents the mean (median) 















Appendix A : First Essay 
Appendix Table A1: Variable definition 
Variable Description 
Firm characteristics (CRSP/Compustat/BoardEx/SDC/Thomson Reuters 13F) 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Total transaction values of acquisitions / Total Assets (AT) 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼  The number of non-executive directors / The number of entire 
directors 
𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  Logarithm of 1 plus the number of directors 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE) / Total Assets (AT) 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  1 if a CEO serves as the chairman in the same firm and 0 otherwise. 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  1 if Dividends Common/Ordinary (DVC) is available and 0 
otherwise. 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  The number of years a firm a firm appears on the Compustat tapes 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸  Sales concentration of business segments within a firm 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  Logarithm of Total Assets (AT) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  [Long-Term Debt (DLTT) + Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC)] / 
Total Assets (AT) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  Numerical transformation of long-term bond rating (SPLTICRM) 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ  Sales (SALE) growth minus industry (SIC2) average of Sales 
(SALE) growth in the same year  
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 (𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 − 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀)  [Total Liabilities (LT) – Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit 
(TXDITC) + Preferred Stock (defined below) + Common Shares 
Outstanding (CSHO) * Price Close (PRCC_F)] / Total Assets (AT) 
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  [Long-Term Debt (DLTT) + Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC) – 
Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE)] / Total Assets (AT) 
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶  The number of business segments in a firm 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀  Liquidating value (PSTKL) if available, else Redemption value 
(PSTKRV) if available, else Carrying value (PSTK). 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Research and Development Expense (XRD) / Total Assets (AT) if 
available, else 0. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  Operating Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) / Total Assets (AT) 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 (%)  Proportion of shares outstanding held by transient investors 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Net Property Plant and Equipment (PPENT) / Total Assets (AT) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  [1.2 * Working Capital (WCAP) + 1.4 * Retained Earnings (RE) + 
3.3 * Pretax Income (PI) + 0.999 * Sales (SALE)] / Total Assets 
(AT) 
Industry characteristics (Compustat/SDC) 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸)  Sales (SALE) concentration of firms within an industry 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼  Sum of transaction values of acquisitions in an industry / Sum of 
Total Assets (AT) in an industry 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  Sum of Research and Development Expense (XRD) in an industry / 
Sum of Total Assets (AT) in an industry 
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Appendix Table A2: Persistence test with “fictitious” 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 
This table reports the mean persistence of “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measure. “Fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is simulated 
1,000 times using the same parameters but with different values of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for 
the sample firms in the same period. Each row of Panel A displays the mean proportion of firms in the corresponding 
“fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t, which remain in the same “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t+1, t+2, …, t+5. 
Each row of Panel B shows the mean migration rates of firms in the corresponding “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in 
year t to each of the “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles in year t+1.  
 
Panel A: 5-year follow-up of “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles 
 
Quintile 
(in year 𝐴𝐴) 
Proportion of firms remaining in the same quantile (as of year 𝐴𝐴) in year 
𝐴𝐴 + 1 𝐴𝐴 + 2 𝐴𝐴 + 3 𝐴𝐴 + 4 𝐴𝐴 + 5 
1 0.404 0.283 0.235 0.212 0.199 
2 0.314 0.243 0.220 0.207 0.200 
3 0.308 0.229 0.209 0.202 0.200 
4 0.356 0.251 0.217 0.204 0.200 
5 0.544 0.376 0.284 0.231 0.200 
 
Panel B: Year-to-year follow-up of “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintiles 
 
Quintile 
(in year 𝐴𝐴) 
Proportion of firms migrating in year 𝐴𝐴 + 1 to Quintile 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.404 0.267 0.161 0.102 0.066 
2 0.265 0.314 0.217 0.127 0.076 
3 0.161 0.217 0.308 0.208 0.105 
4 0.101 0.127 0.208 0.356 0.208 





Appendix Table A3: Pairwise correlation matrix 
This table reports the pairwise correlation matrix between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and firm flexibility measures. Firm flexibility measures are categorized into financial 
flexibility measures (Cash/AT, Leverage, Net Leverage, Long-term Bond Rating), governance flexibility measures (Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Duality, 
Short-term Investors (%)), and organizational flexibility measures (Firm Age, Firm Size, Number of Business Segments, Firm Herfindahl Index). Variable 






















Agility 1.000             
Cash/AT 0.025*** 1.000            
Leverage -0.023*** -0.440*** 1.000           
Net Leverage -0.029*** -0.877*** 0.817*** 1.000          
Long-term Bond Rating 0.025* -0.111*** 0.447*** 0.387*** 1.000         
Board Size -0.008 -0.219*** 0.236*** 0.266*** -0.480*** 1.000        
Board Independence 0.011 -0.033*** 0.105*** 0.077*** -0.238*** 0.351*** 1.000       
CEO Duality -0.007 -0.093*** 0.043*** 0.083*** -0.109*** -0.002 -0.089*** 1.000      
Short-term Investors (%) -0.010 0.012 0.035*** 0.012 0.182*** 0.150*** 0.110*** 0.024*** 1.000     
Firm Age 0.004 -0.079*** 0.059*** 0.081*** -0.091*** 0.067*** 0.136*** -0.107*** -0.042*** 1.000    
Firm Size -0.031*** -0.369*** 0.406*** 0.453*** -0.633*** 0.631*** 0.287*** 0.106*** 0.247*** 0.211*** 1.000   
Number of Segments -0.015* -0.217*** 0.138*** 0.213*** -0.260*** 0.257*** 0.103*** 0.068*** 0.005 0.087*** 0.320*** 1.000  
Firm Herfindahl Index 0.010 0.228*** -0.134*** -0.218*** 0.225*** -0.250*** -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.006 -0.085*** -0.278*** -0.867*** 1.000 




Appendix Table A4: Extended estimation window 
This table reports the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood when 
firm-by-firm regression of (3) is estimated with a 10-year estimation window. The independent variables are measured 
at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 
are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are 
indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The 
specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications 
are estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed effects in Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in 
parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.064 0.107* 0.175*    
 (0.113) (0.068) (0.062)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.256** -0.128* -0.044 
    (0.023) (0.072) (0.536) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.068 -0.032 -0.018 
    (0.594) (0.714) (0.833) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.067 0.704 2.503** -0.630** -0.490** 0.153 
 (0.899) (0.354) (0.038) (0.041) (0.015) (0.446) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.305 -0.151 -0.918 1.480*** 1.793*** 1.694*** 
 (0.546) (0.842) (0.468) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.249 0.427* 0.221 -0.542*** -0.563*** -0.601*** 
 (0.156) (0.082) (0.541) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.033* 0.029 -0.128* -0.006 -0.012** -0.004 
 (0.093) (0.476) (0.063) (0.121) (0.014) (0.468) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  -0.637*** -0.962*** 0.474 -0.186*** -0.194*** -0.171*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.132*** -0.206*** -0.397*** -0.004 -0.016 -0.023 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.801) (0.225) (0.149) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  0.072 -0.100 -0.504*** -0.010 -0.015** -0.171*** 
 (0.172) (0.180) (0.000) (0.224) (0.022) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -2.990*** -1.481* 5.139*** -0.249 -0.290 -0.448* 
 (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.445) (0.224) (0.070) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.490 0.101 -0.010 -0.418 -0.780*** -0.614** 
 (0.576) (0.938) (0.997) (0.228) (0.001) (0.015) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -3.917*** -0.398 12.216*** 0.255 -0.690 -0.646 
 (0.002) (0.838) (0.000) (0.675) (0.102) (0.164) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  6.648*** 9.305*** 1.591    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.602)    
       
Observations 10,141 7,435 4,853 10,084 9,269 7,086 
R-squared 0.404 0.433 0.468    
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Appendix Table A5: Magnitude of competitive threats 
This table reports the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood when 
firm-by-firm regression of (3) is estimated after eliminating the observations with 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in the bottom 
quintile of the same year. The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in 
Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and 
t+5, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is 
delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and 
industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications are estimated via logit regressions with year and 
industry fixed effects in Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.036 0.134** 0.162*    
 (0.445) (0.049) (0.057)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.265 -0.241** -0.280*** 
    (0.108) (0.020) (0.005) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.086 0.136 -0.056 
    (0.721) (0.356) (0.712) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.174 0.199 1.327 0.053 0.394 1.029*** 
 (0.119) (0.857) (0.335) (0.914) (0.199) (0.001) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.570 -1.185 0.000 1.251** 1.294*** 1.470*** 
 (0.453) (0.286) (1.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.174 -0.005 0.261 -0.264 -0.361*** -0.437*** 
 (0.500) (0.990) (0.550) (0.163) (0.002) (0.000) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -0.037 0.031 -0.066 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.213) (0.672) (0.458) (0.866) (0.638) (0.610) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  -0.316 -0.607** 0.417 -0.176*** -0.141*** -0.123*** 
 (0.110) (0.037) (0.291) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.086*** -0.068 -0.356*** 0.042 0.035 0.034 
 (0.005) (0.119) (0.000) (0.255) (0.193) (0.277) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  -0.035 0.182* -0.336** -0.143** -0.255*** -0.337*** 
 (0.657) (0.098) (0.012) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -0.726 -1.931 5.120*** -0.026 -0.185 -0.499 
 (0.416) (0.147) (0.002) (0.966) (0.665) (0.253) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.060 -2.747 -1.533 0.240 -0.536 -0.868** 
 (0.438) (0.165) (0.561) (0.699) (0.201) (0.038) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -4.848** 2.905 12.670*** 1.670 0.697 -0.306 
 (0.026) (0.338) (0.001) (0.102) (0.327) (0.674) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  3.903* 3.692* 0.472    
 (0.066) (0.091) (0.863)    
       
Observations 4,639 3,536 2,492 3,888 3,960 3,276 
R-squared 0.453 0.464 0.509    
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Appendix Table A6: Reporting quality 
This table reports the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood when firms whose business descriptions are less likely 
to be informative are excluded. In Column 1 through 6, firms are excluded if they are younger than 5 years old or appear in the sample for the first time. In Column 
7 through 12, firms are excluded if their size is in top 20% of the sample. The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in 
Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 (Column 7, 8, and 9) are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The 
dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 (Column 10, 11, and 12) are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, 
respectively. The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3 (Column 7, 8, and 9). The specifications are 
estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed effects in Column 4, 5, and 6 (Column 10, 11, and 12). I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.088** 0.143*** 0.005    0.065* 0.097** 0.056    
 (0.022) (0.004) (0.930)    (0.073) (0.027) (0.317)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.203* -0.154** -0.086    -0.111 -0.115* -0.115* 
    (0.076) (0.039) (0.239)    (0.293) (0.092) (0.081) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.033 0.056 -0.089    -0.025 0.094 -0.053 
    (0.825) (0.570) (0.378)    (0.862) (0.311) (0.571) 
Observations 8,700 6,500 4,370 8,574 8,113 6,305 9,549 7,255 5,041 9,461 9,081 7,380 
R-squared 0.375 0.446 0.464    0.360 0.439 0.446    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Appendix Table A7: Product Differentiation vs. Assimilation 
This table investigates the effects of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+  and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+  on product market performance and firm 
survival likelihood. The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix 
A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, 
respectively. The dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted 
from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry 
fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications are estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed 
effects in Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+  0.064 0.117* 0.054    
 (0.175) (0.055) (0.428)    
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−  0.077 0.074 0.044    
 (0.104) (0.229) (0.586)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+     -0.157 -0.213** -0.203** 
    (0.251) (0.016) (0.016) 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−     -0.106 -0.048 -0.050 
    (0.398) (0.548) (0.514) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.121 0.049 -0.105 
    (0.333) (0.555) (0.204) 
Observations 10,886 8,311 5,769 10,971 10,403 8,428 
R-squared 0.348 0.429 0.433    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 












Appendix Table A8: Quasi-agility 
This table reports the effect of 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood. 
The estimation process of 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is identical to that of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 except that it replaces (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 by 
(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 in firm-by-firm regression of (3). In Panel A, the dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 
(Column 4, 5, and 6) are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. In Panel B, the dependent 
variables in Column 1, 2, and 3 (Column 4, 5, and 6) are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted from 
CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed 
effects in Panel A. The specifications are estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed effects in Panel 
B. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Market share growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 
𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.054* 0.057 -0.029 0.041 0.043 -0.041 
 (0.086) (0.135) (0.552) (0.213) (0.266) (0.410) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.060* 0.083* 0.059 
    (0.084) (0.050) (0.283) 
Observations 10,931 8,349 5,803 10,886 8,311 5,769 
R-squared 0.348 0.429 0.433 0.349 0.429 0.433 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Panel B: Survival likelihood 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 -0.082 -0.027 -0.108* -0.065 -0.007 -0.112* 
 (0.417) (0.671) (0.084) (0.536) (0.911) (0.083) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴-𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 0.149 0.062 0.036 0.136 0.054 0.039 
 (0.235) (0.460) (0.659) (0.279) (0.523) (0.636) 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.104 -0.116* -0.090 
    (0.319) (0.082) (0.159) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.110 0.045 -0.113 
    (0.380) (0.590) (0.173) 
Observations 11,015 10,500 8,518 10,971 10,403 8,428 
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 





Appendix Table A9: Residual agility 
This table reports the effect of 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  on product market performance and firm survival 
likelihood. Residual Agility is estimated as the residual from the regression of Agility in t on significant firm flexibility 
measures from each flexibility category (i.e., Net Leverage, Board Size, Firm Size, CAPEX/AT) in t-1 in each 
industry. The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. 
The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The 
dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of 
year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed effects in 
Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications are estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed effects in 
Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.049 0.106** 0.053    
 (0.248) (0.040) (0.425)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     -0.128 -0.108 -0.123* 
    (0.239) (0.117) (0.063) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴     0.093 0.086 -0.068 
    (0.488) (0.326) (0.439) 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -0.459 1.303 2.500** -0.425 -0.396** 0.298 
 (0.488) (0.137) (0.043) (0.155) (0.038) (0.116) 
𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.818 -0.726 0.067 1.534*** 1.855*** 1.648*** 
 (0.266) (0.379) (0.957) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.052 0.195 0.256 -0.426*** -0.484*** -0.528*** 
 (0.792) (0.342) (0.343) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  0.030 0.015 -0.061 -0.006 -0.011** -0.003 
 (0.205) (0.828) (0.606) (0.111) (0.028) (0.496) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  -0.304 -0.746*** -0.122 -0.155*** -0.174*** -0.157*** 
 (0.179) (0.003) (0.753) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼  -0.075** -0.049 -0.237*** -0.016 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.158) (0.000) (0.415) (0.436) (0.647) 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀  -0.004 -0.088 -0.392** -0.011 -0.014** -0.246*** 
 (0.970) (0.385) (0.029) (0.204) (0.040) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -2.788*** -1.040 4.334* -0.378 -0.528** -0.483* 
 (0.001) (0.341) (0.067) (0.259) (0.029) (0.057) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.871* 0.005 -0.194 -0.405 -0.504** -0.592** 
 (0.093) (0.998) (0.944) (0.252) (0.034) (0.015) 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  -1.969 0.520 9.907** 0.310 -0.464 -0.481 
 (0.403) (0.876) (0.023) (0.597) (0.254) (0.281) 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴  2.587 3.813** 1.472    
 (0.126) (0.023) (0.596)    
       
Observations 9,969 7,582 5,238 9,687 9,308 7,467 
R-squared 0.357 0.430 0.432    
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
 165 
Appendix Table A10: Manufacturing industry 
This table reports the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood using 
manufacturing industry firms. In Panel A, the regressions only include firms in SIC 2-digit between 20-39. In Panel 
B, the regressions only include firms in SIC 2-digit of 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, and 38. The independent variables 
are measured at year t, and the definitions are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 
1, 2, and 3 are market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 4, 5, 
and 6 are indicator variables equal to one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. 
The specifications are estimated via OLS with year and industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications 
are estimated via logit regressions with year and industry fixed effects in Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in 
parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Manufacturing industry (SIC 2-digit 20-39)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.103* 0.161** 0.145    
 (0.063) (0.022) (0.122)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      -0.148 -0.139 -0.233*** 
    (0.302) (0.125) (0.007) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      0.130 0.072 -0.158 
    (0.433) (0.509) (0.150) 
Observations 5,906 4,529 3,159 5,998 5,652 4,588 
R-squared 0.453 0.503 0.523    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Panel B: Low-Q manufacturing industry (SIC 2-digit 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.028 -0.020 -0.014    
 (0.411) (0.574) (0.375)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      -0.431* -0.128 -0.222 
    (0.067) (0.367) (0.101) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      -0.051 0.240 0.006 
    (0.845) (0.144) (0.971) 
Observations 2,599 2,026 1,447 2,510 2,420 2,019 
R-squared 0.319 0.402 0.404    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Appendix Table A11: Reasons for delisting 
This table compares the unconditional probabilities of delisting between 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
firms under different reasons for delisting. Each row displays the cumulative proportion of firms in the corresponding 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 quintile in year t (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), which are delisted in year t+1, t+2, …, t+5 for voluntary 
(CRSP DLSTCD 570 and 573), involuntary (CRSP DLSTCD 400 or above, excluding 570 and 573), and M&A (CRSP 
DLSTCD 200 – 399) reasons. Failed delisting aggregates these three types of delisting. 
 
Delisting type Agility (in 𝐴𝐴) 
Proportion of firms delisted 
𝐴𝐴 + 1 𝐴𝐴 + 2 𝐴𝐴 + 3 𝐴𝐴 + 4 𝐴𝐴 + 5 
Failed 
Low 6.05% 12.70% 17.83% 21.51% 24.80% 
High 4.73% 10.35% 15.22% 19.40% 22.64% 
Voluntary 
Low 0.20% 0.46% 0.46% 0.66% 0.79% 
High 0.12% 0.35% 0.52% 0.62% 0.80% 
Involuntary 
Low 1.45% 2.50% 3.88% 4.80% 5.72% 
High 1.12% 2.39% 3.71% 4.70% 5.67% 
M&A 
Low 4.41% 9.74% 13.49% 16.05% 18.29% 















Appendix Table A12: Homogeneous goods industry 
This table reports the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on product market performance and firm survival likelihood using 
manufacturing industry firms. In Panel A, the regressions only include firms in industries producing differentiated 
goods. In Panel B, the regressions only include firms in industries producing homogeneous goods. The industry-level 
product homogeneity follows from Rauch (1999). The independent variables are measured at year t, and the definitions 
are described in Appendix A Table A1. The dependent variables of Column 1, 2, and 3 are market share growth in 
year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The dependent variables in Column 4, 5, and 6 are indicator variables equal to 
one if a firm is delisted from CRSP as of year t+1, t+3, and t+5, respectively. The specifications are estimated via 
OLS with year and industry fixed effects in Column 1, 2, and 3. The specifications are estimated via logit regressions 
with year and industry fixed effects in Column 4, 5, and 6. I report p-values in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Differentiated goods industry 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.070* 0.116** 0.033    
 (0.079) (0.018) (0.511)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      -0.128 -0.116* -0.125* 
    (0.231) (0.088) (0.054) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      0.128 0.089 -0.073 
    (0.337) (0.309) (0.403) 
Observations 9,990 7,644 5,314 10,012 9,502 7,717 
R-squared 0.354 0.453 0.468    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Panel B: Homogeneous goods industry 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼    
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+3 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡+5 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+5 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  0.227 -0.052 0.064    
 (0.215) (0.842) (0.889)    
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      -0.187 -0.172 -0.008 
    (0.619) (0.491) (0.974) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴      0.158 -0.293 -0.584* 
    (0.677) (0.290) (0.052) 
Observations 896 667 455 874 872 692 
R-squared 0.488 0.509 0.567    
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Appendix Figure A1: Word cloud of PEPSICO INC, COCA-COLA CO, and competitors 
These figures present the word cloud changes of PEPSICO INC, COCA-COLA CO, and their competitors 
based on the word dictionaries created from 10-K business descriptions. Size of each word reflects the frequency of 
its usage in the document. Words that are infrequently used (i.e., appear less than five times) are excluded from the 
word cloud for visibility. Panel A shows the word cloud of competitors (MONSTER BEVERAGE CORP, 
NATIONAL BEVERAGE CORP, COTT CORP, CRYSTAL ROCK HOLDINGS INC, REEDS INC) in year 2003 
and 2010. Panel B and C show the word cloud of PEPSICO INC and COCA-COLA CO, respectively, in year 2011 
and 2018.  
 




















Appendix Figure A2: Local linear regression of firm variables (in year t+1) on agility (in year t) 
These figures present how firm flexibility measures (in year t+1) changes with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (in year t). Firm 
flexibility measures are categorized into financial flexibility measures (Cash/AT, Leverage, Net Leverage, Long-term 
Bond Rating), governance flexibility measures (Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Duality, Short-term Investors 
(%)), and organizational flexibility measures (Firm Age, Firm Size, Number of Business Segments, Firm Herfindahl 
Index). I estimate a local linear regression of each firm flexibility measures (in year t+1) on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (in year t) with 
Gaussian kernel function and Silverman’s rule-of-thumb bandwidth choice. Vertical and horizontal axes represent 
firm flexibility variables and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , respectively. The black (green) line represents the local linear regression 
estimates (95% confidence interval).  
 
 
























































































Appendix Figure A3: Falsification test 
These figures show falsification tests for the robustness of the main results. “Fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is simulated 1,000 times using the same parameters but 
with different values of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 for the sample firms in the same period. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is replaced by “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in the 
specifications of Tables 8 and 9. Next, the distribution of 1,000 coefficient estimates of “fictitious” 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in each specification is plotted as a histogram. The top 
(bottom) three histograms exhibit the distributions when the dependent variable is market share growth in year t+1, t+3, and t+5 (an indicator variable equal to one 





Appendix B : Second Essay 
Appendix Table B1: Robustness 
 
Panel A: Aggregated trade credit and patent 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.108** 0.130** 0.166*** 
 (0.041) (0.020) (0.004) 
Observations 26,192 24,305 22,518 
R-squared 0.393 0.369 0.353 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y 
 
Panel B: Aggregated trade credit and patent (weighted average) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.111 0.139* 0.181** 
 (0.121) (0.068) (0.021) 
Observations 26,190 24,304 22,518 
R-squared 0.393 0.368 0.353 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y 
 
Panel C: Principal Customer as the sole customer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.124*** 0.126*** 0.144*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 11,599 8,374 6,188 
R-squared 0.220 0.233 0.255 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y 
 
Panel D: Principal Customer with sales portion above 80% 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+2 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+3 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   0.426* 0.497 0.809* 
 (0.092) (0.173) (0.072) 
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Observations 490 330 222 
R-squared 0.595 0.674 0.760 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y 
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Appendix Table C1: Variable descriptions 
Variable Description 
Age Current fiscal year minus year in which a firm first appears in Compustat 
Cash/K Cash and Short-term Investments (CHE) / Beginning-of-period Capital 
(PPENT) 
∆(Cash/K) Change of Cash/K (defined above) from last fiscal year 
Inv/K Investment (CAPX) / Beginning-of-period Capital (PPENT) 
∆(Inv/K) Change of Inv/K (defined above) from last fiscal year 
CF/K Cash Flow (IB+DP) / Beginning-of-period Capital (PPENT) 
Payout Ratio Total Payout (DV+PRSTKC) / Total Assets (AT) 
Market-to-book (Liabilities(LT)-Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax 
Credit(TXDITC)+Preferred Stock(as defined below)) / (Liabilities(LT)-
Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit(TXDITC)+Preferred Stock(as 
defined below)+ 
Price Close(PRCC_F)*Common Shares Outstanding(CSHO)). 
Leverage (Long-term Debt (DLTT) + Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC)) / Total 
Assets (AT) 
ROA Operating Income before Depreciation (OIBDP) / Total Assets (AT) 
Sales Growth Sales (SALE) / Lagged Sales (SALE) - 1 
Log(Assets) Natural logarithm of Total Assets (AT) 
Analyst Coverage Natural logarithm of the number of analysts on I/B/E/S providing earnings 
forecasts 
Long-term Bond Rating Numerical transformation of long term credit ratings (SPLTICRM) as 
given in Appendix C 
Short-term Bond Rating Numerical transformation of short term credit ratings (SPSTICRM) as 
given in Appendix C 
FraudWithin Indicator variable: 1 if fraud occurs within the same industry, and 0 
otherwise during last fiscal year  
FraudTop Indicator variable: 1 if fraud occurs in the supplier industry for which the 
firm is in the Top-customer Industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal 
year 
FraudBottom Indicator variable: 1 if fraud occurs in the customer industry for which the 
firm is in the Top-supplier Industry, and 0 otherwise during last fiscal year 
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Appendix Table C2: Numerical transformation of bond rating 
Long-term  
Bond Rating (letter) 
Long-term  
Bond Rating (number) 
Short-term  
Bond Rating (letter) 
Short-term  
Bond Rating (number) 
AAA 1 A-1+ 1 
AA+ 2 A-1 2 
AA 3 A-2 3 
AA- 4 A-3 4 
A+ 5 B 5 
A 6 B-1 6 
A- 7 B-3 7 
BBB+ 8 C 8 
BBB 9 D 9 
BBB- 10   
BB+ 11   
BB 12   
BB- 13   
B+ 14   
B 15   
B- 16   
CCC+ 17   
CCC 18   
CCC- 19   
CC 20   
C 21   
D 22   
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